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OBITUARY

ERNST SIMMEL: 1882–1947

Another member of the early, great generation of psycho-analysts has passed away in Los Angeles, California. On November 11, 1947, Ernst Simmel died of a coronary occlusion.

He was only sixty-five years old. His friends had earnestly hoped that his span of life might have been prolonged to permit him to complete the several undertakings in research and institutional work he had charted, and to enjoy an old age free from worry about the exigencies of daily life. In addition to the physical suffering caused by his heart ailment, adversity made his last few years increasingly bitter. These undeserved trials sprang, ironically, from Simmel's idealistic and trusting character.

Nowhere has Ernst Simmel, the man, been more appositely described than in the paper read by Frances Deri at the Memorial Meeting[1] in Los Angeles, California, on December 13, 1947. She pointed out that Simmel was possessed of personality qualities that made him more than an average man, traits that raised him to eminence among analysts, to the status of leader, of pioneer, gifts that produced a physician at once intellectually and intuitively perceptive, a helper in the broadest possible sense. His integrity of character; his absolute fearlessness (which did not fail him even when he was in the clutches of the Gestapo); his brilliant wit were familiar not only to his close friends, but also to the larger circle who learned to know him at the annual meetings of the International Psycho-Analytic Association.

His friends were aware of his shortcomings, most of which were merely shadows of his virtues. His ethical code kindled in him a constant readiness to assist others in every way, whether their problems were professional, economic or personal. In his unselfish giving, he disregarded his own interests to such an extent that his last year of illness was an unmerciful struggle for survival in every respect.

Ernst Simmel was born in Breslau, the youngest of nine children, and grew up in Berlin. His pungent wit, particularly when expressed in German, had the dry humour characteristic of the common man of that metropolis. For it was the common man who appealed most strongly to the socially-minded Ernst Simmel, and whom he strove at all times to help.

He received his medical training in Berlin, and in Rostock, Germany. Although Simmel's interest in psychiatry was aroused early, he did not immediately engage in the practice of this branch of medicine, but worked for several years in other fields, including pathology. In 1913 he began his private practice in general medicine. He chose a modest suburb of Berlin, because he was not interested in a lucrative practice.

His doctor's dissertation (1908), the first of a long list of scientific papers, bore the title: 'A Critical Contribution Concerning the Psychogenesis of Dementia Præcox'. When one considers the status of scientific thinking about mental disease at that time, the title had remarkable implications. It is noteworthy that the young physician, whose medical thinking had been shaped by the exclusively organic and descriptive teaching then prevailing, was sufficiently alert and open-minded to recognize the validity of the Freudian approach and its application to Dementia Præcox, as suggested by Jung. He foresaw that these theories were to open new vistas for research and an understanding of mental phenomena.

During World War I, he was at first a general medical officer with combat troops. In 1916, he was placed in charge of a special military hospital for war neuroses. It was here that his career as a psychotherapist and psycho-analyst was initiated. He launched upon a trail-blazing activity, using hypnosis in combination with comprehension of psycho-analytic dynamics in the treatment of soldiers suffering from war neuroses. In essence, the methods used in World War II were identical with those initiated by Simmel twenty-five years earlier. It is a striking commentary on Ernst Simmel's vision, skill and courage that he employed these techniques at a time when this area was truly *terra incognita*.

His experiences in World War I were summarized in his paper: 'The Inter-relationship of War Neuroses and Mental Trauma—A Hypno-Analytic Research'. For this work, he was awarded the Freud Prize in 1918.

After the war, he returned to Berlin and resumed

[1] Mrs. Frances Deri, 'Simmel, the Man'; at this meeting other papers were given by Dr. Max Horkheimer, 'Simmel, and Freudian Philosophy'; Dr. Emanuel Windholz, 'Simmel's Scientific Contribution to Psycho-Analysis'; Judge Atwell Westwick, 'Simmel's Work in Criminology'; Dr. David Brunswick, 'Simmel, the Organizer'; Dr. Ralph R. Greenson, 'Simmel's Influence on the Younger Generation of Psycho-Analysts.'

private practice. From that time on, his career branched out from his own practice of psychiatry and psycho-analysis into research, teaching and organizing on an extensive scale. Except for the brief interruption caused by the ascent of Nazism and his emigration to the United States, this aspect of his work remained unbroken.

Simmel was one of the founders of the Berlin Psycho-Analytic Institute. He was instrumental in developing some of the fundamental principles for training psycho-analysts ; through participation in the establishment of the first education committee in Berlin, he worked out the initial training curriculum. In this connection, he introduced the plan of supervised analyses and case seminars.

In 1927 at Schloss Tegel, near Berlin, Ernst Simmel founded the first sanitarium operating on psycho-analytic principles. As its medical director he not only treated patients psycho-analytically, but also devised methods of occupational therapy based on metapsychological principles. Cases admitted for treatment at this institution included patients suffering from somatic diseases, addictions, borderline schizophrenia, and sexual criminal offenders.

Simmel was invited to come to Southern California in 1934 to establish an institute to train psychiatrists in psycho-analysis. Here he became the official representative of the Chicago Psycho-Analytic Institute. He organized the few trained analysts then in California into the Psycho-Analytic Study Group of Los Angeles, and later he was the organizer of the San Francisco and the Los Angeles Psycho-Analytic Societies. He introduced and conducted the first psycho-analytic seminars for teachers and social workers, and eventually evolved a programme to train psychiatrists in psycho-analysis. It was largely due to his efforts that psycho-analysis achieved scientific approbation in the eyes of the public and of the medical profession in California.

For years he tried to establish a Psycho-Analytic Institute in Southern California for training and teaching, as well as for research based on data gathered in a psycho-analytic hospital and a free clinic. Unfortunately, circumstances permitted only the establishment of a single department of such an institute, namely, a school to train psychiatrists in psycho-analysis. It was one of the disappointments that darkened the last months of his life that his dream of an institute to further and safeguard the psycho-analytic movement in Southern California was not realized.

Although Ernst Simmel did not belong, chronologically speaking, to the early group of students of psycho-analysis, who formed the first round table in Freud's house, he must be regarded as one of the men who helped to build the basic structure of the science and art of psycho-analysis. He was among those who had the ability to carry out the important tasks of cementing the foundations and of putting in the supporting beams and girders.

Simmel had a truly original and creative mind, a pioneering spirit. Despite his thorough understanding of and adherence to psycho-analytic theory and his mastering of its technique, he was not inhibited in his desire to experiment, nor in his attempts to open new paths into hitherto unworked areas where psycho-analysis could be applied. His intellectual independence was not, however, distorted by residues of an unsolved Œdipus Complex, and did not take the form of disguised rebelliousness or diadochal rivalry. He was too thoroughly mature and mentally too well disciplined to let his sharp vision be dimmed by unrecognized emotional factors. He preferred to wait and see what others had to give, rather than prematurely to make definite formulations about new or deviating theories that occurred to him. He did not blindly accept every word of the master as unalterable truth. On the other hand, he did not find it necessary to be original at any cost, to throw overboard well-established structural components of our science. Nor did he succumb to the ' return of the repression '. Although some of his successful experiments in therapy were most ' unorthodox ', he did not have the urge to found a new school or to invent a new nomenclature. He was able to integrate whatever new ideas he had with the body of psycho-analytic theory as it had developed organically. Moreover, he was dissatisfied with the growing tendency to regard psycho-analysis as merely a branch of medicine, as another therapeutic technique.

Simmel's scientific publications number more than sixty. The problems with which he was chiefly concerned can be classified under the following headings : war neuroses ; institutional psycho-analytic treatment ; therapy for psychoses ; the psychogenesis of organic diseases, and what is now generally called psycho-somatic medicine ; and the application of psycho-analysis to criminology. In addition to these topics, there are a number of papers on a variety of subjects.

Some of his metapsychological papers bring into sharp focus certain difficult and controversial concepts and theories about the origin of the libidinal and the destructive drives. For many of us, his bold vision seems to provide a satisfactory answer to questions that everyone interested in the metapsychological aspect of psycho-analysis has asked himself, questions probing into those early stages of development where libidinal and destructive instincts apparently still form primeval chaos. Simmel's understanding of the oneness of the psychic and the physical aspects of the human being, especially as evidenced in organic diseases, went beyond the analysis of the dynamics of the individual into interesting attempts to work out a more general metapsychological formulation.

When a great person dies, one almost always

feels that he has died too young. This was especially true of our friend, Ernst Simmel. He was called away from a desk full of unfinished work. It was his ardent wish to pour out his stream of ideas, to bring to fruition his far-reaching plans. Three days before he died—this is the painful memory I carried away from my last visit with him—he told me of numerous papers that, in the course of the years, he had read at various meetings and had then put away and forgotten to publish. It was deeply distressing to see the anguish beneath the controlled calm of his countenance, to sense his realization that his urge to give his work to the world, to mankind, might be frustrated.

Ernst Simmel used himself up prematurely. During the last year of his life, he ate his heart out in working for psycho-analysis. It was grief that killed him years too soon.

Ernst Simmel's friends and students, the members of the Los Angeles Society and of the Los Angeles Psycho-Analytic Study Group, as well as all those throughout this area who are interested in psycho-analysis, feel his loss most deeply. For they know it will be a difficult, an almost insurmountable task to find another such leader and teacher.

Ernst Lewy, M.D.

Beverly Hills, California.

ORIGINAL PAPERS

SCIENCE AND BELIEF[1]

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Throughout the whole period of civilization which, one is almost constrained to say, has just ended, matters of belief have been the central focus around which human life has orientated itself. We regard ourselves as the heirs of a Christian civilization, and for centuries it was accepted without question that the fundamental cultural boundary was between the Believers and the Heathen. Within each realm, the differences which divided men into more or less exclusive and often hostile groups were usually expressed in terms of belief in certain formulated doctrines. Some of the most ferocious of all wars have raged between people who considered that their most important characteristic was a belief in Catholicism or Protestantism, in the Divine Right of Kings, in Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, or some other such ideal. Many modern historians would wish to look behind the dividing lines drawn in terms of belief, and claim that one can discover other factors, usually economic in the broad sense, which separated the various groups, and of which, they argue, the consciously held beliefs were mere rationalizations couched in the fashionable religious terminology of the age. That may well be largely true; but it must still be recognized that, as far as an individual man attempted to control his own behaviour, and act as a conscious agent, it was by such beliefs that he was influenced. The religious martyrs did not, consciously, die on behalf of a rising class of entrepreneurs or bourgeois middlemen, but for points of doctrine. And even those who did not in fact believe anything deeply enough to die for it, seem for the most part to have considered beliefs as things to which it was quite proper to give such attachment, were not everyday human nature all too weak for such devotion.

In speaking of beliefs in this way, I am not, of course, referring to comparatively trivial theories concerned with the details of behaviour. A man may believe in the wisdom of the editors of his daily newspaper, in the existence of ghosts, or the value of boarding schools for boys, for any of a number of reasons, most of which are likely to be related to the satisfaction of his conscious or unconscious wishes. Such convictions are not of the first importance even for moulding the believer's own character, let alone for the history of civilization. But a much greater importance must be attached to the ultimate general beliefs or fundamental ideals which provide the guiding principle on which men try, somewhat intermittently perhaps, to direct their lives, and which are the aspiration towards which they feel they ought to strive. It is these major ideals—such things as Christianity, Reason or Communism—that I shall be referring to when I speak of beliefs.

At the present time, a very large and influential body of people within our civilization—perhaps the majority of its members—no longer regard religious dogmas as worthy of complete devotion. In fact, we do not now find it intellectually satisfying to base our actions on any belief, however intensely held, for which objective evidence cannot be produced. But the older attitude of mind persists, not only among those unused to precise thought, but in many places where one would have expected a fuller appreciation of the implications of recent psychological investigation. For instance, a few years ago I wrote an essay which attempted to relate man's ethical ideas to the nature of organic evolution, and particularly to the characteristic human mechanism of evolution. A number of scientists, and others, engaged in a discussion of

[1] The second Ernest Jones Lecture delivered to the British Psycho-Analytical Society on November 19, 1947.

my thesis. And I was written to by an eminent Cambridge philosopher, of my own generation, who complained bitterly of the slipshod thought of scientists. Why could they not see, he asked, that prior to any question of the relation between ethics and evolution there was a fundamental problem, whose importance had been emphasized by Herbert Spencer in a similar discussion a generation or two ago; and reading further, this fundamental problem turned out to be the query, 'Is life worth living?' Not until that had been decided was there, according to my philosopher friend, any ground from which deductions could be drawn.

Surely to anyone brought up in a mental atmosphere tinged with the results of psycho-analytical studies, such a question, far from being of profound importance, must seem a completely trivial intrusion from another world of thought. What can it possibly mean if I say that I believe that life is worth living? Apart altogether from the difficulty of defining any of the terms involved; apart from the fact that, whatever I am prepared to say, I have not yet taken cyanide or a barbiturate; if I say, like a good Anglican Christian, that life is worth living, or, like a Buddhist, deny that statement, I am in either case merely expressing a personal emotional attitude; and this has no more general significance as a basis for deduction, than the stated belief of any other of the infinitude of men past and present. It is merely a rather uninformative piece of evidence as to my mental make-up, since the belief that life is worth living can be combined with almost any other set of beliefs one chooses to name. As evidence for a serious study of the nature of the world, it has no more value than a single line picked out of one of Shakespeare's sonnets—much less value, indeed, as coming from a less profound individual.

To anyone who is not mesmerised by a cultural insistence on the importance of beliefs, a simple common-sense inspection of the behaviour of one's fellows is adequate evidence that even if a man gives as accurate a statement of what he believes as he is capable of formulating, that provides only a very rough and incomplete guide to his character. And at a more critical level of study, psycho-analysts have shown conclusively that consciously held beliefs form only a small part of a much larger complex in the mental structure. Much of this complex normally remains below the level of consciousness, as the greater part of an iceberg is beneath the surface of the sea. Exactly which part floats uppermost, and comes within our vision, is partly a matter of chance. Although there are certain elements of the complex whose nature is such that they tend to be more accessible, the ideas with which these parts become clothed are subject to two sorts of variation, due on the one hand to the nature of the deeper levels on which they are based, and on the other to the particular, rather arbitrarily chosen symbols by which the nature of those levels happens to be expressed in the individual concerned.

The wealth of evidence which modern psychologists, and particularly psycho-analysts, have presented on these matters is such that the intellectual world has been persuaded, for the last twenty years or so, of the general truth of their conclusions, at least in broad outline. Applying such an outlook to one's own thought, as one must, one has to concede that no belief, however firmly held, and no axiom, however self-evident, can provide a basis for deductions about the objective world. The essential conclusion was stated quite clearly by Ernest Jones in the first of his papers on psycho-analysis in a book published over thirty years ago, '. . . whenever an individual considers a given (mental) process as being too obvious to permit of any investigation into its origin, and shows resistance to such an investigation, we are right in suspecting that the actual origin is concealed from him—almost certainly on account of its unacceptable nature. Reflection shows that this criterion applies to an enormous number of our fixed beliefs—religious, ethical, political and hygienic, as well as to a great part of our daily conduct; in other words, the principle above quoted refers to a large sphere of mental processes where we least suspect it.' At the time they were written, those sentences must have seemed at best doubtful to most people, and frank heresy to many; to-day the idea they contain should be one of the central methodological principles in all enquiry into the relations between human beliefs and human behaviour, or between metaphysical systems and the objective world.

It is easy to deduce from such a principle that it is vain to search, as philosophers and metaphysicians and moralists have done for so long, after final truths which may be accepted without question and used as the foundations on which a whole system of thought may be erected. Many philosophers, of course, had already come to a similar conclusion on other grounds. Plato, for instance, states somewhere that the highest truths cannot be expressed as doctrines, but only as myths. And in our own times, Whitehead has insisted that 'philosophy is akin to poetry, and both of them seek to express that ultimate good sense which we term civilization' (*Modes of Thought*, p. 238). Other recent philosophers, infected with the mundane climate of thought of our age, would scarcely recognize mere myth and poetry, if that were indeed all that was left of philosophy. Bertrand Russell, for instance, counselled an enlightened scepticism, too brilliantly illuminated by wit to notice such nebulous presences; while Wittgenstein could do no more than recognize them and admit the complete unsuitability of his razor-sharp analytical apparatus for handling their impalpable and Protean nature.

The course of recent history has, however, provided a terrifying exposure of the unacceptableness of a call for scepticism, and the dangers of a high-minded silence about human beliefs. For civilization has obviously been caught on both horns of dilemma. While, on the one side, the intellectual basis for the acceptance of any form of belief has been undermined, on the other, our political development has been distorted by the profound influence of new myths, which have attracted to themselves more fanatical devotion than any other set of beliefs for the last century or more. It is the oldest, most thoroughly tested beliefs which have been given up ; not only the ancient elaborately rationalized doctrines such as Christianity, but also the less precisely formulated ideals, such as humanitarianism, liberalism, neighbourliness, which were so influential during the last few centuries. But the place of the former theologies has been taken, and more than filled, by new doctrinal schemes, such as Communism, free enterprise, or the various brands of national socialism and the cruder nationalisms which are qualified by no social aim ; while the older values have been replaced by such ideals as efficiency, ruthlessness in attaining a desired end, equalitarianism, or the leadership principle, and whole host of others. I have no wish to claim that all these doctrines or ideals are necessarily unworthy of devotion. Among them are to be found the forces that will shape the future, and, speaking for myself, I can see, clearly enough to feel a moderate optimism, potentialities for a future far preferable to the past. The only point I wish to make here is that these newer doctrines and beliefs, the good and the bad alike, have called forth an intensity of belief which is in flat contradiction to the understanding which we now have of how beliefs are formed and the reasons for which they are held.

There is no need to labour the point and quote more examples. We see clearly that the preliminary analysis of the nature of belief, carried out in the early years of the century, has had consequences of both a negative and a positive kind—negative in that it loosened the hold of the older creeds, and positive by the rather indirect route that it was in actual fact followed by the adoption of a large variety of new doctrines, many of which at least pretended to be ' scientific '. This evidence is enough to warn us that it is inadequate to draw from the recent analysis merely the pious aspiration that men's conduct should not be affected by any tenet which cannot be proved by the objective criteria of science. There is no doubt that all men's actions (including, let us remember, our own) will continue to be profoundly influenced by beliefs which are held for quite other reasons than the weight of the evidence which supports them.

This need not constrain us to abandon the use of our scientific faculties in discussing human motivation and action. It means that the centre of interest shifts from the nature of the ideal—the particular thing believed—to the mechanisms by which beliefs in general come to be formed, and the part which they play in the functioning of the whole human personality. Already the progress of psycho-analysis, supplemented by the studies of anthropologists and other social scientists, is filling in a picture in whose outlines even the non-expert can begin to find a fresh and less negative way of criticizing his own and other people's systems of ideals. But there still seems to be a great need for those professionally competent in such matters to discuss explicitly the relation between the detailed technical findings of psychiatrists and the general structure of the human mind as it functions in its highest, and not merely in its lowest, activities. I suppose all scientists are used to outsiders asking them why they concentrate their attention on such apparently trivial matters ; I know I have often had to explain at length why I study heredity in fruit-flies, and development in newts' eggs. Perhaps I am making a similar disingenuous error when I ask psycho-analysts not to concentrate quite so much as they do at present, on the neurotic and pathological. I am very ready to believe that these may be by far the most useful experimental material—that is a technical question of which I cannot judge. But I imagine most psycho-analysts are well aware of the effects of their discoveries on the whole of our philosophy and ethics ; and I think one is justified in asking them whether they can truthfully say that they devote enough time to discussing the most fundamental implications of their studies, and make enough investigations specifically directed towards solving the problems that arise.

The conventional views about the origin of man's more deeply-held religious, ethical and political beliefs, have in the past moved between two poles. One was that they had a supernatural origin and were implanted in him independently of any action of his consciousness ; the other that they were arrived at by rational thought concerning the nature of the world. The psycho-analytical and sociological investigations have issued in conclusions which are, in some ways, a synthesis of both these. We find that a great part of the belief-structure of an individual has an origin which is independent of his conscious mind in so far that it arises in the very earliest childhood, at a time whose traces are usually almost completely obliterated from later memory ; the learning of beliefs is, according to this view, pressed back so far into infancy as to fall, as it were, outside the later conscious personality. On the other hand, the content of belief is dependent on the actual events which the infant experiences. In particular, a major contribution to the underlying factors of all beliefs is made by the social inter-relations between a child and its parents or other early

guardians. The formation of beliefs is thus an aspect of the most fundamental biological characteristic of humanity, namely, the development, as the main mechanism for evolutionary change, of a system of learned social behaviour.

One cannot appreciate the fundamental rôle played by belief in the normal human personality without some idea of the magnitude of this biological revolution of which it is an integral part. A student of the long succession of non-human organisms finds that he can regard them as essentially reducible to the hereditary genes which lie embedded within the nucleus of each cell. Only the most trivial modifications can take place if the genes remain unaltered, and all evolutionary changes are the expressions of changes in the frequency or nature of the genes present in the organisms concerned. In man the situation is totally different. Although individual men and populations of men undoubtedly differ from one another in the genes they contain, it is certain that historical changes of fundamental importance can take place without any closely corresponding genetic alterations. To give one instance, the Maori were within a few decades transformed from a warlike and savage society into peaceful citizens of a modern civilization, and there is no possibility of explaining this by a change in the genetic nature of the population. In general, the progress of civilization—indeed, its very existence—depends not on equipping each individual with a set of genes which gives him the potentiality to develop into a certain kind of person, but on social learning acting within a population all of whom have, throughout all stages of the historical process, essentially similar genetic constitutions. The pre-eminence of the genetic mechanism, which is the rule throughout the entire non-human world of living organisms, has been superseded by the biologically unparalleled development of the social interactions.

The evolutionary mechanism which man has adopted acts, of course, only in the mental sphere, and leaves his physical structure unchanged. But within its own field of action, it is incomparably more rapid in its effects than the normal biological mechanism of the selection of genes. Even such an ' intelligent ' animal as the horse differs in mental ability from its ancestors of a few million years ago by only a fraction of the interval which separates a modern farmer from his unlettered Saxon forefathers who lived only a thousand years in the past. The developments of social life must have conferred very great advantages in the struggle for existence on the primitive Hominidae who adopted them ; and, by competition between more and less closely integrated groups, the tendency to the formation of societies must have been rapidly strengthened until it came to play something approaching its present fundamental rôle in determining man's nature.

The formation of any human society is based essentially on some degree of acceptance of authority. The primitive urges to activity, which are probably physiologically inherent in every animal, must be restrained or directed into certain channels if the separate individuals are to live and act together as a community. In the human form of society, this restraint is at least partly conscious. The authority appears within the mind as what I have referred to as ' belief-structure ' ; that is to say, a complex of feelings, images and ideas, partly conscious and partly hidden in the unconscious, which can be grouped together by the fact that they all play the functional rôle of acting to restrain the primitive urges to activity. Different authorities seem to differ somewhat in their usage of the technical terms, but the complex I am referring to includes the greater parts of the super-ego and ego-ideal, and probably some of what would often be considered as part of the ego.

Psycho-analysis has revealed the previously unsuspected power both of the primitive urges to action (the id) and of the restraining belief-structure. The wars, tortures, forced migrations and other calculated brutalities which make up so much of recent history, have for the most part been carried out by men who earnestly believed that their actions were justified, and, indeed, demanded, by the application of certain basic principles in which they believed. Such events provide, surely, proof enough that the belief-structure, whose function is essentially that of restraining the aboriginal id, has a crude power which may lead it to act quite unlike a gentlemanly and kind policeman. This apparent hypertrophy of the human control mechanism is, perhaps, rather surprising. It may be, of course, that the primitive urges are so strong, and would, if left to themselves, be so incompatible with social existence that a dangerously powerful belief-structure is indispensable before man can reap any evolutionary advantage from living in groups. But it may also be asked whether our present development of the super-ego does not represent an over-specialization, comparable to the excessive body-armour of the later Dinosaurs, or the finicky adaptation of certain parasites which fits them to live on only one host. It would be interesting to know whether the differentiation of the human mind into opposing factions—roughly speaking, into id and super-ego —has increased in modern civilized man as compared with the primitive savages of the still existing Stone Age cultures. Is the apparent prevalence of neurosis in Western civilization a mere consequence of better diagnosis, or the result of the greater strain of industrial civilization, or due to a real over-specialization in the direction of human evolution ? If the latter suggestion is true, then the self-destruction of mankind in wars of political religion, which hangs as such an obvious threat over our heads, will be merely one more example in

the long tale of evolutionary doom following on over-specialization.

The potential destructiveness of our beliefs has, of course, been recognized by many students of these matters. It has not been so easy to prescribe an antidote. Some have been tempted to suggest a very radical remedy. For instance, in a recent lecture, General Chisholm, a distinguished psychiatrist who was Director-General of Medical Services in the Canadian Army, and is now Executive Secretary of the World Health Organization of the United Nations, went so far as to suggest that we should abolish beliefs, 'stop teaching children moralities and rights and wrongs, . . . the poison long ago described and warned against as the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil'. Instead we should 'protect their original intellectual integrity'. But can we find an original integrity which is independent of the belief-structure mechanism of organizing social life? If I have been on the right lines in the previous discussion, in which I have argued that the setting up of a system of ideals in opposition to the primitive urges is the essential feature of a new evolutionary method, then we cannot merely abolish one half of the dualism, however hypertrophied it may have become.

We need to approach the matter more cautiously and to devote more careful study to the exact nature of the system which we wish to control. What are the broad structural features of that complex of beliefs and their unconscious counterparts which exercises a restraining and directing function within the human mind? And further, since we cannot contemplate the abolition of this complex, we need to enquire what types of internal balance may be set up within such complexes as enable their possessors to live active, creative and co-operative lives. A very great deal more thorough and professional study must still be devoted to such questions. We can as yet give only incomplete and very tentative answers. If I venture on a few suggestions, it must be understood that they are offered out of a background of acknowledged ignorance, and are only put forward in order to provide an example of the kind of working hypothesis which requires investigation.

We may take it that the main element in a belief-structure is the representative of authority. Ultimately this may be regarded as the introjection of a parent or parent-substitute, but in the shifting alchemy of the developing personality, the original human authority may come to be symbolized by many different images and ideas. The function of this element in the complex is to restrain and direct the energies of the primitive physiological urges, and it can only do this by virtue of a measure of love, reverence and submission which is paid to it by the remainder of the self. But this submission cannot be absolute; the primitive urges, and the id which represents them, struggle against restraint; the belief-structure is the subject of hate as well as of love. This sets up a simple duality. Such systems may sometimes come into a balanced equilibrium which remains comparatively stable and unchanging. But they also, and perhaps more frequently, enter on the process which sociologists have spoken of as schismogenesis, that is, an interaction of the two parts which leads to each becoming more extreme and the tension between them more acute. Thus we find often that it is those people with the most deep attachment to an ideal who actually commit the most terrible crimes against it. It was the ultra-nationalists of Germany who showed least respect for the nationalisms of the neighbours, it is the revolutionaries in the name of human brotherhood who root out their enemies like rats.

I should like to put forward the hypothesis that one way, perhaps even the only way, of controlling this tendency to schismogenesis, is to erect a second dualism, as it were, in another dimension to it. If the love of one ideal leads to some degree of attachment to a second ideal, which, while not the diametrical opposite of the first, is yet of a quite different and contrasting kind to it, then the hate directed at the primary symbol can become mutated into the service of the secondary. To give an example, the Christian belief-structure, which lasted for so long, and for much of this period facilitated the growth of a progressive and fairly stable civilization, involved the two ideals of holy humility and the organized Church: Saint Francis and the Popes. A primary attachment to the restraining authority of the Church contained a necessary element of reverence for the very different ideal of brotherly love which the institution was supposed to serve; and the internal forces of hate directed against the organization could take the form of a devotion to this essentially anarchic aspiration. Again, on a somewhat lower level, the pre-eminently stable British political system has been based on an acceptance of a social hierarchy, mitigated by a devotion to the principle of equal justice for all men. On the other hand, everyone can see at present the dangers to the whole of civilized life which threaten from an exclusive belief in the virtues of 'free enterprise' or in the cause of social organization.

It has, I think, been usual to consider that in a balanced duality of loyalties, the two elements must be of the same nature though opposite in tendency. That is to say, that a belief in the virtues of social organization, for instance, must be countered by a belief in its exact opposite, namely, in social freedom; or a belief in a doctrinaire and hierarchical Church balanced against a belief in the value of the individual conscience. I believe this to be a misinterpretation. A stable mental equilibrium seems to me to be something other than a mere compromise between opposites. It seems rather to involve a relation between two

entities of different order. The values of the Sermon on the Mount belong to a different sphere to those of the organized Church ; and the balance weight to a belief in social organization is to be found, not in the absence of regulations and planning, but in an insistence on the richness and depth of individual experience. The individual hate directed against the super-ego probably cannot be simply transmuted into love for its opposite, but can, it appears, take the form of an attachment to some ideal totally other to the primary one. I shall not attempt to discuss possible reasons for this, being certainly unqualified to do so ; but they must surely be connected with the relations between the conscious and unconscious parts of the mind, and dependent on the difficulty of accommodating within the one field of consciousness two tenets which are clearly opposite to one another. In general, it must be said here, that the extremely simplified sketch which I am offering of the structure of the belief-function of the mind requires supplementing by a much fuller consideration of the mechanism of repression, which introduces still another dualism, that between the conscious and unconscious representatives of the primitive urges and the restraining authority.

The practical conclusion to be drawn from this line of thought is that it is dangerous to allow questions of belief to become concentrated into a single channel. We have to recognize not merely that it is impossible to eliminate beliefs from the human mind, but that a stable and equable personality must be founded, not only on one, but on several ideals. If we see all things in terms of one shibboleth, in monotone, we shall almost certainly come to see them in stark contrasting opposites, in black and white. We need a multi-dimensional view of the universe.

This conclusion amounts to a denial of the practical value of the philosophers' age-long attempts to reduce the apparent chaos of immediate experience to a single unified and harmonious system of concepts. Of course, in so far as a metaphysical system remains a purely intellectual construction, it does not require criticism on the grounds I have been bringing forward. It would be at least an innocuous component of the mental structure and might even be a useful framework of abstract thought. But so soon as it becomes employed as a guide for action, a metaphysical system must attract to itself some degree of belief ; and if, being a comprehensive system, it is taken as the sole guide, it becomes the vehicle for a monotone belief of the kind which, I have argued, is in danger of leading to a destructive schismogenesis. Thus the search for a unified metaphysics remains either an intellectual pastime having no important effects on human action, or it leads belief into the dangerous confinement of a single dimension.

These severe strictures on the elaboration of systems of thought must be counterbalanced by another consideration. Stability is not the only desideratum which we should wish to achieve in the human mind. In fact, if it were not that present-day society is suffering so grievously from mental instability and unbalance, one would probably have been tempted to place much less emphasis on the necessity for a counterbalance of beliefs than I have done in this lecture. From a more general point of view than the purely contemporary, the outstanding characteristic of the human evolutionary mechanism is the width of the field of experience and achievement which it throws open to the individual. The process of social learning offers to him a large part of the thoughts and attainments of his ancestors. A man's life, it may be said, is not restricted to his own existence, as is a dog's. It is primarily on this account that the human method of variation and selection has proved so far more rapid, and to produce such far greater effects, than the normal biological procedure. It is, therefore, obviously a prime requirement of the belief-system that it should not unduly restrict, but should rather enlarge in as great a degree as possible, the breadth and scope of the social heritage which the individual is willing to acknowledge, test, and possibly accept. An ideal, to be worthy of belief, should be on a large scale.

This consideration goes some way to mitigate the apparent particularism of our previous conclusion. It may be easy enough to set up a stable personality on the basis of a belief structure comprising a primary attachment to, say, the cause of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, counterbalanced by a degree of devotion to the exacting, but quite different, God who rules over the game of golf. But these ideals are unduly restricted in their field of application. If mankind in general adopted them as the basis for civilization, we might perhaps be spared the dangers of a destructive schismogenesis, which lead to the committing of terrible crimes in the name of the very ideals which are supposed to prevent such conduct, but it is obvious that the richness and depth of our culture would shrink to pitiful dimensions. It is true, of course, that concentration on a restricted ideal by a given individual may enable him to devote to it sufficient energy to produce a noteworthy result ; and to that extent, society may be the gainer from the impoverishment of the beliefs of some of its members. But what may be true of single persons is not necessarily applicable to society as a whole. There can be no doubt that if the generally accepted ideals of belief in a society are narrow in their scope, the richness of civilization must suffer, and the belief-structure partially fail in its function of mediating the acceptance by the individual of the cultural heritage offered him by the past.

This line of thought might at first sight lead to the conclusion that we should, after all, seek an

all-embracing ideal. But not only does that seem inevitably to lead, as I have argued above, to an unstable and potentially dangerous internal conflict, but it is also at present intellectually impossible of attainment. No philosophical system yet proposed really accommodates all the values which man has formed from his experience. The acceptance of one system, as the final and comprehensive scheme to which everything may be referred, must lead to an undue restriction of the fullness of civilization even before the schismogenesis to which it will give rise becomes a practical danger. The best we can do is to see that each of the two or more complementary ideals which we adopt is as all-embracing as it can be within the limits of its own field. Thus, if one accepts an attachment to a political ideal formulated in terms of a national loyalty, the larger the national organization chosen, the less likely it is to restrict the range of values which can be appreciated. Similarly, greater scope will be offered if the ideal is formulated in general terms, rather than taken to involve precisely defined and particularized characteristics. A politico-economic belief in, for instance, free trade, or communal ownership, is more limiting than a devotion to the cause of increasing the material standard of living, or enlarging the possibilities for individual development.

The functions proper to the belief-structure of the mind are, potentially, best filled by ideals which are of extremely wide range. The brotherly love of the Christians, the intellectual curiosity and good sense of the Greeks, even the orderly British ideal of conduct appropriate to one's station in life, were beliefs general enough in character to apply to almost all the situations which arise in a full and active life. While representing very clearly the ultimate parental authority on which the whole process of social learning rests, they reflect this as a leading and guiding, rather than a merely restraining influence. The more particular beliefs, such as those in nationalism or free trade, which were mentioned above, can be regarded as incomplete derivatives of one or other of the more general ideals. Unfortunately, there is undoubtedly a strong tendency for such partial ideas to assume a more dynamic rôle within the personality than the more general ones. The broader and deeper the scope of an idea, the harder it is for the mind to grasp it in its general significance, or to apply it to particular instances. An intellectual formulation of such a belief must, indeed, be of a highly abstract nature, and is beyond the capacity of any but a highly trained mind. Non-intellectual people may, of course, apprehend such ideals ; in fact it sometimes appears as if it is easier to attain to a really profound ideal by some unformulated process of an intuitive nature than by close abstract reflection —we must all have met instances of the simple good man. But even these are all too rare. The beliefs one notices as operative in the personalities one meets are usually focussed on some comparatively minor particular, some specific political or religious or ethical point. A devotion which constantly refers back to one of the great large-scale ideals of humanity is something of a rarity in human characters as they are formed by society at the present day. It is surely one of the major tasks of civilization to remedy this, to see that as the child's reverence and love passes on from its parents to some wider authority, it finds itself in the presence not merely of a particular doctrine but directly confronted with the major premises of human society.

There are several current ideals of breadth and scope sufficient to rank among the mainsprings of civilization. Perhaps it is not always realized that science, as it has grown under the co-operative efforts of so many men, has by now become one of the most compelling of the possible candidates for the position of internal authority in the human belief-structure. Its adequacy to this rôle is often denied, chiefly by those who interpret the scientific ideal in an unduly narrow way. If Christianity meant no more than the strict adherence to the tenets of a particular fervent and narrow-minded sect (say the Fundamentalists of Tennessee) it would seem a poor and dangerous basis on which to try to continue the culture of Western civilization. Equally, if science is thought to mean no more than an exclusive attention to the data of physics, chemistry and physiology, and to demand the dismissal of all other aspects of human experience, it also appears a threadbare and puerile belief. But the scientific attitude of mind is a much more profound embodiment of the human spirit than such a shallow view suggests. I shall not attempt to formulate it in a few words ; but psychologists at least have every reason to know that science can approach and discuss even the subtlest problems of human conduct and of the relations between a man and his fellows. I would not say that the scientific ideal alone is a wholly adequate foundation for the good life of the individual, or the highest civilization of society ; but my main reason for this is the conviction, the grounds for which I have given earlier, that no single ideal is sufficient. The authority of science gives its sanction to one of the greatest creations of the human mind—the attitude of logical thought continually checked by the empirical appeal to experiment—but it needs, in my view, to be supplemented by the quite different ideal of the creative artist—an ideal which expresses itself in thought-processes which move in a different dimension to the scientific. Perhaps at the end of a discussion on the general topic of beliefs, it may be in order for me to state a belief of my own. That is, that these two types of authority—the scientific and the artistic—constitute the dualism which is, of all the possible choices open to a child growing up in our time, the most effective in carrying out the

functions of the belief-structure of the human mind, namely, of enabling man to use the experience of past generations as an aid in coming to grips with the world as he finds it. In the words of Yeats :

> Civilization is hooped together, brought
> Under a rule, under the semblance of peace
> By manifold illusion ; but man's life is thought,
> And he, despite his terror, cannot cease
> Ravening through century after century,
> Ravening, raging, and uprooting that he may come
> Into the desolation of reality.

If we cannot hope to abolish the beliefs or ' illusions ' on which human social life is based, at least we should choose such as are large enough to accommodate the major part of reality, and are of a kind which facilitate man's gradual approach to it.

ANALYSIS OF A SCHIZOPHRENIC STATE WITH DEPERSONALIZATION [1]

By HERBERT ROSENFELD

Introduction

The patient I shall now discuss was sent to me for a variety of physical complaints of a functional origin. In the course of treatment it became apparent that I was dealing with a psychosis of the schizophrenic type. In this paper I shall concentrate only on certain aspects of the case ; namely, the schizoid symptomatology and some of the schizoid mechanisms encountered. An additional aim will be to throw some light on depersonalization, and I will try to show the connection between processes of ego disintegration and depersonalization.

Short History of the Case

My patient, Mildred, is a young woman who was twenty-nine when the treatment started in March 1944. She is of average height and build, with straight fair hair. Her face is not exactly plain, but it usually appeared so because of its lack of expression. During the latter part of the treatment her expression became more alive and she sometimes smiled. She had her first breakdown in health when she was seventeen. Her second breakdown occurred at the age of twenty-five, in the early part of the war, while she was serving in the Auxilliary Territorial Service. She developed one physical illness after another, e.g. influenza and sore throats, until she had to be invalided from the Service. After some time she recovered and made another attempt to defeat the recurring illnesses by joining the Land Army, but again the physical disturbances prevented her from continuing. When I saw her in March 1944 for consultation she had been suffering from a so-called influenza for about four or five months. She agreed to analysis ; we soon realized, however, that she had no desire to come for treatment, and this was in the main due to a deep-seated hopelessness about any recovery.

Family and Early History

There were no known schizoid disorders in the family, but one uncle is an alcoholic, and her father has suffered from a neurosis all his life. The patient described him as avoiding company and depending a great deal on his wife. She thought him old-fashioned, extremely dominating and very ' nervy '. She had always disliked him, but had, for the most part, ignored him. During the treatment her relationship with him improved considerably. She had always been very much attached to her mother, and had turned to her frequently in her childhood troubles. As a child she wrote poems and fairy stories and always found her mother a ready audience, and an adult who would treat her as an equal. She had one brother, Jack, nineteen months younger, and a sister, Ruth, six years younger.

Jack seems to have been a very attractive and intelligent boy, adored by everybody. Mildred, however, was ambivalent, but on the whole very fond of him and depended on him a great deal. She had quite consciously tried to adopt his personality and his interests, but had failed. When Jack was killed in a flying accident round about Christmas, 1940, she did not feel anything about it at the time ; but during treatment she began to realize what a shock his death had been to her, and how responsible she felt for it. Her sister was very neurotic, suffering as a child from many anxieties, and as long as Ruth was small, Mildred felt quite motherly towards her, which enabled her to accept, without much jealousy the greater attention which was shown to the anxious little sister. In contrast to Mildred, Ruth improved when she got older, and during the war did very well in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force. Socially, too, she became more self-confident ; but both these circumstances roused considerable jealousy in my patient.

About Mildred's early development nothing abnormal was reported to me. I gathered that she cried but little as an infant and apparently showed no reaction on being weaned. We must remember, however, that schizoid reactions in small children are generally overlooked and we often get a history of a particularly good baby, as in this case. She started to talk and walk normally. In addition to her mother, who breast-fed her, she had a nurse who was very devoted to her. As she was born in 1915, she did not see much of her father, who

[1] Based on a paper read at a meeting of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, March 5, 1947.

served all through the 1914–18 war ; but whenever he was on leave he took a great deal of interest in his little daughter. When she was nineteen months old, Jack was born, and for three weeks her mother was away in a nursing home. This was the first time Mildred was separated from her mother for any length of time, and it was not until the tenth day that Mildred was allowed to visit her and the baby. Her mother told her later on that from the time she first saw Jack she became completely silent and withdrawn ; and this reaction had disturbed the mother very much, since up to that time the child had talked normally. Four weeks after Jack's birth Mildred's nurse left to get married, and the new nurse had mainly to look after Jack. During the following years there were frequent changes of nurses. Mildred disliked them all, complaining to me that they treated her cruelly and often hit her, which might have been true, because she must have been an extremely difficult child to handle. She was frequently told she was no good, while Jack was held up to her as an example of goodness.

I had the impression that there was not only an impairment in her development after Jack's birth, but a definite regression to an earlier level of development. Not only did she give up speaking for a considerable time, but her ability to walk suffered as well, so that Jack developed far in advance of her. When Mildred was six a governess arrived, who seems to have been very prim and proper, but was liked by both children for her other good qualities. At eight years of age, Mildred fell ill with mastoiditis and had to have two operations, which greatly increased her paranoid reactions. She remembers feeling that for no apparent reason the doctors descended on her to frighten and hurt her, and afterwards she never quite overcame her fear of doctors. It took her many months to recover from these operations, and when she was better again she had to face another hard blow. Jack had been sent to school and they were no longer educated together.

She was educated at home by the governess, and for a long time she found it impossible to learn. Only when she was about twelve years of age did her intellectual capacity develop once more, and then she went to boarding-school, where she got on well, sometimes reaching the top of the class. On leaving school, she had a breakdown, which consisted in one physical illness after another, and culminated in a period of uncontrollable crying. The analysis revealed that jealousy of her best school friend, who got on better than she did, started this breakdown more than a year before leaving school. After school, until shortly before the war, she lived at home and was allowed to do exactly what she wanted. On the whole she felt fairly well, read a great deal ; but took no interest in the running of the house. She had frequent periods of withdrawal from both friends and parents, and at these times she felt physically unwell, spending most of the time in bed. In addition, her mental state was always worse at the time of her periods when she suffered great discomfort and pain. As was mentioned earlier, she afterwards served in the A.T.S. and in the Women's Land Army.

Condition when First Seen and during Early Stage of Treatment

When I saw her first, she was living in a large flat in London with her parents, and for some considerable time she continued to be withdrawn from the family life, leaving all the work of the flat to her mother and an elderly maid. Though consciously very fond of her mother, during analysis we realized that she tried to keep her mother completely under her control, ignoring her wishes to be assisted, even when the latter was not feeling well. On the other hand, she wanted her mother to look after her, and give her her meals in bed, if she herself felt unwell. She expected her mother to take an interest in whatever she was doing, but she could stand no criticism from her nor even a suggestion or question referring to anything she might be doing. For example, she did not allow her mother to ask her whether she intended to stay in bed for the day or not, and when she was engaged in some occupation, such as reading, even a comment would be resented. If her mother did make one, Mildred immediately lost any desire to continue what she was doing, and would withdraw into herself. I later found out that there was a gradual improvement in this attitude after about a year's analysis.

Shortly after starting treatment she took up work again, doing some hours at an aircraft factory, and later on she succeeded in getting afternoon work at a well-known bookshop. Her physical health improved gradually and she attended analysis quite regularly, even while she had her periods, though at times she was very late. There were great difficulties with free association, and these increased rather than decreased. She generally made a long pause at the beginning of the hour, and at times she was silent for the whole session or only said a few words at the end. Sometimes the lack of material made it necessary to interpret on only one sentence. In addition, previous interviews or observations on her general behaviour had to be used for interpretations which were frequently of only a tentative character, and this created difficulties in assessing her reactions in the working through period. Only on very rare occasions did she succeed in talking fairly fluently for most of the session, and then she spoke predominantly of actual events in the past or present.

Another technical difficulty was a particularly strong resistance to interpretations connecting together material of several interviews, because she could very seldom consciously remember what

had been discussed at previous sessions.[2] This made it difficult to obtain the conscious and intellectual co-operation which is so helpful in those schizoid disorders when the intellect is little affected.

The Depersonalization

Her conscious behaviour in analysis was marked by a rigid detachment and denial of all feelings, an attitude which at rare intervals was interrupted by paranoid suspicions or by despair about her lack of progress. Already at an early stage of the analysis she described symptoms and sensations of a distinctly schizoid type and feelings of depersonalization. She felt dim and sleepy, half unconscious and could hardly keep awake. At times when describing her experience she would say that there was something like a blanket separating her from the world, that she felt dead, or not here, or cut off from herself. At other times she called these feelings 'deadlock feelings', and explained that they had increased a few months before the treatment had started. She had felt giddy and faint at the time too.[3] She was frequently afraid of not being able to speak at all and of getting into a completely unconscious state. I realized that she was aware of the danger of insanity, because she said if she tried to join up with herself she might force her mind completely out of joint.

I have the impression that although this state occurred frequently as a defence against impulses of all levels it was also, indeed perhaps mainly, a defence against feelings of guilt, depression and persecution. From time to time there seemed a small improvement in her condition, but the slightest difficulty, particularly any positive transference interpretation, produced long-lasting silences, and when she was able to speak again she related that she had experienced some of the schizoid symptoms I enumerated just now. As usual there was an amnesia of everything we had discussed previously. Her inability to deal particularly with positive transference interpretations had its basis in her marked ambivalence, which I shall discuss more fully later on.[4] Whenever the opportunity arose I interpreted her love and hate impulses towards the analyst, but I had to dose these interpretations very carefully because of the seriousness of the schizoid reactions which followed. The positive transference towards the analyst as a parent, sister or brother figure was always displaced on to other people; but her object-relations at this stage were very insecure, and on analysis it turned out that more often than not the other people represented a part of herself.

To give a short example of this process: Denis, the husband of her best friend, had a nervous breakdown while he was separated from his wife who was expecting her second child. He tried his best to seduce my patient. At first she had great difficulty in controlling him. The wish to take him away from his wife soon came up as a conscious impulse, but it did not seem that she had any difficulty in coping with this wish directly. Her whole anxiety turned on whether she could control *his* wishes and arguments. She repeated some of his arguments to me, and it was clear that Denis stood for her own greedy sexual wishes which she had difficulty in dealing with and which she therefore projected on to him. Denis seemed a particularly suitable person for projection, because the precipitating factor of his neurosis corresponded to my patient's early situation, when the birth of her brother precipitated her first breakdown. The analysis of this mechanism helped Mildred to cope with Denis without having to avoid meeting him. Apart from the projection of impulses which were felt by the patient to be bad, there was a continuous projection of good impulses also into other people, particularly women friends, who not only represented good mother-figures, but the good part of herself. She felt excessively dependent on these friends and could hardly function without them. Her great dependency on Jack, which led to her inability to learn without him, was probably of the same nature.

Details of the Analysis

Coming now to the details of the actual analysis, I shall bring forward the instances mainly in chronological order, but it will be understood that I have to select points from a vast collection of material, and I am trying to choose only that which is most relevant to the main theme of my paper. In the winter of 1944–5 the patient developed influenza for the first time since she started treatment. She was afraid that the illness would drag on for months, but it cleared up in the normal time. When she returned to analysis, she told me she had found out quite a lot about the meaning of the influenza, namely, that she liked her 'flu' and enjoyed staying in bed and withdrawing from the world. She spontaneously described phantasies of living warmly and comfortably inside another person which she thought must be her mother, and remembered that she always told her mother that she had not wanted to be born. She herself related her overwhelming desire to go to sleep, or to become unconscious, to this particular state, and she admitted that she

[2] This attitude reminds one of Eidelberg's (1935) depersonalized patient who could not remember any previous interpretations and at times gave the impression of being demented.

[3] It is interesting to note that both Dr. Mayer Gross (1935) and Dr. Shorvon (1946) in their papers on depersonalization point out that the beginning of the depersonalization syndrome is often marked by feelings of faintness and giddiness.

[4] It is of interest to note that one of Reik's (1927) patients became depersonalized whenever Reik tried to make conscious her positive feelings to her husband, to whom her relationship was consciously a bad one.

sometimes simply could not bear to remain awake and had to disappear into unconsciousness.[5]

This part of the analysis had a distinctly good effect on her physical symptoms; her difficulties then concentrated mostly on getting up in the morning to come to analysis at 10.30 a.m. For weeks she appeared up to *forty minutes* late. At first she seemed quite unworried about her inability to co-operate. Only gradually was I able to show her the anxiety which was hidden underneath her lack of feeling, and she then started to complain in these words: 'There is nothing to *make me* get up and come for treatment.' I was at first not sure what she meant by this oft-repeated complaint. Then one day she came almost in tears. She had asked her mother to give her breakfast in bed; she hoped that with her breakfast inside her she would be able to get up. But when she got it, it did not work, and she said: 'It is no good to make it up in all sorts of ways.' I analysed this incident and similar ones in terms of internal and external object-relationships, and felt that her difficulties were mainly due to a failure in introjecting and maintaining a good inner object as represented by the breakfast. Her complaint that there was nothing to make her get up would therefore mean there was no good inner object inside her to help her to get up; the breakfast was supposed to fill this gap but had failed.

Shortly after this she told me another spontaneous phantasy, which she had had since childhood and which she related now to her difficulties in co-operating. She felt there was a devil who attacked what she called the good people and was keeping them tied up in dungeons. They could not move and had gags in their mouths. No sooner did they manage to get a little freer than the devil appeared, attacked the victims violently and tied them up even more tightly than before. The victims were not killed, yet it was uncertain whether they were still alive. There was no point in fighting this devil because he was stronger than everybody. The only possible method of defence against him was *to ignore him*. This phantasy threw a light on the very strong negative therapeutic reaction of the patient which followed any improvement or freeing of her personality; it foreshadowed the depth of the paranoid situation which was to be expected in the analytic transference, when the analyst would turn into the devil father. For a while there was an improvement in her ability to come in time for treatment, and the positive transference then appeared, displaced, as always, on to a young relative whom she scarcely knew. After she heard that he was engaged, she felt very disappointed and became afraid of not being able to control her tears during the analytic session. She explained that if she started to cry she might not be able to stop again and would feel very ill. For a week she would not disclose the reason for her sadness. The hour after admitting what had happened, she felt dead and had lost her feelings so completely that she could not believe that she had ever had any love feelings before. When I interpreted to her the strength of her love and hate, her fear of not being able to control them, and that she was defending herself against depression, she was at first incredulous and felt I was only reassuring her that she had feelings. By the end of the hour she realized that she was warding off feelings of pain and said: 'It is like squeezing one's finger in a door and saying one didn't feel anything.' In this situation the depersonalization was very marked. It followed a disappointment and appeared to be a mechanism of defence against depression. But this view appeared later on to be incomplete.[6]

During the next interview the depersonalization increased and was accompanied by feelings of persecution and *sensations of being split in two*. She talked about her fear of doctors and later on my talking was felt as an attack, making her feel I was pushing her into a hole, putting a lid over her and leaving her there. As a result of this assault she felt dead and although there was another part of her which was alive, the live part and the dead part did not know anything of each other. The connection of this material with the devil phantasy where the objects were put into dungeons was obvious, and it seemed that the persecuting devil attacked not only her objects but her very self. After the attack her ego was completely divided. I did not interpret this to my patient in detail at the time, as she was quite incapable of following any elaborate interpretation of mechanisms until the later part of treatment, I confined myself here to demonstrating to her her ambivalent impulses, which made her feel split in two. In the following weeks, I expected the depression relating to the disappointment she had experienced over the marriage of her friend to come more to the surface. But instead she began to slip from a state of depersonalization gradually into a schizophrenic state, which was marked by the development of a strongly paranoid relationship to the analyst.

At the beginning of this schizoid period she was not entirely devoid of positive feelings, but these she split off and transferred on to a girl friend, with whom she went out frequently and who arranged parties for her. She told me nothing about this at the time. To make the division complete, nothing good was allowed to mix with anything bad and, as I was kept and thought of as almost entirely bad, she acted accordingly. She began to stay away from treatment, sometimes for two or three

[5] Other analysts, for example Nunberg (1924) and Reik (1927), have described phantasies of living inside the mother's womb in depersonalized patients.

[6] Particularly Reik (1927) and Feigenbaum (1937) have emphasized depersonalization as a mechanism of defence.

days on end, and when she did come she was often thirty to forty-five minutes late. At times she appeared confused and disconnected, and her forgetfulness concerning matters in the analysis was most marked. Occasionally she could admit her feelings of persecution and explained that she didn't tell me anything which mattered to her because either I would make it bad or take it away from her, or would cause her feelings about it to disappear. She was trying to sort things out in her mind. I was muddling it all up. Whenever and whatever I interpreted she firmly believed and felt that I was telling her to stop thinking about what she had in her mind and trying to make her think of something else. Her greatest suspicion was that I was making her think entirely in my way, so that she no longer knew what she had thought of before, and that thus she would lose her own self.

Acute fears appeared that when she met people she might one day find herself talking in a strange voice or accent. This voice would have talked, I am certain, with the analyst's voice and accent, but the patient could not admit this connection consciously. About this time she frequently criticized her father for his selfishness and greed in his relationship to her mother and she herself could hardly bear speaking to him. Other material, for example, fears of hairy animals which attacked her, suggested the fear of an aggressive penis. Generally speaking, her persecutory fears were related to a bad father or penis and the sadistic impulses were mostly of an oral and anal nature. But the central anxiety was a phantasy of the persecuting analyst forcing himself into her to control her and rob her, not only of her inner possessions, for instance, her babies and her feelings, but her *very self*. It was not clear whether in this particular anxiety situation, I always stood for the bad father, or another figure. At this point of the analysis the girl friend she depended on was called up for war service, and her difficulties in coming for treatment and in speaking grew still worse. I realized that frequently she was not sufficiently aware of herself to come or talk or perform any action at all. At times she was more integrated, consequently more aware of herself. She was then able to complain that she felt so split up, and at times could not connect up enough to think or even talk. To get up or go to bed took her sometimes two hours because of the difficulty of consecutive action. Her sense of time was very confused. She could not judge time and often left home only shortly before or even after she was due to be at my house.

At the height of this transference-psychosis there was an alternative state to this split-up condition. She gave one the impression of being withdrawn into an omnipotent world of her own, where she was quite oblivious of external reality, where time and the passing of time did not matter, where she felt comfortable and not at all anxious about her serious mental condition. But sometimes she gave herself away and showed she was in fact controlling a severe threat coming from external reality. So she stated that she had a great deal to think about by herself, but she could not bring herself to tell it to me, because it would give me a handle with which to approach her and make her talk. This omnipotent withdrawal seemed very similar to the one she described in connection with influenza, when she admitted phantasies of living inside mother. But the force behind these phantasies seemed now increased. Indeed one sometimes had the feeling, when she showed no response, that she lived far away in another world.

I must admit that the alternation of states of narcissistic withdrawal and ego-disintegration seemed to me for some time a problem which I was unable to solve. In spite of the difficulties, I adhered all the time to the analytic technique in the hope that gradually a clearer pattern would show itself in the analytic situation. My understanding of the psychopathology of the schizoid mechanisms of my patient was very fragmentary at this point of the analysis, and her difficulties in co-operation did not make the task any easier. I was struck by the various phenomena I have been describing, but thought mainly of them as a defence against depression and persecution. Only gradually did I begin to realize the *specific* nature of the primitive schizoid processes which seemed to affect the very core of the ego. Fortunately the analysis somehow or other continued in spite of her short and rare appearances for the sessions. I am sure she must have unconsciously taken in some of my interpretations, but outwardly it appeared as if I were talking to a blank wall. Only quite gradually did she begin to show some response and understanding. She explained one day that she had realized that she could not stand coming for a treatment which made her aware of herself and the hopeless condition she felt herself to be in. Her fear of analysis failing was approached by her in a roundabout way. She expressed fears of losing her job at the bookshop where she had been working for just a year. She explained to me that in her life everything started to go wrong after one year and that after eight or nine months more she always had to give in. As at that time she had been under treatment for exactly nineteen months I could demonstrate to her convincingly that her greatest deeply denied fear at the present moment was that I would not continue with her analysis. You will remember that she was nineteen months old when her brother Jack was born and we realized in analysis that his birth meant to her that everything had come to an end and that her parents, particularly her mother, had given her up. The realization of the repetition of the early childhood situation struck her forcibly. This produced a flicker of hope and a slightly more positive attitude to the treatment.

During the following weeks the pattern of the transference showed that after any particularly successful interview, when I was able to demonstrate to her some important connections, she stayed away or did not talk at the following session. I was struck by the similarity of her present reaction to what had actually happened at Jack's birth when she had become completely silent. I now understood that in the transference I was the mother, and any particularly productive hour represented for her my giving birth to a baby to which she reacted with complete silence and withdrawal. Consciously she still denied any hostility to the analyst, but in my interpretations I reminded her of the sadistic envious attacks of the devil who, in her phantasy, always attacked the good objects ; and I tried to show her that she was now behaving like the sadistic devil and that attacks against me as the envied and admired mother were hidden behind her silence.

These interpretations were, as always, at first ignored, but in the very lengthy working-through period she admitted that she had always been afraid of letting her women friends down. She gave me an important example of this. In the Land Army her friend Mary and she had arranged to form a partnership in looking after the cows. She herself had undertaken the milking, but Mary was to be in charge of the scheme. She remembered that she had felt that in one way or another she would let Mary down. Actually they never worked together because she broke down, and now she could offer the explanation herself. She thought it was the fear of hurting Mary which made her ill. The analysis of this incident with Mary, which went on for months, revealed that she was mainly afraid that she would not get up in the morning to milk the cows. She had dreams of forgetting about the cows for days, which meant that all the good and nourishing milk was wasted, and pain was inflicted on the animals. I suggested that Mary stood for the mother and the cows for the breasts. In addition, this situation showed a distinct similarity to the transference situation, when she stayed away and refused to take in the nourishing analysis. From this I concluded that I not only represented the pregnant mother, and the mother who gave birth to Jack, but a part object, namely, the breast which she attacked in a particularly aggressive and tantalizing way by refusing to take any milk. I had the impression that these attacks on the breasts sprung not only from the jealousy of Jack, who was breast-fed by her mother, or from a deeply-repressed phantasy of having stolen Jack from the mother, but it seemed that early sadistic impulses against the breasts had been revived.[7] The incident with Mary was not, of course, the only example of her difficulties with women. She admitted now that she often withdrew from her girl friends in the same way as she reacted to me in analysis. Formerly she had depicted herself as being in harmonious and idealized relationship with them.

In sorting out information I had obtained up to that time, I concluded that even as an infant Mildred's sadistic impulses must have been very powerful. She must have been still struggling with them without any great success when the mother became pregnant again. A positive bond with her father had developed early, but the birth of Jack had caused an acute disappointment, and had acted, in addition to the loss of her first nurse, as a severe trauma to the already weak ego threatening the whole organization of it. In consequence, the situation of Jack's birth and the separation from the mother were denied. The mother was idealized and at the same time omnipotently controlled. Part of her sadism was projected on to her father, in the typical way, who was thus turned into a violent devil persecutor, but regression to the early relationship to the breast, which caused a mobilization of the schizoid processes, absorbed the rest of her aggression. This method of absorbing aggression I shall show in some detail later on.[8]

Progress was now noticeable in that she came regularly and mostly in time, but in spite of the intellectual understanding of the aggressive impulses inside her, she still could not experience them as conscious feelings. However, we observed that whenever she had occasion to feel envy or frustration, some of the symptoms of depersonalization or ego-disintegration which I have described before, appeared. It seemed that the destructive impulses, instead of being registered by her ego as aggression and being directed outwards against an

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[7] In analysing other schizoid patients, I have frequently observed a revival of similar sadistic attacks on the breast in the transference situation, which first showed themselves in the patient's inability to talk and to co-operate. The sadism, which gradually came to the surface, was of a particularly *tantalizing* quality : the patient appeared continuously to try to rouse interest and enthusiasm in the analyst, only to frustrate him and discourage him as soon as he showed any response by an interpretation. In spite of the history of an early weaning trauma in most of these cases, the patient had actually never refused the breast or other food as a baby. On the contrary, some of the patients were described as model babies. I want to suggest here an explanation of this fact. The sadistic attacks and the refusal of the breast exist in the phantasies only of these babies, while fear of starvation on the one hand, and persecuting anxieties on the other, compel the child to submit to taking food. In the analytic situation, a great number of these deeply-repressed phantasies are acted out before becoming conscious, and constitute our most valuable information about the impulses at work in earliest infancy.

[8] The regression of my patient reminds me of Melanie Klein's (1946) suggestion that a regression from a later level to the paranoid position occurs frequently in cases where strong paranoid fears had impeded the normal working-through of the paranoid position. Federn (1928), on the other hand, suggests that depersonalization is *directly* based on a shock in early childhood through which the ego becomes permanently weakened.

external object, turned against her own libidinal impulses, causing a lack of desire and feeling, as well as against her ego, producing varying degrees of splitting and thus disturbances in the function of her ego. During the height of the paranoid schizoid state for periods lasting some days, her ego more or less ceased to function in relation to the analyst. She had, therefore, been unable to come to the sessions, and when she did come she was unable to feel, think or talk. The improvement in her condition showed itself in that now, even when she was in a bad phase, the destructive impulses left part of her ego intact, which meant that self-observation, talking and simple action were possible. In consequence, the schizoid processes of internal splitting and excessive projection of impulses and parts of her ego could be observed in greater detail. One had to be continuously on the look-out for those parts of herself which she projected into other people, mainly her friends, her sister or the analyst, and also for internal splits, which showed themselves in a monotonous form of speaking, complete inability to speak, drowsiness or other difficulties like disturbances of thinking and acting.

There was a great resistance to any attempt to integrate the projected and split-off parts, even after the intellectual recognition of such a process. A great deal of hate was hidden behind this resistance. This hostility only gradually came more to the surface and was part of the destructive forces inside her which divided practically anything and everything. By this I mean that this division was not only observed between good and bad impulses and objects, or between what occurred inside her and in outer reality, but it seemed as if all thought-processes, actions and impulses were split into innumerable parts, isolated from one another and kept in a state of division. The patient spontaneously referred to this condition as 'I am split up again'. The persistent interpretation of all the splits and divisions, wherever they were noticed, seemed to bring great relief to the patient; it stimulated integration and increased her hope of ultimate recovery. The splitting of thoughts and actions, showed itself particularly in relation to the analytic situation, for example, her frequent lateness for analysis arose from her dividing up her coming to analysis into many isolated part-actions. Getting up, dressing, having breakfast, the bus ride to the analysis and the analytical session itself were all acts which did not seem to her to have anything to do with one another; if she were early in getting up, it did not necessarily mean to say she would come in time. She might quite easily take an hour for dressing without any anxiety about it getting late. Then she might hurry over breakfast, only to wait a long time before deciding to leave for her appointment. Sometimes she arrived quite in time, but would not start to talk, and it seemed that the action of arriving for analysis had finished and there was now a gap. The action of talking to me had become split off, and there was no desire to talk. As I pointed out before, owing to this division into part-actions, very little conscious anxiety was felt by her about her failure to come for treatment, and no adjustment in time or learning from experience could be achieved until she could think of all the part-actions together as a single whole. Similar difficulties showed themselves in her everyday life. She frequently took a great deal of trouble to fix an appointment with her hairdresser, who lived half-an-hour away from her, only to muddle up the appointment by leaving home at the time she was due there. She had not forgotten that the journey took thirty minutes, but this fact and the action of travelling had become completely dissociated from one another. Frequently her emotional appreciation suffered through the splitting process, even later on in the analysis when she had greatly improved. It happened that her fiancé had to go to Bombay where riots had broken out and shooting attacks on British soldiers were reported. For days she was quite unconcerned about him, because the fact of his being in Bombay remained disconnected from the dangerous situation which existed there. When this split righted itself through the analysis, she felt a great shock of anxiety and her normal concern for her fiancé could come to the surface.

I have now chosen some material, from a time when she herself had become aware of her impulses, in order to demonstrate the turning inward of the aggression.

Throughout the treatment she had had a great desire to ask questions, but only a few of her questions were actually asked, because she knew I would only interpret them and this she could not stand. Improvement was also shown in her increased ability to ask questions, which were in themselves an important source of information concerning her wishes and anxieties, and they also threw light on her reactions to frustration. As soon as I started to interpret a question, she complained of feelings of deadness or could not remember what she had asked. This repeated itself frequently, until one day she realized and admitted that she was demanding an *immediate* answer from me. She said she felt cross and tense. But what was the point of wanting to ask questions if one did not get an answer. After that she fell into a long silence. When I interpreted that she had got rid of her feelings, she replied that she was pleased not to feel any tension; but soon after she showed her understanding of the danger of this mechanism by saying: 'If one wanted to get rid of one's curiosity one would just die, because one has no desire to live. It is not that one wants to die; one just dies.' *Instead of attacking and destroying the analyst, the destructive impulses had turned against her desire to live, her libido, which left her half-dead,*

as it were, and so in a state of depersonalization.[9] The intensity of the ambivalence on this and other similar occasions suggested that the impulses were of a pregenital nature and her curiosity seemed to be primarily an oral impulse, while the aggressive impulses were linked with anal phantasies and symptoms. For instance, her desire to find out through looking or reading led frequently to indigestion ; and once when I had interpreted her crossness as an attack on the analyst with fæces, she failed to appear for the next session. She explained later that she had become so constipated that, instead of coming to analysis, she had gone home to give herself an enema. Similar facts were over and over again demonstrated to the patient and gradually genital impulses appeared for the first time more clearly in the transference. For example, when she left the bookshop for her analytic interview she began to suspect the girls of thinking she went out to enjoy herself. After my interpretation that she felt she was coming to enjoy the analysis she fell asleep, but had a dream which she related to me on waking. The dream was that she held the lid of a teapot in her hand and felt it was getting larger through her touch—the lid had here a distinctly phallic significance.

In other ways too she began to show her feelings more openly. A boy friend wrote her a farewell letter on leaving her which upset her very much, and for the first time she could quite openly allow herself to cry during the analytic session. But she could not bear to hear me speak because, as she said, it hurt her, jarred on her, felt like an attack splitting her up into a thousand pieces, as if one were to take a hammer and hit a drop of quicksilver. I suggested that her hate of the boy-friend who deserted her was here turning against her feelings and herself. In an attempt to save herself, however, the destructive impulses were projected on to the analyst instead of herself, and so the feelings of persecution from without returned. As was almost to be expected after this interview, she stayed away for a few days to work through her hate by herself ; but when she returned she told me that she had just made the discovery that she felt ashamed of never having been able to feel or to show affection. This realization was still completely split off from the analytical experience, and there was then a struggle for a week or so to make her aware of the split, so that she was able to become conscious of the positive transference. When she was at last able to express gratitude, it was for the fact that it was now possible for her to feel for the first time a whole and a live person.

It was shortly after this time that she came to know a young man with whom she fell deeply in love. At the same time the jealousy of other women could become fully conscious. This was realized particularly in connection with a girl friend who had introduced this young man to her. The relationship between her and the young man developed satisfactorily on both sides, and after several weeks they got engaged. He had to go abroad for two months and they arranged to get married after his return to England. She reacted to his going away with an acute attack of depersonalization. This situation coincided with my summer vacation and there were no signs of a spontaneous recovery when I saw her after the holiday. She had again lost all desire to talk or to come for treatment, at the same time all her feelings for her fiancé had disappeared. She had been crying for days before they had to separate, because she had been afraid that something might happen to him on his plane journey as a repetition of what had happened to her brother Jack. But when he actually had to go she had not felt anything, and now she wondered whether she loved him at all, because she could only feel a thrill about the prospect of getting married, but *he* did not seem to exist. She was worried about this state and keen to co-operate.

Apart from the lack of feeling, another symptom reappeared which she had mentioned only once before at the height of the psychotic state. She felt that she was swelling up like a balloon twelve times her own size. At the same time she felt she was only a tiny self inside this balloon. My patient described this state as most unpleasant and the only clue she gave me was that *expectancy* had something to do with it. If she expected something from another person or from herself or someone wanted something from her, this symptom greatly increased. This description recalled to me the time of her acute paranoid fears concerning the analyst, when she had been afraid that whenever he spoke to her or expected her to speak he would force himself into her. Her active impulses of wanting to force herself into people to dominate, use and empty them, which corresponded to her passive paranoid fears, had been particularly strongly repressed, denied, and split off. I had the distinct impression that one of the reasons why the aggressive impulses had so forcibly turned against her libido, was a fusion of the libidinal impulses with her primitive, greedy, dominating self, against which she felt a violent hatred. Before it had always been difficult to make her aware of wishes, because any desire was unconsciously related to this greedy part of herself which had to be suppressed.

At this stage of the analysis it was sometimes possible for her to admit her wishes, and she now realized that she did not want her fiancé to go

[9] The importance of the ambivalent conflict in depersonalization was particularly realized by Reik (1927), who points out that the lack of feeling is connected with death-wishes directed against the ego. He quotes the words of one of his patients : ' Instead of knowing you want to kill somebody else, you wipe yourself out.' Melanie Klein (1946) has recently described the turning of the destructive impulses against the ego as a schizoid mechanism.

abroad. The frustration connected with his going had stirred up her greedy aggressive wishes. They had taken the form of phantasies in which she was forcing her way into him to compel him to do what she wanted and at the same time she felt she was emptying him of all that was good in him.[10] The result of this greedy aggressive attack was that she felt herself to be inside him. The sensation of the big balloon was connected with the fact that the object she had forced herself into was dead, emptied through her oral demands and full of air through her anal controlling attacks. She felt dead through the projective identification with the object. On the other hand, the loss of the feelings lost through this process seemed to correspond with that part of herself and her libido which through the projection had become split off from herself. This at once became related to the transference. I pointed out to her the anxiety about being separated from me during the holidays and her anxiety about the analysis coming to an end after her marriage. But when I interpreted that these fears had increased her desire and greed for treatment and that she had phantasies too of forcing herself into me to get from me all she wanted she went into a long silence and I then wondered whether she could cope with what I had pointed out. At last she could speak again and said that she had felt immediately that my interpretations were right, but, with that realization, she had become so tired that she had lost consciousness for a few minutes ; nevertheless had managed to get out of the state again by herself. We understood that this reaction was a confirmation of my interpretation and that this state of unconsciousness and complete loss of herself was connected with a fear of going completely into me and losing herself there. It struck me then that her present fear of losing her feelings and the depersonalization were only quantitatively different from the complete loss of herself in the schizoid state of disintegration. If in her greedy desires she felt that she completely entered into another object, she either went to sleep or felt severely split up. If smaller parts underwent the same process she still retained the awareness of herself and was only aware of loss of feelings.

I found a similar situation applying to the splitting processes inside the ego, which I have already described. Here, too, it appears to depend on the quantity and strength of the destructive forces turning against the self, whether depersonalization or a varying degree of ego-disintegration takes place. In the last few months of analysis other interesting material appeared. She admitted, after a long-lasting resistance, that she had been completely frigid in her attempted sexual relations with her fiancé. The frigidity was distinctly related to her feelings of depersonalization. We found that she had masturbation phantasies of being raped, which were closely related to her fears of the penis and other objects being forced into her. Interpretations which established the connection between her primitive oral phantasies and her depersonalization with later genital phantasies, themselves following the earlier pattern, brought great relief to my patient ; this decreased her fear of her genital impulses and allowed them to come more to the surface, making a gradual simultaneous improvement of her depersonalization, her frigidity and her object-relationships become evident. Another fact became noticeable at the end of treatment. With the greater integration of her ego, the process of introjection came more into the open. Previously introjection had been largely overshadowed by projection mechanisms ; or, to put it in another way, the process of introjection had become inhibited through the paranoid anxiety of objects being forced into her. It was particularly the decrease of these specific paranoid fears, through the understanding of the primitive impulses and processes described, which enabled the introjection mechanisms to function again.[11] When she got married and went with her husband to live abroad, the analysis had to be interrupted. I saw her a few times after her honeymoon. She was happy and confident, and her sexual relationship to her husband was developing satisfactorily.

From many points of view the analysis is still very incomplete and there is a danger of relapse. On the other hand, the marriage has a reasonable chance of success and since the patient will return with her husband in two or three years, I did not put any pressure on her to continue analysis at that time.

SUMMARY

I will briefly summarize my conclusions from the analysis of this case.

Schizoid processes, including depersonalization, can be used by the ego as a defence-mechanism at comparatively late stages of development. They are, however, processes which affect the very structure of the ego, causing varying degrees of splitting and projection of the ego. These processes are related to the working within the ego of destructive impulses, which are felt to be alien (split off) and therefore persecutors. Oral and anal sadistic impulses, directed against the inside of mother's body, also increase the persecutory anxiety. These factors suggest an origin of these schizoid mechanisms on a paranoid level, which weakens the subsequent development of the ego.

[10] Similar reactions in depersonalized patients have been described by D. W. Winnicott (1945). Federn (1928) discusses depersonalization as a direct actual disturbance of the narcissistic libido and suggests that in depersonalization regression to ego-boundaries of earlier times takes place, which gives rise to disturbances in ego-feeling. Melanie Klein (1946) has shown the connection of schizoid ego-splitting with projective identification.

[11] Melanie Klein (1946) has made similar observations, she points out : ' As a result of the mind or body being felt to be controlled by other people in a hostile way, there may be a severe disturbance in introjecting good objects.'

The weakened ego of my patient felt the birth of the brother and the circumstances related to it as a shock, and a considerable regression took place through which the schizoid processes became reinforced.

Depersonalization is still considered by psychiatrists and psycho-analysts alike as a very obscure subject. It is often found in the beginning or end of a neurosis or psychosis; it accompanies some organic diseases of the brain, schizophrenic conditions, depressions, obsessional neurosis, hysterical conditions, and has been described as a separate disease entity.

I have tried to show in this paper that there is a definite relationship between the schizoid process and depersonalization. The schizoid splitting mechanisms described were manifested both in the schizoid ego-disintegration and in the depersonalization of my patient. I suggest, therefore, that there is a quantitative difference only between the two clinical states. Among analysts, Helene Deutsch (1942) has drawn attention to certain emotional states similar to depersonalization, and their relationship to schizophrenia, and lately Melanie Klein (1946) has suggested that in depersonalization regression to the paranoid schizoid position takes place.

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ON THE INTENSE AFFECTS ENCOUNTERED IN TREATING A SEVERE MANIC-DEPRESSIVE DISORDER [1]

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Klein in 1934, at the Thirteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress (Lucerne), described observations which led her to conclude that the depressive position was fundamentally associated with anxieties regarding the destruction of whole good introjected objects which were identified with the ego. This anxiety is the ego's fear of the id, and of introjected bad objects identified with the id. She described the manic position as a depreciation of the value of the internal objects—depreciation of the goodness of the good objects as well as the badness of the bad objects—in order to allay some of the anxiety regarding the destruction of the good objects. A detailed elaboration of these

[1] Slightly altered from a paper read on August 2, 1938, at the Fifteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress (Paris). Grateful help for its clarification was obtained from Dr. Susan Isaacs and Mrs. Melanie Klein.

views is to be found in her paper ' A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States ', where she has related them to the earlier views of Freud, Abraham, etc.[2]

In this paper I wish to relate these views to some conclusions I have arrived at in treating manic-depressive states, where intense anger, love, fear and grief of pathological types were found. I wish to describe how inhibitory symptoms, such as silence and stupor, and excitatory symptoms, such as elation and manic flight—often linked by psychiatrists to the primary and constitutional aspects of the manic-depressive disorder—may be analysed and related to the specific phantasies derived from instincts, to the associated anxieties and to the resulting defences. It is also my intention to attempt to describe how vomiting and vomitus and the phantasies connected with each of these may be the basis of feelings of persecution from within and without, as well as how phantasies connected with vomitus may be related to a severe disturbance of the ability to speak about feelings. The use of the atonia of sleep, of sleep itself and of fatigue as defences against the effects of bad internal objects will also be described.

During the past two and a half years an opportunity was afforded me of analysing in an institution several patients with such severe manic-depressive disorders that treatment in private would have been impossible. As an example, a brief description will be given of the history, the clinical state during the analysis, and some crucial situations in the analysis, of a young woman of twenty whom I had under treatment for two years.

She was a first child, and breast-fed for about one month. She sucked strongly, but obtained little, and often screamed herself to sleep. Owing to this she was weaned to the bottle, which she sucked well. The screaming ceased. At the age of six or seven months she spoke a few words and, before two years, was using complicated words and sentences. Her bowel and bladder were trained quickly and early. At about fifteen months she was weaned from the bottle to liquids. At first solid foods were refused and she remained anxious about solid food for several years. She put no toys to her mouth. Her further development was marked by uneventfulness. When she was two years and five months a sister was born and brothers when she was eight and eleven. At ten she had whooping-cough and mumps, after which her tonsils were removed. At eleven she had measles and bronchitis. Her menses began at sixteen. No emotional reaction nor change in her personality was observed regarding any of these events. She progressed steadily through school, but was never considered to be doing her best. After finishing her secondary school curriculum, she went to a Teachers' College—both her parents having been teachers—where she met a woman whom she admired and to whom she wrote letters. This friend noticed that she was becoming more tense and depressed, and suggested that she should go to a Psychological Institute for advice about the type of occupation which would most probably interest her. She was told that the tests she had done there showed her to be of exceptionally high intelligence, and was advised to seek medical treatment for her emotional state. The psychiatrist whom she consulted considered her to be on the verge of a serious depression and advised treatment in hospital. This was soon arranged. Although with her family her disposition had always been sociable, she was shy with new acquaintances, especially men. She never discussed her feelings and under no circumstances showed any intense feeling. Until she went to the Teachers' College, piano playing had been a great interest to her, but she gave it up because she felt she was not making any progress. During the few months preceding admission to hospital, while her mother was convalescing from the effects of having had her uterus removed, she helped at home. Later it became clear that the conflict between her sadistic phantasies about the events of her life and her libidinal phantasies connected with these same events had been so severe that she had been unable to show either normal or neurotic reactions to them.

On admission to hospital she was tense and fidgety. She seemed continuously to be on the verge of tears, but wore a forced smile. She did not speak much and when talking spoke slowly and in a low voice. She complained of being fed up and of not knowing what to do. On being questioned she said that she had been becoming increasingly depressed for as long as she could remember, but that during the previous few years her depression had been worse. She stated that twice during the year prior to her admission she had seriously contemplated suicide by poisoning. Her physical condition was good, although her weight had decreased considerably during the previous year.

As the analysis progressed the following marked changes occurred in her clinical condition. During the first weeks she was usually silent ; during the next months almost completely silent ; while during analytic hours and for some time after interviews an anergic stuporous state occurred, and frequently there was abnormal sleepiness. Occasional slight movements furnished material for the analysis. After about seven months emotional outbursts began to occur—at first at the end of, then later during, interviews. To begin with these outbursts were convulsive and vaguely directed, and the type of affect was difficult to recognize. At times it appeared to me as if she were going to have a ' grand-mal ' convulsion. The spells which began at the end of interviews lasted up to forty

[2] *Int. J. Psycho-Anal.*, 1935, XVI, 2, p. 145.

minutes, making it necessary for me to remain with her until she was able to leave the room without much difficulty. At times she had to be held, and at times the help of nurses was required owing to her strength.

Later these emotional outbursts were more clearly seen to be either those of anger or of love. At this time she became more sociable in the hospital, and was friendly with a younger girl. She began to write letters to me, which she brought to the analysis, and later on drawings as well. Then came a phase when more openly depressed and suicidal tendencies were apparent, and she would cry during interviews. But at other times her behaviour was excited and playful in a flighty manic manner. She began to be more active outside analysis, becoming both more guilty and more actively a nuisance, and attempting to make the analysis impossible. She tried to interfere with the treatment given by me to other patients. She talked more during interviews, and although her emotional outbursts were accompanied by yelling and screaming, they became less frequent and less intense. She was more friendly towards her family when she went home on visits. A friendship with an older man started and later on she became friendly with several young men of her own age, whom she secretly depreciated. Jealousy was more openly apparent. She began to show greater interest in her personal appearance, to make plans for the future, and to be more guilty about the real hardship her treatment was causing her family. For these reasons she decided to discontinue treatment and to start training as a secretary. There was marked improvement in every way, including her sexuality.

Masturbation was first described in a letter written after about nine months' treatment. She wrote that she had tied herself so that on moving she was hurt. She imagined she had a penis attached to herself and was having intercourse with a woman. During the last year of treatment the need to feel pain during masturbation gradually disappeared. Her activities became predominantly feminine. Masturbation phantasies were of more normal intercourse and ended in pregnancy phantasies. She began to think of most men as potential husbands.

The following more detailed description of important aspects of the analysis will illustrate the material on which the conclusions drawn are based.

It was three weeks before she would consent to lie on the couch. The following scanty material and the immediate interpretations of it during this period allowed the analysis to begin. From such material I have come to believe that, in psychoses, what may at first sight seem to be almost conscious, or at least preconscious, material is often deeply unconscious. After more than a year's treatment I became convinced that the behaviour which had been used as the material on which to base interpretations during these first weeks had been deeply unconscious.

During the first weeks she sat tensely and for the most part silently, stating that she was afraid of what I would think if she spoke. I suggested she was afraid that I would say something frightening just as had been said to her by others in her life. She replied that she felt dead. I said that she wanted me to make her feel alive and not to frighten her as others had, to which she replied that she felt inferior. I then said that she wanted me to help her lose this inferior feeling, whereupon she caressed her leg and smiled. I said she wished to show me, but was afraid to tell me, that she was pleased. She told me she wanted to scream where I could not see her. I interpreted this as anger at her frustrated desire to show more pleasure than she had already shown me by stroking her leg and smiling. I said she was angry partly because I asked her to put all she was conscious of into words and had not actively encouraged her or shown pleasure at the way she showed me her pleasure—namely, by smiling and stroking her leg. I said that she wanted to protect me and herself from all she thought would happen if she screamed at me while she was watching me and I was watching her. She began to stroke her legs quite tenderly. Later she told me a dream :

> ' Mother was dead and I had to care for the house. I was to have come here in a day or so. I wanted a husband and a baby, but I couldn't care for the food.'

She gave no associations. She was silent and, after a time, asked me not to look at her. I connected the dream thought ' I couldn't care for the food ' with her difficulty in dealing with the analysis. I informed her that her difficulty in speaking and her wish that I should not watch her nor hear her screaming, arose from her feeling that she could only say or show me something bad—something which she thought would make me act towards her as others had acted when they had seen her do what she wanted to do or say what she wanted to say. She then became less tense, stretched, yawned, and looked sleepy, and turned to the couch. I said that she had elected to sit instead of to lie, because she was afraid of what would happen if she lay and slept, and without watching me she could not protect herself. She got up and then lay down.

After that the analysis was inaugurated by using not only the sequence of what she had said, but also by using the few movements and expressions of emotions she had shown, together with her words. This appears to me to be similar to the minute attention paid in child analysis to the details and the sequence of the behaviour as a whole. More than a year later she told me that she had been unconscious of all the emotions and activity she had shown during this first period of about three

weeks and had often believed that I was lying to her.

A description will now be given of some aspects of the analysis of the stupor. Soon after lying on the couch she began to talk less, and finally did not speak to me in analysis for several months. She lay motionless and blank, and often it was impossible to know whether she was asleep or not. All movements were very slow. After some weeks she began to touch a small rip in the upholstery of the couch near her left shoulder. I was sitting at her left. She touched the rip—she tucked its edges in, making the hole larger—she folded the edges together, making the hole seem to disappear ; at times she would leave it alone and roll over on her back to the right. Once after touching the edges of the rip and putting her finger in it, she suddenly pulled her skirt down as far as it would go and lay on her back. I interpreted this as anxiety about masturbation, and I said she seemed to feel that I would stop her doing so, just as something within her had stopped her playing with the couch. I interpreted the shift to the genital pleasures as a defence against the oral anxieties with which she had started the analysis. She became more active with the hole in the couch as well as becoming weaker and slower ; and by now looked much sleepier at the end of interviews. She continued to be stuporous for some hours afterwards.

I considered that the weakness and the sleepiness were defences against showing me more details of genital masturbation. As more details of her anxious interest in the hole in the couch, and more of her non-anxious or libidinal interest in it became apparent, the defences were more openly shown and stronger. In my opinion, the interest in masturbation itself was a defence against oral interests. Interpretations were along these lines. At this time there was not the confirmation of these views available, which came later when the alternations between oral and genital interests often occurred from moment to moment.

The next phase began when she suddenly arose and stuffed some paper into a window which was rattling in the wind. She did this energetically, and seemed to rouse suddenly from a stuporous sleep state to do so. On lying down again she returned to her former state. I told her that this strong reaction to a noise was to prevent it from harming either me or herself in the way which she thought the noises she was keeping in (by remaining weak and sleepy and silent) would harm one or both of us, if she gave up the defences already mentioned. At the end of the interview she clutched me silently and vaguely and strong convulsive movements followed. I thought that she was going to develop a ' grand mal ' convulsion. She seemed to be fighting with herself to hold something in. Her eyes and mouth were closed. She became fatigued, and afterwards left silently. I interpreted her behaviour as showing the contrast between her sleepy stuporous state of anxiety at my being harmed and then harming her in revenge (if I knew what she were keeping silent about), and her intense anger at the frustration, when I did not give her the help she was unable to ask for, all of which I related to the memory of an early period when she felt her parents knew her wishes, although she had not spoken. This phase was followed by her bringing me a letter. She blamed me for making her want a husband and a baby. I linked this to her first dream of some months before, and said that she was writing as if I had been the dreamer, and that she was substituting me for her earlier acquaintances through whom she had first known of husbands and babies. I said she believed that I was as deeply within her as the part of her which dreamt. From this time on the material concerning introjected objects became more conscious.

She then wrote of the fear she had had of the way her father had hugged her and kissed her. I said that she had also blamed her father for her wish for a husband and baby, just as she had blamed me for the dream of which she had told me. She then yelled loudly :

' I can't speak.'

' You make me talk.'

' I don't dare speak.'

I said these were memories of what she had said when angry, and memories of phantasies of talking when frustrated, as for example, when her father wanted her to talk instead of act and when, during the analytic treatment, I wanted her to talk. This was followed by a dream : ' I vomited out of the window and was afraid you would touch it ', which, in my opinion, was linked to the mess that she had told me she was in (which she wanted me to clear up), to the noise she wished to expel (the window in the dream was the window where she had stopped the noise), and to her fear that the good, uneaten external me and the bad internal mess of vomitus would unite.

The emotional outbursts then became more purposeful and much less convulsive. They appeared to be more definitely attacks of anger, in which she growled, scratched, kicked and bit. The analysis of the details of this behaviour convinced her that in her phantasies vomitus represented the me which she believed she had eaten in the first apparently vaguely directed convulsive attacks. The wish to eat me now (since I frustrated her as her parents had done in the past), became connected with much memory material—both fact and phantasy—of her parents and also of her grandparents.

She now became obsessed with the feeling that there was a lump of meat in her throat and, for a time, she was nauseated and unable to eat well. This became associated with memories of her bottle and memories of her father giving it to her. The emotional attacks were no longer simply

attacks of anger, but became mixed with libidinous features. She energetically tried to bite me in the genital region and, when prevented, she tried to bite me wherever her mouth happened to be. Such biting was more than an attempt to bite a bit off my body. She stated and wrote that she wanted to eat her way into my body. This behaviour was interpreted as a desire to swallow and control, mixed with or followed by a wish to eat her way into the person attacked, and to be eaten by that person in order to preserve him from being destroyed by her. I stated that this behaviour was a repetition of what she had phantasied she had done with her father. At this time she wrote about how she feared her father when he said he was going to show her what the boys would do to her. It was not discovered at what age she believed this occurred, nor if it were fact or phantasy.

Shortly after this she began to write letters about her masturbation and to draw masturbatory scenes. She described a series of women she had secretly admired. As soon as the interpretation that she wished to control my sexual behaviour from within, as she had previously tried to control her father's with her mother, was given to her, the masculine identification, which had been brought about both by oral incorporation and by trying to eat her way into me, became less. Different attitudes, which had led to the masculine identification, were seen at the same time. Phantasies of having sucked, bitten and swallowed her father's penis, of having eaten her way into him, and of having been eaten and swallowed by him, all led to a masculine identification—in the first case due to being controlled from within by the man she had introjected, and in the second by controlling the man she phantasied living within (i.e. projective incorporation). She became able to describe considerable guilt regarding her attitude to several women. It was now possible to link her previous actual indifference to her mother and father to her anxieties about and her denial of her phantasied control over their mutual behaviour to each other.

Her wish to restore to other women what she had taken from them was first seen in a change in the emotional outbursts as she now became more gentle and tender. At first it was seen as a wish to be loving to a man, so that he could be loving to another woman. It was only much later that this was understood in terms of feminine wishes or of a feminine identification.

As yet there was no indication of improvement in her everyday life, and many of my non-analytic colleagues thought that her reactions furnished an example of analysis precipitating a psychosis. My judgement was, however, that the changes in her clinical state were clearly related to a transference situation in the analysis, which was gradually becoming conscious and being resolved. In my opinion she appeared to be in a state nearer normality than before the onset of the analysis. At this time the continuance of and the progress in the analysis itself seemed to me to be indicative of improvement. In the analysis of psychoses it is these criteria which have to be relied upon most, as there may not be any other standards to depend upon.

After the period described above her condition in interviews began to vary much more frequently and quickly. The alternations between feminine and masculine identifications occurred very rapidly. They could be understood in terms of the swiftly-changing relationships of her internal objects. The ' good ' mother, made good partly by the patient's libidinal wishes, had to be protected from the ' bad ' father, who was himself partly made bad by the patient's aggressive wishes towards him. The ' good ' father, made good partly by the patient's libidinal wishes, had to be protected from the ' bad ' mother, who was herself partly made bad by the patient's aggressive wishes towards her. In both cases the ' good ' parent is the parent imago to which libidinal wishes have been previously directed and to which they are again directed. This ' good ' parent has, of course, been made ' good ' by the projection of the libidinal wishes, while the ' bad ' parent is the parent imago towards which aggressive wishes have been previously directed, and to which they are again directed. This ' bad ' parent has been, of course, made ' bad ' by the projection of the aggressive wishes. The ego identification was found to be with either the ' good ' or ' bad ' father or ' good ' or ' bad ' mother, or their substitutes in actual life. When the ego was predominantly identified with the ' good ' father or the ' good ' mother and endangered by the ' bad ' father or the ' bad ' mother, the depression and the defences, already mentioned, recurred. When the ego was mainly identified with the ' bad ' father or ' bad ' mother, the libidinal and/or aggressive emotional outbursts recurred.

The following is an example of part of an interview in which very rapid changes occurred. Once, at a time when suicidal tendencies were prominent, her voice suddenly became soft and she tried to caress, fondle and tenderly embrace me. She said softly that she could never leave me. Then she suddenly yelled in a state of fear ' Don't look at me—you are too nice '. This was interpreted as a wish to protect the loved good internalized object by projection—I being the good object. Immediately after this she pleaded with me in sorrow, in a rather vague but intense manner, to kill her. I interpreted this as the wish that the good object, which she had just projected, should kill the bad object in order to protect the good object against the bad object. She at once became more energetic and lost her vague look. She stated sorrowfully that she hated me, that I had no feeling and that I was dead. I interpreted this as a coming-

together of the good and the bad, both in me and in her, following my previous interpretation—that she was now more energetic and less vague—but that the good object was still endangered by the bad and that, for the moment, our egos were both in the same state. She immediately took a more neutral attitude towards me. I was no longer depreciated nor idealized by projection of good or bad imagos, nor was her ego modified by identification with introjected imagos. Or, put in another way—I was not more depreciated or idealized by projection of ' good ' or ' bad ' imagos than her ego was modified by ' good ' or ' bad ' introjected imagos. She sorrowfully said that, if I did not love her, no one would. I related her sorrow to the new position with regard to me, her hopelessness to the earliest situations of sorrow when she had few objects and when they appeared destroyed or unloving, the whole world seemed destroyed or unloving. I reminded her that at this early time experience had not yet brought her into touch with possible substitutes. This conclusion concerning the relationship between the id impulses, which are the source of anger and love, and the internal objects, at times of maximal feelings, only became clear when I realized that the good object was projected totally and temporarily on to me at the moment of the outbreak. In the absence of such total projection of affects these did not manifest themselves in their full strength. By the continued analysis of this mechanism in the transference, both transference love and hate diminished and her relationship to me became more normal.

From the interpretations described in the last paragraph it might be assumed that I was suggesting to her that as an external object I was not there at all, i.e. that I had no reality and that therefore there was no ground for her to have any attitude to me in my own right. Her contact with reality was at this time such that I did not think she believed I was what would technically be called a hallucination and consequently I only dealt in the interpretation with the disturbance of reality relations which was present. If I had believed that she unconsciously did not believe I existed as an external object, I would have interpreted differently as shown in the first of the following examples.

The two final examples from the last part of the analysis described show how the internal objects were more easily detected as such. This example occurred during the first interview after the patient returned from a visit to her home. During this visit she had been able to assume a more responsible rôle in the household. She was over-solicitous in regard to the suffering of all members of the family ; but the analysis of her sadism in relation to this suffering was well advanced. In the interview she was much more relaxed and it appeared to me as if she almost fell asleep. At the end of the interview she seemed to wake up suddenly, frightened and angry. She fought to remain in the room, saying, ' Don't let me wake up—I'll be home again '. This reaction subsided when I interpreted her belief that she was asleep, that I was inside her, that she was treating the whole analysis as a dream or phantasy and as a substitute for the good relationship which she wished to develop at home, both when awake and asleep, but which she still felt would be disturbed by her sadism.

In later interviews, when the transference was to a nursing mother, and when memory material was closest to the earliest months (when, according to her history, she was ill-fed and screamed) she tried to make me wear cushions as breasts, tried to expose my breasts, and had phantasies regarding how I could grow breasts. She yelled and choked in her bouts of anger ; sucked and smiled in her attempts to love, and described oral sensations, which were accepted by her as memories of feelings in her mouth before she had any teeth. One day she tried to draw a mess which she felt inside herself. What she drew was at first a sheet of scribble, but the form gradually changed. I interpreted her activity as the wish to remake her mother's breast which she believed she had eaten and to restore it to me in the rôle of her mother. At that moment she became conscious of her drawing as a fair representation of a full-sized breast, and her associations were immediately of good relationships between mother and child.

In conclusion some general points about writing and drawing are mentioned. Both have proved useful with other patients in the same way as with this patient. Writing was sent or brought to me from about the seventh month. After the sixteenth month less was brought. I always accepted the writing, and tried to read it aloud in interviews and to interpret it if possible as I went along. In general, writing was interpreted as a projection mechanism acting as a defence against oral activities. Occasionally, it was related directly to dealing with the derivatives of anal play and play with her stool. Once she wished to write her name on my body and this could be related to play with her stool. More intense anxieties were analysed in connection with writing being used as a secret and silent defence against oral situations. During the analysis the writing became less rigidly formal and, during the last months she gave me some writing which was almost indecipherable. Earlier in the analysis she had brought writing in a secret code and soon afterwards began to bring drawings without writing. She brought mirror-writing and a small mirror which she kept in her hand. She gave me the mirror-writing, but I had to look into the mirror which she held and controlled in order to be able to read what she had given me.

The drawings were interpreted as the projection of memory and of phantasy material. Her drawing changed little from the artistic standpoint, and I do not think that there is much chance of her

is how we are considering it, we may represent it by a single symbol and write

$$u_i = (u_1\ u_2\ u_3\ u_4)$$

where i is given the values 1, 2, 3, 4 in succession.

The row u_i is called a tensor of the first order (or a vector) : u_1, u_2, etc. are called the components of the tensor ; and the number of components is the number of dimensions of the tensor. Thus u_i is a four-dimensional tensor. In what follows, all the tensors involved in any given problem will have the same number of dimensions unless the contrary is explicitly stated.

Now let us take a new first-order tensor v_j and form the product $u_i.v_j$ by multiplying each component of u_i by each component of v_j. The result is a square array of sixteen components, thus :

$$u_i.v_j = \begin{Bmatrix} u_1v_1 & u_1v_2 & u_1v_3 & u_1v_4 \\ u_2v_1 & u_2v_2 & u_2v_3 & u_2v_4 \\ u_3v_1 & u_3v_2 & u_3v_3 & u_3v_4 \\ u_4v_1 & u_4v_2 & u_4v_3 & u_4v_4 \end{Bmatrix}$$

and is a tensor of the second order. Similarly we can construct the product of three first-order tensors $u_i.v_j.w_k$, which is a third-order tensor having 64 components in a cubical array. To complete the scheme, we define a tensor of order zero (or a scalar) to mean an ordinary number.

Tensors of the same order can be added or subtracted by forming a new tensor whose components are the sums or differences respectively of the corresponding components of the original tensors, thus :

$$\begin{aligned} u_i+v_i &= (u_1\ u_2\ u_3\ u_4)+(v_1\ v_2\ v_3\ v_4) \\ &= (u_1+v_1\ u_2+v_2\ u_3+v_3\ u_4+v_4) \end{aligned}$$

$$x_{ij} - x_{ij} = \begin{Bmatrix} x_{11} & x_{12} & x_{13} & x_{14} \\ x_{21} & x_{22} & x_{23} & x_{24} \\ x_{31} & x_{32} & x_{33} & x_{34} \\ x_{41} & x_{42} & x_{43} & x_{44} \end{Bmatrix} - \begin{Bmatrix} y_{11} & y_{12} & y_{13} & y_{14} \\ y_{21} & y_{22} & y_{23} & y_{24} \\ y_{31} & y_{32} & y_{33} & y_{34} \\ y_{41} & y_{42} & y_{43} & y_{44} \end{Bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{Bmatrix} x_{11}-y_{11} & x_{12}-y_{12} & x_{13}-y_{13} & x_{14}-y_{14} \\ x_{21}-y_{21} & x_{22}-y_{22} & x_{23}-y_{23} & x_{24}-y_{24} \\ x_{31}-y_{31} & x_{32}-y_{32} & x_{33}-y_{33} & x_{34}-y_{34} \\ x_{41}-y_{41} & x_{42}-y_{42} & x_{43}-y_{43} & x_{44}-y_{44} \end{Bmatrix}$$

The convention is adopted that whenever a suffix (i, j, etc.) is repeated twice in a tensor, the repeated suffix is to be given all possible values and the results are to be added together. The operation of equating two suffixes and then complying with this summation convention is called contraction. If we contract the tensor x_{ij} we obtain

$$x_{ii} = x_{11}+x_{22}+x_{33}+x_{44}$$

which is an ordinary number or a tensor of zero order. Similarly, on contracting the third-order tensor x_{ijk} we get

$$\begin{aligned} x_{ijk} = ((&x_{111} + x_{221} + x_{331} + x_{441}) \\ &(x_{112} + x_{222} + x_{332} + x_{442}) \\ &(x_{113} + x_{223} + x_{333} + x_{443}) \\ &(x_{114} + x_{224} + x_{334} + x_{444})) \end{aligned}$$

which is a tensor of the first order. From these examples it is evident that in general the contraction of a tensor reduces its order by two.

This is all the tensor calculus required for the present purpose, and we now proceed to develop the formulæ of the generalized hedonic theory.

Mathematical Formulation of the Generalized Theory

If, under a given set of conditions, the ego experiences m different kinds of pleasure simultaneously, and if each of these pleasures has an intensity which is expressed numerically, as was done in the restricted theory, then no matter what the psychological meaning of the phrase ' different kinds of pleasure ' may be, the hedonic state of the ego is completely expressed by the first-order tensor P, where

$$P = p_i = (p_1\ p_2\ p_3 \cdots p_{m-1}\ p_m) \quad . \quad . \quad (1)$$

in which p_1 is the intensity of the first kind of pleasure, p_2, that of the second kind, and so on. When convenient, as on the left of (1), we shall use a capital letter without a suffix to denote a tensor. In (1) and in the rest of the paper, a negative value of any of the p's will signify an unpleasure, as in the restricted theory.

The given set of conditions will be taken to be that the ego is influenced in a number of ways simultaneously, such that the nth influence acting alone and in the absence of any of the others produces a hedonic state of the ego represented by the tensor P_n, where

$$P_n = p_{ni} = (p_{n1}\ p_{n2}\ p_{n3} \cdots p_{nm-1}\ p_{nm}) \quad . \quad (2)$$

Then we may say that the nth component hedonic state is P_n, and that the resultant hedonic state is P. We now proceed to establish a formula for the resultant in terms of the components.

Before doing so, however, I must set right an error in the derivation of equation (5) of the restricted theory which came to light some time after the theory was published. To understand the nature of this error it is necessary to consider the stability of the equilibrium of the ' forces ' tending to change P : I quote from that earlier paper [2] : ' I conceive that when the stimuli are applied, the ego is acted upon by " forces " which tend to change P, and that in consequence P sets itself to such a value that the " forces " are in equilibrium with each other so that their resultant vanishes. . . . The mathematical representation of the equilibrium condition is evidently . . . $\Sigma(f_n) = 0$. . . . It seems to me reasonable to assume that the greater the value of any component pleasure P_n, the greater will be the " force " f_n associated with it, and further, that this " force " will increase as the difference between P and P_n becomes greater. Since there is no reason to assume any more complex law, we shall take it that the " force " is directly proportional to P_n and to the difference

[2] See footnote on p. 180.

between P and P_n. . . . In accordance with the above assumptions we write $f_n = P_n(P - P_n)$.'

Now suppose that all the other ' forces ' are suddenly removed (by removing all the other component pleasures) so that f_n acts alone. Then if the equation for f_n is to be valid, f_n must always act in such a direction as to cause P to take up the value P_n, since P_n is now the only pleasure felt by the ego. It is readily seen that the equation does not fulfil this condition and is therefore invalid; for suppose first of all that P_n is positive and that a positive value of f_n is supposed to act in such a direction as to reduce the value of P_n. Then in this case, if P is greater than P_n, f_n is positive and so reduces the value of P until $P = P_n$, whereas when P is initially less than P_n, f_n is negative and so tends to increase P until $P = P_n$. Thus for positive values of P_n the equilibrium is stable. Now suppose that P_n is negative. In this case, when P is greater than P_n, f_n is negative and so causes P to increase still further, whilst if P is initially less than P_n, f_n will be positive, thus causing a further unlimited decrease in the value of P. Thus for negative values of P_n the equilibrium is unstable and the equation for f_n cannot stand.

This difficulty can be overcome by introducing some odd function, Q say, of P on the right of the equation for f_n. (*A* function $F(x)$ is odd if it is such that $F(-x) = -F(x)$). Then we shall have the modified equation

$$f_n = Q.P_n.(P_n - P) \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (3)$$

where the sign of the bracket term has been changed so that we now have (assuming Q positive when P is positive) the more usual convention that a positive ' force ' is in the direction of P increasing. It will be seen that whenever P_n and P (and hence Q) are both positive or both negative, the sign of f_n is the same as the sign of the bracket, so that in each case P is brought back to the value P_n, the equilibrium being stable. If, on the other hand, P_n and P are initially of opposite sign, P will move away from the value P_n until it passes through infinity, after which P has changed sign so that P_n and P are now of the same sign and the equilibrium is again stable.

The working is now practically the same as in the earlier paper: we have

$$\Sigma(f_n) = Q.\Sigma(P_n(P_n - P)) = 0 \quad . \quad . \quad (4)$$

from which we have, on dividing by $-Q$:
$\Sigma(P_n(P - P_n) = 0$, which is equation (4) of that paper.

Returning to the generalized theory, consider the components p_1 and p_{n1} of the tensors P and P_n respectively. Both these components represent the same kind of pleasure, and as in equation (3) above, we assume that a ' force ' is associated with them and that this ' force ' is proportional to p_{n1}, to the difference between p_1 and p_{n1}, and to an odd function $q(p_1) = q_1$ of p_1. Calling this ' force ' f_{n111} (the reason for the multiple suffix will appear in a moment), we shall have $f_{n111} = k_{111}.q_1.p_{n1}.(p_{n1} - p_1)$, where k_{111} is a constant of proportionality. Similarly for p_2 and p_{n2} we shall have $f_{n222} = k_{222}.q_2.p_{n2}.(p_{n2} - p_2)$ and so on, the general equation of the series being

$$f_{niii} = k_{iii}.q_i.p_{ni}.(p_{ni} - p_i) \text{ (not summed over } i) \quad (5)$$

But this is not all, for there is no reason why there should not be a ' force ' proportional to q_i, to p_{nj}, and to the difference between p_k and p_{nk}: calling it f_{nijk} we shall have the general equation of the complete three-dimensional set, viz,

$$f_{nijk} = k_{ijk}.q_i.p_{nj}.(p_{nk} - p_k) \text{ (not summed over } i, j, k) \quad (6)$$

By analogy with the tensor notation we can write for the entire set

$$F_n = f_{nijk} = (k_{ijk})\, g_{nijk} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (7)$$

where

$$G_n = g_{nijk} = q_i.p_{nj}.(p_{nk} - p_k) \quad . \quad . \quad (8)$$

and the bracket in (7) is used to indicate that the summation convention is not to be applied in virtue of the doubling of i, j, and k. It will be observed that G_n is in fact a third-order tensor formed of the product of three first-order tensors.

We now make the assumption that when all the influences are acting on the ego, P sets itself in such a way that each component of (7) when summated for all values of n vanishes independently, which is to say that

$$\Sigma(F_n) = 0 \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (9)$$

where 0 is shorthand for the third-order tensor all of whose components are zeros. It is evident from (7) that (9) will be satisfied whenever we have

$$\Sigma(G_n) = 0 \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (10)$$

and therefore we shall take (10) as the condition to be fulfilled. From (8) and (10) we have

$$q_i.\Sigma(p_{nj}.(P_{nk} - p_k)) = 0 \quad . \quad . \quad (11)$$

Multiplying by q_i and summing for all values of i, afterwards dividing by the scalar $q_i.q_i$, we have

$$\Sigma(p_{nj}.p_{nk}) - p_k.\Sigma(p_{nj}) = 0 \quad . \quad . \quad (12)$$

It is now an easy matter to find p_k. Multiply by $\Sigma(p_{nj})$ and divide by the scalar $(\Sigma(p_{nj}))^2$ after summing for j: then

$$p_k = \frac{\Sigma(p_{nj}).\Sigma(p_{nj}.p_{nk})}{(\Sigma(p_{nj}))^2} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (13)$$

If in (13) all the tensors are of one dimension so that they reduce to ordinary numbers, we shall have

$$p = \frac{\Sigma(p_n).\Sigma(p_n)^2}{(\Sigma(p_n))^2} = \frac{\Sigma(p_n)^2}{\Sigma(p_n)}$$

which is equation (5) of the restricted theory—the fundamental equation of the theory. But since all the tensors reduce to ordinary numbers, all the pleasures represented by them must be of the same kind. Thus it is seen that the restricted theory is a special case of the present theory, as was mentioned in the Introduction above.

Equation (13) is the fundamental equation of the present generalized theory, and the rest of this paper is concerned with its implications. Before leaving this section, however, we define the scalar resultant p to be given by

$$p = p_i . l_i \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (14)$$

that is to say, to obtain p, we multiply the tensor p_i by a first-order tensor all of whose components are unity, and then contract, the result being the sum of the components of p_i.

Further Assumptions and General Considerations

It is now time to link up the mathematical formalism with psychological concepts, and in this connection the first question which presents itself is this: What meaning is to be attached to the phrases 'different kinds of pleasure' and pleasures of the same kind' and hence to the different components of the tensors representing the pleasures? Let us introduce another piece of mathematical shorthand. It will be remembered that n is the number which distinguishes the different influences acting on the ego. Let us agree that whenever a term is to be summed for all values of n we shall denote the operation by underlining the term and omitting the suffix n. Equation (13) then takes the compact form

$$p_k = \frac{p_j . p_j . p_k}{(p_j)^2} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (15)$$

Now suppose that each component p_{ni} of the tensor P_n is replaced by a first-order tensor R_i multiplied by a numerical constant p_{ni}. R_i is independent of n, and in general the number of components will be different for different values of i, and we make the restriction that

$$r_{iu} . 1_u = 1 \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (16)$$

so that each R_i may be regarded as representing a different kind of compound pleasure made up of the elementary pleasures represented by its components r_{iu}, the intensity of this compound pleasure being given by the value of the numerical multiplying factor p_{ni}. Substituting in (15) we obtain

$$p_k = \frac{p_j . p_j . p_k . (R_j^2 . R_k)}{(p_j)^2 . (R_j^2)} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (17)$$

where the brackets enclosing the R-terms have the same meaning as in (7). R_j^2 is a second-order tensor contracted and is therefore an ordinary number. It is positive, since it is the sum of squares of real numbers. It will thus be seen that the only difference between (15) and (17) is the presence of these positive constants (depending only on the composition of the compound pleasures) in the latter, and since we have at present no means of measuring pleasures, it is a matter of indifference whether the pleasures with which we are dealing are simple or compound, so that we are absolved from the necessity of defining the meaning of a simple pleasure and of resolving compound pleasures into their elementary components. This is a most fortunate circumstance, because our present knowledge would certainly not suffice for such a task, and had things turned out otherwise I should probably have been forced to abandon the investigation. In view of these considerations, we shall from now on ignore these constants by assigning the same value to them all so that they cancel out in the numerator and denominator of (17). If it should happen that in a given case this condition is not in fact fulfilled, then we shall remain unaware of it, since the only effect would be a change in the scale of measurement of the various pleasures relatively to each other, and this we have no means of detecting.

We now introduce two important postulates linking the mathematics with the psychology. Firstly we assume that the resultant pleasure P is the thing that enters experience, and that each component of the tensor is experienced as a distinct pleasure, and secondly we assume that the pleasure-principle within the ego acts automatically so as to make the scalar resultant p as great as possible within the framework of the relevant circumstances.

We will now consider the meaning of the phrase 'different kinds of pleasure'. Suppose that we have two influences acting on the ego simultaneously and that each of them carries with it a pleasure, and let us call these pleasures P_1 and P_2. Then if they are of the same kind, the numbers representing their intensities will occupy corresponding places in the respective tensors; we can write $P_1 = a$ and $P_2 = b$, and we shall have

$$P = p = \frac{a^2 + b^2}{a + b} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (A)$$

which is the case studied fully in the restricted theory (1).

If, on the other hand, the pleasures are of different kinds, their intensities will be represented by numbers which will occupy different places in the respective tensors, so that we may write

$$P_1 = (a, 0), P_2 = (0, b)$$

This gives $p_{11} = a, p_{21} = 0, p_{12} = 0, p_{22} = b$

$$\underline{p_1} = a, \underline{p_2} = b,$$

$$\underline{p_1 . p_1} = a^2, \underline{p_1 . p_2} = 0, \underline{p_2 . p_2} = b^2$$

Substituting in (15) we obtain

$$p_k = \frac{(a^3, b^3)}{a^2 + b^2} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (18)$$

the scalar resultant being

$$p = \frac{a^3 + b^3}{a^2 + b^2} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (B)$$

To facilitate the comparison of equations (A) and (B), their graphs have been plotted and superimposed in Fig. 1. In these graphs, the value of a has been set equal to unity and p has been plotted against the value of b. The most striking and significant difference between the behaviour of the

two functions occurs when the value of b is in the neighbourhood of -1; i.e. when a pleasure and an unpleasure of about equal intensity are applied to the ego simultaneously.

Using equation (A), which is the same as equation (6) of the restricted theory, I was able, on account of its remarkable behaviour to the left of the zero point, to give a coherent explanation of a whole series of phenomena in the paper above referred to. It would have been quite impossible to do this by using equation (B), which give a graph which runs smoothly downward to the left. It follows that in all the examples considered in the previous paper the pairs of pleasures which are combined together must be represented by pairs of numbers which occupy corresponding places in the respective P-tensors, since it is only under this condition that we obtain curve (A). What is more, all those examples were chosen before the present theory was worked out, so that if we re-examine the examples in the previous paper, and if in every case we find a similarity between the two members of the pair of pleasures which is the same for all the pairs, then there will be good grounds for associating this similarity with the fact that both pleasures are represented by numbers occupying corresponding places in their respective tensors and for saying that pleasures which exhibit this particular similarity are to be called ' pleasures of the same kind '. Conversely, if we have two pleasures which do not exhibit the similarity referred to, and which combine according to equation (B), and are so to be represented by numbers occupying different places in their respective tensors, then it will be legitimate to speak of them as ' different kinds of pleasure '. The way is thus open to finding a psychological meaning to the concept of ' different kinds of pleasure ' by a direct appeal to observation.

The examples in the order in which they appear in the earlier paper are as follows :—

(1) The unpleasure due to the return of repressed sexual impulses.

(2) The unpleasure of oral jealousy exhibited by a three-months-old baby on hearing the sounds of the parental love-making and kissing.

(3) The pleasure of a masochist in being birched by his mistress.

(4) The pleasure of a sadistic six-year-old child on witnessing the caning of another child.

(5) The reduction of unpleasure brought about by self-punishment in cases of moral masochism.

(6) The pathogenic unpleasure produced in the case of Little Hans by his mother's castration-threat coinciding in time with his masturbation pleasure.

(7) The pleasure of playing chess.

(8) The pleasure of an eighteen-months-old boy in throwing his toys away to represent the departure of his mother. (Freud.)

(9) The pleasures of mountaineering and similar activities.

(10) The pleasure of love-play.

(11) The pleasure of expectation of food when hungry.

Just enough information is given here for the present purpose ; further details will be found in my earlier paper.

Now consider the first example. A good way to study the return of the repressed is to observe the phenomena which occur during analysis itself, for here the process is taking place before our eyes and the conditions are ideal for subjecting it to the closest scrutiny. It turns out that when a repressed sexual impulse becomes conscious it is by no means invariably accompanied by unpleasure, as the following instance will show.

A patient in analysis reported a dream in which she and her father were going along a road with bicycles, her father being in front. On the back of his bicycle was a ' case with a hood ' of a special dark green colour which seemed to have great importance. The associations led *viâ* ' back ' and sitting on the bicycle saddle to her father's tight riding breeches, an idea which has been associated with erotic feelings since her childhood. The ' case ' with a hood ' was her perambulator, whilst the dark green was the colour of the pram cushions and also reminded her of fæces. At this point the analyst suggested that perhaps as a small child the patient had passed fæces while sitting in her pram and had been sexually excited by the pressure of the fæces against her anus, thus coming to associate the tight breeches with erotic sensations. This suggestion released a repressed memory, and the patient went on to recount how this had actually happened and how surprised her mother was to find the piece of hard fæces when she undressed her much later. When she came upon this memory, the patient reacted with spontaneous pleasure at having made a discovery, and without any conscious unpleasure at all. The question then naturally arises : How could this apparently harmless anal-erotic memory have become repressed, seeing that the child was not scolded or intimidated in any way ? The answer came in the further course of the analysis, when the patient began to reveal that she felt herself to be tightly packed inside with the decaying remains of her mother, whom she had devoured, and that the piece of fæces was in fact a piece of this internalized bad mother which had become detached and externalized, so as to reveal her depressive secret to herself and to the world.

Now compare this with the following extract from another case-history. A patient suffered from compulsive swallowing as a transition-symptom during a part of her analysis. This symptom had occurred many years before her treatment, in the presence of women to whom her attitude was one of fear mixed with homosexual ambivalence, especially at meal-times. Whenever it occurred, it was always accompanied by feelings

of anxiety. In the further course of the analysis, during which the symptom grew steadily worse, the patient had a dream in which the analyst was transformed into a man who had once put his hand over her breast. The atmosphere of the dream was felt to be sinister, and in the subsequent associations it came out that the patient felt afraid lest her aunt (a mother-figure) should discover that she (the patient) had murdered the analyst. Finally the analyst told her that she evidently wanted to bite off her mother's breasts and the analyst's penis, and that that was the reason for her constant swallowing. This interpretation produced in the patient sensations of biting off a huge nipple with hallucinatory vividness, accompanied by an acute and most distressing anxiety-attack, with profuse sweating and palpitation. Soon after this the symptom disappeared.

I may add that in both these examples the patients had established a mother-transference towards the analyst at the time of the incidents referred to, a thing which is obvious in the second case, and that both patients had shown strong anxiety from time to time as their analyses proceeded. Furthermore, the first patient has since spontaneously vouchsafed the information that she too suffered from compulsive swallowing accompanied by anxiety as a child, and her analysis has shown that this symptom was determined by the same mechanism as in the case of the second patient. How comes it, in view of these similarities, that the first patient reacted to the analyst's interpretation and the consequent return of the repressed sexual impulses with pleasure, whilst the second patient went into an intensely unpleasurable anxiety-attack ?

Amid the welter of complexities that is our mental life it is inevitable that a great deal of selection of material must be done if we are to orient ourselves theoretically at all. In making such a selection we, of course, run the risk of falling into error. On the other hand, if we do not select in this way, then no theoretical progress is possible. The thing is inevitable and must be accepted : all we can do is to wait for the future to show whether our selections have been wise and our conclusions correct. I frankly admit the element of uncertainty in what follows, and bearing it in mind, will proceed.

I have already mentioned three factors common to both patients : the mother-transference, the liability to anxiety-states, and the presence of compulsive swallowing in the anamnesis. A fourth common factor is that the unpleasure in the hedonic conflict leading to repression is an oral frustration : in the first case in the form of the idea that the mother has been devoured, and in the second case in the form that the nipple has been bitten off. We are probably fairly safe, also, in saying that in both cases this unpleasure is more intense than the pleasure with which it is combined.

When we come to examine this pleasure, we find that in the first case it is a gratification of the wish for anal-erotic stimulation, whilst in the second case it is a gratification of the wish for the breast itself. To put the matter another way, I may say that if I have not overlooked some other important factor, then the essential difference between these two cases is, that in the case exhibiting pleasure the pleasure and unpleasure which are in hedonic conflict are associated with two different wishes, whilst in the case exhibiting acutely unpleasurable anxiety, the conflicting pleasure and unpleasure are both associated with the same wish.

But this gives the clue we are looking for, because we are already aware that in the second case the pleasure and unpleasure are to be represented by numbers occupying corresponding places in their respective tensors, thus leading to combination according to equation (A), because it is only by using this equation that we can account for the resultant unpleasure which is experienced as anxiety.

We thus arrive at the following tentative pronouncement : Pleasures are of the same kind if they are all associated with the same wish : they are to be represented mathematically by numbers signifying their intensities which all occupy corresponding places in their respective *P*-tenors. Conversely, pleasures are of different kinds if they are associated with different wishes : they are to be represented mathematically by numbers signifying their intensities which all occupy different places in their respective *P*-tensors. Each place in the *P*-tensor thus corresponds to a certain wish, and when a number occupies that place, it indicates the intensity of the pleasure accompanying the gratification of that wish if positive, or the intensity of the unpleasure accompanying the frustration of that wish if negative.

Now let us test our results so far by substituting actual numbers in the equations appropriate to the two cases so as to see what happens theoretically, and then compare the results with the observed facts. To make the comparison of the two cases a fair one, let us assume that the intensity of the anal pleasure in the first case is the same as that of the oral pleasure in the second case : suppose they both have the value + 2. Since we are assuming that the intensity of the oral unpleasure is greater than that of the pleasure, let us suppose it to have the value − 3 in both cases. If we put the unpleasure equal to a and the pleasure equal to b we shall have $a = -3$ and $b = +2$. Before the return of the repressed pleasure we have the hedonic state of the ego given by $P = -3$ in both cases. Let the oral wish occupy the first place and the anal wish the second place in the *P*-tensors. For the first case the appropriate formula is

$$P = \frac{(a^3\ b^3)}{a^2+b^2} = \frac{(\,(-3)^3\ (+2)^3)^2}{(-3)^2+(+2)} = (27/13 \quad 8/13)$$

Thus the oral unpleasure drops from − 3 to about − 2 and at the same time an anal pleasure having a value of about 0·6 comes in as soon as the repressed impulse returns, which would account for the pleasurable feelings of the first patient. In the case of the second patient the appropriate formula is

$$P = \frac{a^2 + b^2}{a + b} = \frac{(-3)^2 + (+2)^2}{(-3) + (+2)} = -13$$

so that in this case the oral unpleasure rises from − 3 to − 13 when the repressed pleasure returns; i.e. it becomes more than four times as great as before. Hence the anxiety-attack. So far, then, the theory fits the observed facts admirably, and with this encouragement we will proceed to examine the rest of the examples.

With the exception of the case of moral masochism (Example (5)), which is more complicated than the others and will be considered later, the rest of the examples fit in with our formulation *en bloc*, and may be arranged in the form of a table as follows :—

If I were asked to justify such a brusque tabular dismissal of a heterogeneous group of phenomena, each one of which is teeming with complexities and unsolved problems, I should reply that I am merely concerned to show that the examples tend to uphold the mathematical theory with which the present paper is concerned, and that in any case the limitations of my present knowledge and of the space at my disposal quite preclude anything approaching a full treatment.

The case of moral masochism, which was omitted from the table below, is somewhat different from the rest of the examples, and an attempt will be made to examine it in some detail. We know that in the group of phenomena subsumed under this heading the intrapsychic unpleasure is produced by what Freud calls 'a tension between ego and super-ego', but it is not very easy to lay hold of the nature and cause of this unpleasure felt by the ego. What we do know is that the ego usually reacts by resorting to some kind of self-punishment, either directly, or else indirectly by behaving in such a manner as to cause the forces of reality to

Ex. No.	Description	The Wish is :	In Hedonic Conflict	
			Pleasure	Unpleasure
2	Oral jealousy . .	For the breast . .	Sounds associated with sucking.	Absence of the breast.
3	Erotogenic masochism .	For the mother's love .	Coitus associated with being loved.	Birching associated with being unloved.[3]
4	Sadism . . .	For love . . .	Phantasy of being loved.	Caning of unloved child identified with self.
6	Case of Little Hans .	For coitus with mother.	Masturbation phantasy about mother.	Castration meaning permanent separation from mother.
7	Chess	To win . . .	Own moves promising success.	Opponent's moves threatening failure.
8	Child throwing toys away	For the mother . .	Knowledge that mother will return.	Toys receding to signify departure of mother.
9	Mountaineering, etc. .	To succeed . . .	Efforts leading to success.	Difficulties threatening failure.
10	Love-play . . .	For coitus . . .	Stimulation of erotogenic zones.	Tension of sexual frustration.
11	Hunger . . .	For food . . .	Odour, etc., associated with food.	Hunger tension.

It will be seen that in every case the pleasure and unpleasure which are in hedonic conflict are both associated with the same wish, which is what we should expect, so that each of the examples furnishes a further vindication of our tentative pronouncement above.

penalize it in one way or another. Owing to this uncertainty about the nature of the intrapsychic unpleasure, it will be best to modify the method of procedure as used in the other examples. I shall proceed to examine the self-punishment or other ego-reaction, which is open to direct observation,

[3] Freud writes ('The Economic Problem in Masochism', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 258): '. . . the masochist wants to be treated like a little, helpless, dependent child, but especially like a naughty child. . . . But if one has an opportunity of studying cases in which the masochistic phantasies have undergone specially rich elaboration, one easily discovers that in them the subject is placed in a situation characteristic of womanhood, i.e. they mean that he is being castrated, is playing the passive part in coitus, or is giving birth.' Whichever of these two interpretations we adopt, we arrive at the idea of being denied the mother's love : in the first case by her anger, and in the second case by castration, etc., which deprives the subject of his power to reunite with her.

and shall then use the mathematical theory to infer from this observation the nature of the intrapsychic unpleasure, subsequently examining to see if the results so obtained are in accord with our ideas about the super-ego derived from analytical observation. We shall first dispose of the mathematical aspects of the problem so as to get the ground clear for the psychological discussion. I shall assume that owing to the action of the super-ego, the ego experiences a constant unpleasure of an as yet unspecified kind from which it cannot escape. We shall assign the value -1 to this unpleasure so as to simplify the discussion and the arithmetic, for in doing this we are not limiting the generality of the argument, because it does not really matter what numerical value we assign to this fixed unpleasure, and in any case the formulæ which we shall obtain could easily be generalized to take account of any other value if that should prove convenient. I am going to assume that under the pressure of this fixed and inescapable unpleasure the ego begins to experiment with small quantities of pleasure and unpleasure of various kinds in order to try to reduce the resultant unpleasure in accordance with the pleasure-principle, i.e. it brings various influences to bear on itself from the external world in order to try to make p greater than -1. For the sake of simplicity I shall not consider the case of the simultaneous application of a number of different pleasures and unpleasures, but shall confine the discussion to the case of one at a time. With this limitation there are two main possibilities: either the applied component can be of the same kind as the fixed unpleasure, in which case we use equation (A) to find the scalar resultant, or it can be of a different kind, in which case we use equation (B). In either case the applied component may be a pleasure or an unpleasure, thus giving four possibilities in all.

It is shown in Appendix I that when the applied component is of a different kind from that of the intrapsychic unpleasure, its effect on the resultant p is negligible, whereas when it is of the same kind, the change in p is equal to the intensity of the applied component but opposite in sign, the condition in each case being that the applied component is much smaller than the permanent internal component in magnitude. This means, of course, that as a result of its tentative experimenting with small quantities of stimulation, the ego will always finally choose an unpleasure of the same kind as the permanent unpleasure derived from the super-ego, since it is only by doing this that the ego can obtain some reduction of unpleasure in accordance with the pleasure-principle. Thus, when we know the kind of self-punishment chosen by the ego, we can infer from the mathematical theory that it is being subjected to exactly the same kind of unpleasure by the super-ego.

In attempting to bring forward pertinent clinical material I am met by two difficulties: firstly, that patients of this type tend to use their environment as the instrument of their self-punishment to such an extent that to give an adequate account of the situation would be to risk revealing the identity of the patient, and secondly, that the self-punishing tendency is often so overlaid by moral rationalizations and mixed with restitution mechanisms as to need much analytical work before its precise nature is clearly revealed. On account of these difficulties I shall confine myself to the consideration of two of Freud's examples.

It would appear that Freud intends expressly to exclude the significance of the qualitative differences between self-punishments when he writes: 'The one form of suffering has then given way to another, and all that mattered, as we see, was that a certain level of suffering should be maintained.'[4] On the other hand, he does not bring forward evidence in support of the absence of the qualitative factor, and in two striking examples which he gives, the presence of such a factor is readily perceptible. Before quoting them, however, I must make a digression.



FIG. 1.

The curves of Fig. 1 were plotted with $a = +1$. A little consideration will show that to obtain the corresponding curves for $a = -1$ all we have to do is to turn Fig. 1 bodily upside down and then read the values of b and p in the usual way, i.e. positive to the right and upwards, and negative to the left and downwards. This saves replotting fresh curves for the case in which $a = -1$. If the curves of Fig. 1 inverted are studied, it will be observed that if we start from the point $b = 0$ and move to the right, curve (A) dives down steeply to large negative values of p, whilst curve (B) rises steadily although it starts by being flat and then gains slope gradually, rising above the point $p = 0$ when b becomes greater than unity. Translated

[4] Freud, S.: 'The Economic Problem in Masochism', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II, p. 263.

into psychological terms, this means that the incidence of a pleasure of the same kind as the permanent intrapsychic unpleasure will cause a large increase in the resultant unpleasure, whilst the application of a pleasure of a different kind will ease the unpleasure of the ego, although there is nothing in the curves to start such an attempt at escape, since small amounts of pleasure of a different kind make no appreciable difference to the situation owing to the flatness of curve (B) at the point of commencement (at the point $b = 0$). Have we not here an explanation of the behaviour of those unhappy individuals who, unable to tolerate solitude, are flung by their acquaintances of similar temperament into a whirl of gregarious pleasures, only to collapse in dejection so soon as the excitement has passed and they find themselves alone with the persecuting super-ego once more ? And cannot we account by the same means for the striking but transitory improvements which occur in the condition of many neurotics when they are pitchforked into taking a holiday by physician or friends, to say nothing of the spurious improvements which so regularly take place as a result of the ' holiday ' constituted by the commencement of an analysis ?

In the light of these considerations let us study the following case of Freud's,[5] which I quote *in extenso* because of its great interest in the present connection. Freud writes : ' Well-born and well brought up, as a quite young girl she could not restrain her zest for life ; she ran away from home and roved adventurously till she made the acquaintance of an artist who could appreciate her feminine charms but could also divine, despite her degradation, the finer qualities she possessed. He took her to live with him, and she proved a faithful and devoted companion, apparently needing only social rehabilitation for complete happiness. After many years of life together, he succeeded in getting his family to recognize her, and was then prepared to make her his legal wife. At this critical moment she began to go to pieces. She neglected the house whose rightful mistress she was now about to become, imagined herself persecuted by his relatives, who wanted to take her into the family, debarred her lover, through senseless jealousy, from all social intercourse, hindered him in his artistic work, and soon fell into incurable mental illness.' Freud quotes this case as an example of ' those wrecked by success ', but does not suggest that there may be a connection between the events in the first part of her story and the patient's final breakdown following her being accepted by her lover's family. The remarks which follow are naturally somewhat speculative, since we know nothing of this patient's early history, but if from an early age she had entertained the wish to displace her mother and marry her father, then the entire series of happenings recounted by Freud becomes intelligible as a connected whole in the light of the present theory. The account would run somewhat as follows. Owing to her wish to take her father away from her mother, there would arise a fear that the revengeful mother, now internalized as a persecuting super-ego, would retaliate by robbing her of her father. The patient's running away from home would then have as one of its motives a self-punishment carried out by the ego so as to ease the unpleasure produced by the threat from the super-ego, the content of the punishment being, in accordance with our theory, the same as the threat : namely, to deprive her of the loving father at home. Mathematically speaking, the ego is at this stage climbing up curve (A) to the left towards its maximum or highest point, which is reached when $b = -0{\cdot}414$. But once the patient has left home, we have something like the ' holiday ' situation referred to above : she ' roved adventurously ' among different kinds of pleasures on the right hand portion of curve (B) so as to keep herself above the point at which $p = 0$ and so escape the unpleasure caused by her nagging super-ego. We must assume that she had set up a sharp distinction in her mind between free love and marriage, so that even after she had settled down to live with the artist as his mistress she could still dissociate this pleasure from that of marrying a father-substitute and so remain on curve (B). (That such a thing is possible is shown by the fact that one sometimes encounters women who have had many lovers but are nevertheless covered with shame and embarrassment at the idea of marrying and bearing children.) Thus at this stage the artist is not a father-figure and no difficulties arise. But the moment his family accept her and he offers her marriage, the old Œdipus phantasy is revived, the circumstances force upon her a pleasure which is of the same kind as the unpleasure coming in from the super-ego, i.e. the pleasure of marrying the father and displacing the mother, and the ego finds itself back on curve (A) again, but this time on the right of the zero-point and running steeply down into the most intense unpleasure. The subsequent events are tragic but instructive. The ego embarks on a series of desperate attempts to defend itself against this unpleasure : the patient neglects the house, thereby attempting to deny her interest in it, she takes flight from her super-ego by means of a paranoic projection of it on to the relatives of her lover (the representatives of her mother) with the consequent formation of delusions of persecution, the original jealousy of her mother breaks out of repression to form insane jealousies in regard to her lover and attempts to stop his artistic work which symbolizes for her the begetting of children . . . her psychic equilibrium has collapsed completely under the unbearable resultant unpleasure to which her ego is subjected.

[5] Freud, S. : ' Some Character-types met with in Psycho-Analytic Work ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, p. 324.

The other example from Freud occurs in the same paper as the previous one[6]: I refer to Rebecca West, the central character in Ibsen's play *Rosmersholm*. Freud traces out how Rebecca, after the death of her mother, becomes the mistress of Dr. West, who is in fact her father, although she is unaware of this at the time. 'After the doctor's death she obtains a footing at Rosmersholm, the ancestral seat of an old family whose members are unacquainted with laughter and have sacrificed joy to stern fulfilment of duty. At Rosmersholm dwell Pastor Johannes Rosmer and his invalid wife, the childless Beata. Overcome by 'a wild uncontrollable passion' for the love of the aristocratic Rosmer, Rebecca resolves to remove the wife who stands in her way . . . '. By a trick she drives Beata to commit suicide by throwing herself into the mill-race. But when Rosmer proposes marriage, Rebecca refuses him and says that if he presses her further she will 'go the way Beata went', and later on in the play she makes the matter even clearer to our understanding when she says: 'Yes, Rosmer—this is the terrible part of it; that now, when all life's happiness is within my grasp—my heart is changed and my own past cuts me off from it.' Ultimately she learns of her incest, and to quote Freud once more: 'After she has learnt that she has been the mistress of her own father, she surrenders herself wholly to her now overmastering sense of guilt. She confesses to Rosmer and Kroll that she was a murderess; she rejects for ever the happiness to which she has paved the way by crime; and prepares for departure.' Thus she separates herself from her father-surrogate just as in phantasy she separated her mother from her father, so that her ego is subjecting itself to just the same kind of unpleasure as that with which her maternal super-ego torments her.

That is as far as Freud takes us, but it is not the end of the play. It is evident that Rosmer's own sense of guilt is called forth by his willingness to accept Rebecca even after learning of her crime. No doubt he feels himself in league with her against his dead wife Beata; at any rate he has thoughts of death in his mind, and his own death at that, as subsequent events show, when he says to Rebecca: 'Have you the courage—have you the will—gladly, as Ulric Brendel said—to go the same way that Beata went?' And Rebecca, because she has not only dispossessed her mother, but murdered her, takes to this idea immediately and replies: 'That you shall see to-morrow—or afterwards—when they find my body. . . . What I have sinned—it is fit that I should expiate.' She is ready to die alone, as her mother died and as Beata died, and so make her self-punishment fit the reproaches of her super-ego completely and exactly. But it cannot be so in the play because of Rosmer's guilt and his love for her. And so at the end they go to the mill-race together and die in each other's arms.

This is all I have to say about moral masochism. If the argument is valid, then it is reduced to a manifestation of the pleasure-principle in the sense here understood, together with the talion law in the super-ego. I shall later make an attempt to explain the talion law itself in terms of the pleasure-principle, but must now postpone the discussion of it in favour of other topics.

I said in the Introduction to this paper that I have limited the present theory to the ego. In doing this I have, of course, restricted its scope and at the same time introduced a vagueness into it corresponding to the vagueness of the ego boundaries. I could not in any case do otherwise at present, because I am not in possession of the knowledge necessary to enable me to extend it into the other departments of the mind. If such a restriction should appear arbitrary, there are nevertheless arguments other than its inevitability which can be brought forward to justify it: for example, if we are attempting to formulate laws governing mental processes it would certainly not be a valid criticism of them to suggest that they are inadequate since they do not govern the course of events in the outer world as well. That would be equivalent to confounding psychology with physics, and would amount to a regression in thought to the level of primary narcissism. If, then, we accept Freud's statement about the ego, that 'the id, however, is another outer world to it, which it strives to bring into subjection to itself', then we are at liberty to leave the id out of account when considering the relations obtaining within the ego. Or again, when Freud writes: 'The psychical processes in the "id" obey quite different laws; their course and the influence they exert on one another are different from those that reign in the ego', he is warning us in the plainest possible terms not to attempt to carry our conclusions over from the one system to the other.

As regards the super-ego, one might justify its exclusion on the grounds that it was formed by internalizing a part of the outer world (and also by re-introjection of portions of the id which had previously been projected on to external objects), so that it will tend to obey the laws of the outer world and the id. Turning once more to Freud, we read: 'In the course of individual development a part of the inhibiting forces in the outer world becomes internalized; a standard is created in the ego which opposes the other faculties by observation, criticism and prohibition. We call this new standard the *super-ego*.'

It is arguments such as the foregoing (which cannot in any case be completely convincing since the id and super-ego are after all integral parts of the psychic apparatus which we are studying), which have determined me to consolidate the

[6] *Op. cit.*, pp. 333 *et seq.*

theory within the ego and to leave to the future even the most tentative attempts to extend its scope into the other departments of the psyche.

Resolution of some Difficulties of the Restricted Theory

At the end of my paper on the restricted theory I wrote as follows : ' The theory as here presented suffers from at least two serious limitations : firstly the combination law represented by equation (6) ' (equation (A) of the present paper) ' is not universally valid, and to make matters worse, the conditions which are necessary and sufficient for its validity are not known, and secondly equation (6) must be an approximation only, because in changing sign P always passes through the values plus and minus infinity, and it is highly improbable, to say the least of it, that this represents the actual state of affairs in the normal functioning of the psychic apparatus, even if, as seems fairly likely, something of the kind happens in the case of neurotic symptom formation.'

In the light of the generalized theory the first of these limitations has melted away, for as I have tried to show, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the validity of equation (A) is that both the component pleasures shall be of the same kind, or in other words shall both be associated with the same wish. Let us consider the second limitation. Up to the present we have mostly been concerned with the compounding of two components only, either of the same kind or of different kinds. This limitation to two components has one great point in its favour : it simplifies the mathematics. But that is about all there is to recommend it, for in nature things are not so simple as that, and it would not be surprising if we found that our simplification had turned out to be an over-simplification, and had led to results which depart from the truth in certain quite important ways. One of these departures from the truth is the occurrence of the infinity-point when $b = -a$ in equation (A) : infinities do not occur in nature, but only in the minds of those addicted to mathematics. A concrete example will help to make matters clear. As I sit at my desk writing this paper, the pleasure of progressing with it and the unpleasure of the difficulties as they arise combine together to make the task a pleasant one ; much more pleasant than it would be if there were no difficulties. Both the pleasure of progressing and the unpleasure of the difficulties are of the same kind, since they are associated with the gratification or the frustration of the same wish, which is to arrive at sound conclusions about hedonics and to express them clearly. But this is not all, for I am also aware of the pleasant warmth from the fire burning in the grate, and a moment's free association tells me that I have here the symbolical gratification of quite a different wish, and so the warmth from the fire is a pleasure of a different kind from the other two. It is quite small in intensity by comparison with the others—I had hardly noticed it—but it is there, and as I shall show in a moment, it abolishes the infinity-point which would otherwise have occurred had the others become equal and opposite. It is evident that in practice there will always be such small irrelevant pleasures or unpleasures occurring simultaneously with the main situation, and that it is a practical certainty that at least one of them will be of a kind other than those comprising the main situation. I shall use the term ' distractions ' to designate such small components of a different kind, and shall assume (quite unwarrantably, but again so as to simplify the mathematics) that there is only one distraction operative at any given time. Thus we shall now have three components acting in combination : the two comprising the main situation, and the distraction, which latter will be of a different kind from either of the others, and much smaller than at least one of them. Suppose first that both main components are of the same kind and that their intensities are a and b ; then if the intensity of the distraction is denoted by k we shall have

$$P_1 = (a, 0) ; \; P_2 = (b, 0) ; \; P_3 = (0, k).$$

Substituting these tensors in (15) as was done in deriving (18) we find

$$P = \frac{((a + b)(a^2 + b^2), k^3)}{(a + b)^2 + k^2} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (19)$$

the scalar resultant being

$$p = \frac{(a + b)(a^2 + b^2) + k^3}{(a + b)^2 + k^2} \quad . \quad . \quad (C)$$

From (C) it is immediately obvious that unless $k = 0$, the denominator can never vanish, from which it is evident that neither P nor p can ever become infinite so long as there is a distraction present.

The investigation of equation (C) is rather complicated and is given in Appendix II, the results being as follows. Suppose that k is numerically much smaller than a and that both are kept constant while b is varied and we observe the consequent changes in p : then outside the region within which $a + b$ is numerically less than say $5k$, equation (C) gives approximately the same values of p as does equation (A). Within this region we have the following approximate results : Let $|k|$ be the numerical value of k, i.e. $|k|$ is always positive whatever the sign of k ; then p has a sharp minimum of value $-(a_2/|k|) - a$ when $b = -|k| - a$; it rises steeply through the value k when $b = -a$ to a sharp maximum of value $(a_2/|k|) - a$ at the point $b = |k| - a$, after which it falls steeply as b increases still further. Thus, as k becomes smaller, the trough and the peak become deeper and higher respectively and at the same time they draw closer together, until when $k = 0$ they become infinitely deep and infinitely high and coalesce, at which point we have arrived back at

equation (A) again. It is also evident from the above results that if the distraction k is kept constant whilst a is increased, the size of the peak and trough increases proportionately to the square of a and they remain the same distance apart, although they both move to the left, the distance between them being $2k$. It is important to note that the extent of the peak and trough is proportional to a^2, as this result will find an application



Fig. 2.

later. Fig. 2 has been plotted to show the main features of equation (C) graphically, and in it a has been put equal to unity as in Fig. 1, whilst k has been given the value 0·2. If the graph is turned upside down and read in the same way as Fig. 1 inverted, it shows the case when $a = -1$ and $k = -0.2$. It does not very much matter whether the distraction is a pleasure or an unpleasure; its principal effect is the same in either case, viz, to limit the swing of the graph in the neighbourhood of $b = -a$.

It is now easy to see that since equation (B) has no infinity-point, the effect of distraction is negligible in the case in which the two main components are of different kinds, so that we do not need to consider this case further.

In one of Pavlov's famous experiments with dogs,[7] the main situation was so arranged that the dog was subjected to a stimulus involving, as far as we can judge, simultaneous pleasure and unpleasure of the same kind and of about equal intensity, the most elaborate precautions being taken to exclude distractions as far as possible by isolating the animal in a sound-proof room and so on. Under these conditions the dog broke down and developed a neurosis. It would be interesting to conduct a similar experiment in the bustle of an ordinary room with the experimenter present in the room so as to increase the amount of distraction. I do not know if this has been tried, but in the light of the foregoing considerations it seems to me extremely probable that if it were done the neurosis would fail to appear, because the increased distraction should limit the depth of the trough of unpleasure and so protect the mind of the dog from injury.

Again, in comparing the trivial annoyance of an adult kept waiting for dinner with the devastating effects of a similar oral frustration in the case of a young baby, it seems to me that the difference is partly to be explained by the fact that the amount of distraction available to the baby must be vastly smaller by comparison on account of the very limited ego-development and orientation in the external world. The baby is thus in the position of Pavlov's dog, the ego receiving the full impact of the conflicting oral components without the mollifying effect of distraction, with a schizophrenia as the possible outcome.

If the amount of distraction is about the same in different situations, then the outcome will evidently depend on the strength of the main components. People do not as a rule become mentally ill as a result of losing a game of chess, and if such a thing should occur one would search for the cause in quite another direction, knowing full well that the components comprising the manifest situation were not strong enough to give rise to a hedonic shock of sufficient intensity to institute pathological processes. On the other hand, we are not at all surprised that the castration-threat in the case of Little Hans should have proved to be pathogenic, for we know how intense are the pleasures and unpleasures in the Œdipus situation. Even if they had been only ten times as strong as in the trivial example referred to, we should be dealing with a shock of one hundred times the magnitude of the former one, so that it is only to be expected that the behaviour of the ego in the two cases would be radically different. It is thus seen that the present theory can account satisfactorily for the fact that some hedonic conflicts prove to be pathogenic and others not, a thing which the restricted theory was unable to explain.

Another difficulty of the restricted theory is in connection with erotogenic masochism. I wrote in the earlier paper: 'In the first place it is not every person who is a manifest masochist, and secondly it is not every source of unpleasure which can serve to reinforce erotic pleasure in a given individual.' Actually the first point was to some extent disposed of in that paper, although I did not make the matter sufficiently clear: for if, as I there maintained and do still maintain, the joy of

[7] Pavlov, I. P.: *Conditioned Reflexes*, pp. 290 *et seq.* For a description of the precautions taken to exclude distraction see pp. 20 *et seq.*

achievement and the pleasure of games and so on are to be regarded as sublimated forms of masochism, then we are all of us masochists, and the question of the particular form taken by this masochism lies outside the field of the present investigation altogether. In regard to the second point, of course, the present theory gives a perfectly definite answer, to the effect that a source of unpleasure will serve to reinforce erotic pleasure in a given individual if it is of the same kind as the erotic pleasure, or in other words, if it represents the frustration of the wish of which the erotic pleasure is the gratification.

To conclude this section I shall attempt to clear up a difficulty in connection with the return of the repressed which must have struck many readers who have followed me so far. Confining our attention as before to the processes which occur during analysis, I may put the matter this way: that although the theory offers an explanation as to why, under certain conditions, the return of a repressed sexual impulse is experienced as unpleasurable instead of pleasurable, it looks on the surface as if no such return should ever be possible at all, because it increases the unpleasure of the ego and thus appears to run counter to the pleasure-principle. Clearly, this is a problem closely bound up with the theory of the therapeutic results of analysis. Everyone is agreed that transference interpretation is the most powerful therapeutic instrument we possess, and this unanimity was brought out very clearly in a symposium published in this JOURNAL.[8] Thus; Edward Glover: 'The humane relation in the transference and the tolerance of the analyst towards instinct derivatives in the first place encourages the freer use of primitive mechanisms . . . '; Otto Fenichel: 'The result is a relative diminution in anxiety, and this assists in the production of fresh and less distorted derivatives . . . to bring about this result we make use of the positive transference and of transitory identifications with the analyst'; James Strachey goes to the heart of the matter: 'But there is a third peculiarity which distinguishes transference from non-transference-interpretations, and . . . may even provide us with a clue to . . . the problem of how it is that the analyst is able to produce a permanent modification in the patient's super-ego. This . . . is the fact that . . . the person who gives the interpretation is at the same time the person who is the object of the id-impulse which is being interpreted'; H. Nunberg writes: 'In obedience to the analyst's request to remember . . . the patient's ego braces itself for the re-admission of the repressed into consciousness and is even ready to find some pleasure in what had actually been excluded because of the unpleasure which it caused the ego. . . . The obedience is reproduced owing to libidinal ties belonging to the Œdipus complex'; and finally E. Bibring writes: '. . . the patient's relationship to the analyst from which a sense of security emanates is not only a pre-condition of the procedure but also effects an immediate (apart from an analytical) consolidation of his sense of security which he has not successfully acquired or consolidated in childhood.'

Now the thing which keeps the id-impulse in repression is the unpleasurable threat of vengeance from the super-ego, and I do not think I shall be doing violence to any of the opinions which I have quoted if I express the matter—I almost said 'sum them up'—as follows: that once the transference-neurosis is established there is a close intermingling of the analyst with the patient's super-ego. The super-ego is threatening vengeance, whereas the analyst, when he makes a transference-interpretation, is fused with the super-ego and is in effect saying to the ego: 'I quite understand what it is you want to do to me; you need fear neither vengeance nor loss of love, because I neither hate you nor fear you.' But this attitude of the analyst is the direct antithesis of the harsh and primitively revengeful attitude of the super-ego, so that *insofar as the analyst and the super-ego are regarded as a single entity by the ego at the moment when the interpretation is made*, there is bound to be at this moment a mitigation of the unpleasure coming into the ego from the super-ego-analyst combination, and this mitigation is just what is required in order that the repressed id-impulse shall be allowed free entry into the ego in accordance with the pleasure-principle. What happens after this we can only guess at, but it would not be altogether surprising if such a sudden shift in the balance of forces within the mind were to disrupt the fusion of the analyst and super-ego, with the result that the ego would then experience the full resultant unpleasure compounded of the pleasure of the id-impulse and the unpleasure from the super-ego in accordance with equation (A). If the ego can tolerate the unpleasure without resorting to neurotic defence-reactions, and if the severity of the super-ego becomes lessened in some such way as that described by James Strachey,[9] then a therapeutic advance will have been made. . . . But I am getting away from the point; which is that we have here an explanation of how it can happen that an id-impulse can enter the ego and give rise to an increase of unpleasure there without contravening the pleasure-principle within the ego.

APPLICATIONS

Let us apply the theory developed in the preceding Sections in order to attempt an explanation of the kind of vengeance which we encountered in the super-ego when studying moral masochism. Freud says: '. . . that the super-ego of the child is not really built up on the model of the parents,

[8] 'Symposium on the Theory of the Therapeutic Results of Psycho-Analysis', *Inter. J. Psycho-Anal.*, XVIII, 125.
[9] Strachey, James: *ibid.*, p. 143.

but on that of the parents' super-ego ; it takes over the same content, it becomes the vehicle of tradition and of all the age-long values which have been handed down in this way from generation to generation.' If we go back to the time of Moses we find the revenge-principle explicitly embodied in the law (Lev. xxiv. 17) :

' And he that killeth any man shall surely be put to death.

' And he that killeth a beast shall make it good ; beast for beast.

' And if a man cause a blemish in his neighbour ; as he hath done, so shall it be done to him.

' Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth : as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again.'

One does not need to look deeply into human motives at the present time (December 1941) to see that such ideas as these are by no means confined to the super-ego, but are commonly enough characteristic of ego-reactions as well : at all times they can be observed in the quarrels of children, and now we witness the phenomenon of whole communities taking revenge on each other in a manner which would appear to leave no doubt that we are dealing with a universal and primitive mechanism in the ego which under the influence of cultural development may be modified or rendered inoperative by reaction-formation or some other mechanism, but which exists as a potential norm of behaviour in all of us. This leads naturally to the idea that in primæval times vengeance was the normal response of the ego to every form of agression coming from without, and that therefore the super-ego of modern man is in this respect patterned on the *egos* of his remote forefathers. Thus, if this argument be accepted and we can explain the vengeance of the ego in terms of our theory, then we shall have explained the vengeance of the super-ego as well, and so shall have accounted for moral masochism entirely in terms of the pleasure-principle within the ego.

If I am attacked by another man, and if I take primitive revenge on him, then I inflict exactly the same harm as he has done to me ; in other words the revenge consists in subjecting him to the same kind of unpleasure as I have suffered at his hands. If the revenge is to serve any purpose at all in my mind, then it must in some way reduce my unpleasure, but it is not very easy to see how such a thing can come about, because analytical investigation merely reveals the existence of revengeful impulses and unmasks their motives whilst leaving the actual mechanism of the pleasure-gain as obscure as ever. But a clue comes from the idea that if the act of revenge is to have any effect on the mind at all, one must be aware that one's enemy is suffering the same unpleasure as oneself. This tells me two things : that I am identifying myself with my enemy, and that I must use equation (A) since both components are of the same kind. But now I fancy I have everything clear : let us use actual numbers to see what happens. Suppose that when my enemy strikes his blow my unpleasure takes the value -4 : my ego experiences his triumph as well, because of the identification, and this triumph, being a pleasure, will be positive ; but since I get it through identification it comes to me in a weakened form : suppose it has the value $+1$ for me, then my hedonic state will be

$$\frac{(-4)^2+(+1)^2}{-4+1} = -5{\cdot}65.$$

When I strike my blow in revenge, my enemy's triumph has turned to unpleasure which I know from bitter experience has the value -4, but again I receive this unpleasure through identification and so it comes to me weakened : suppose it is halved and so has the value -2 for me ; my hedonic state is now

$$\frac{(-4)^2+(-2)^2}{-4-2} = -3{\cdot}34,$$

so that by taking revenge I have reduced my unpleasure to less than 60 per cent. of its former value. It thus appears that the revenge is carried out in accordance with the pleasure-principle after all. It is to be noted that I have left something out of account, because the change in my hedonic state when I strike my blow is conveyed to my enemy in virtue of his having identified himself with me, so that his state changes more than is shown in these simple calculations, and this extra change is in turn transferred back to me and so on. Perhaps there is the possibility of further work here, but I must proceed.

Suppose now that I had, in revenge, inflicted a much greater unpleasure on my enemy than he on me : suppose that his hedonic state was -20 instead of -4 ; then halving it to take account of the weakening due to identification, it comes to me as an unpleasure of value -10. Then my hedonic state would be

$$\frac{(-4)^2+(-10)^2}{-4-10} = -8{\cdot}3,$$

whereas before I struck my blow it was $-5{\cdot}65$: then my last state is worse than my first. Clearly I am so appalled at the sufferings of my enemy that I pity him instead of hating him, so that his misery only serves to increase my own. Thus, if the revenge is to succeed in reducing my unpleasure it must not be too harsh. What is more, it is evident that the more readily and completely I identify myself with my enemy, the less harsh will be my revenge and the more merciful shall I be. We have here a quantity which is peculiar to me in the particular situation and which we may call the *Coefficient of Identification* : in the particular example which I have chosen I have taken the coefficient of identification to be one-half, since I have assumed that I experience one-half

of my enemy's pleasure or unpleasure when I identify myself with him. If the coefficient of identification is zero, so that I do not identify myself with my enemy at all, then we shall have a state of affairs in which the whole mechanism of revenge is inoperative, since it will not occur to me that he—or rather, *it*—is capable of experiencing anything at all. Thus, an animistic savage might revenge himself upon a tree if a branch of it should strike him, for to him it is a person with feelings like his own ; but for us it is a thing, and we cannot under ordinary circumstances identify ourselves with it.

The above results are easily generalized, and the amount of revenge giving the greatest pleasure-gain is readily calculated : thus, if the unpleasure inflicted on me has the value $-a$ and if my coefficient of identification is ϕ, then it is evident from the second table of Appendix II or from curve (A) of Fig. 1 inverted that the amount of unpleasure which I must receive by identification in order that my resultant unpleasure shall be a minimum is $-a(\sqrt{2}-1)$. It follows that the amount of unpleasure that I must inflict on my enemy will be $-a(\sqrt{2}-1)/\phi = -0{\cdot}414.a/\phi$ approximately. If my coefficient of identification happens to be 0·414, then I shall derive the maximum benefit by inflicting exactly the same amount and kind of unpleasure as I receive, so that in this case the *lex talionis* will be fulfilled completely.

Before quitting the topic of vengeance, it is incumbent on me to demonstrate the effect of inflicting, in revenge, an unpleasure of a different kind from that which my enemy inflicts upon me. At this point a doubt arises as to the value to be assigned to the coefficient of identification, because it seems natural to suppose that it is easier to identify oneself with a person who is suffering the same kind of unpleasure as oneself than it would be if the unpleasure were different. In any case my unpleasure after being attacked and before taking revenge will be the same as before, viz., − 5·65. Assume first of all that the coefficient of identification is the same as before ; then after I have punished my enemy my hedonic state will be, using equation (B) and the same figures as before,

$$\frac{(-4)^3+(-2)^3}{(-4)^2+(-2)^2} = -3{\cdot}6.$$

If, on the other hand, we assume that $\phi = \frac{1}{4}$ instead of $\frac{1}{2}$, we shall have

$$\frac{(-4)^3+(-1)^3}{(-4)^2+(-1)^2} = -3{\cdot}82,$$

whereas in the case of talion it was − 3·34. Thus although I get some satisfaction, in neither case is it so great as that afforded by talion. It is shown in Appendix III that talion punishments always afford the greatest possible gratification of the desire for revenge, which is just what we should expect from their primitive character.

If anyone should object that the foregoing discussion is completely abstract and out of touch with reality, I should thoroughly agree with his estimate of it and add that that is exactly what I intend it to be. I have tried to gain some understanding of a mental mechanism by studying it in isolation from all the other things which in reality crowd in upon it ; therefore I have ignored love, the fear of counter-vengeance, the dictates of the super-ego—everything except the one thing which I set out to study—everything, in fact, which would have rendered the study an impossibility. In no other way would it have been possible to show that the *lex talionis* comes out as a direct consequence of the mathematical theory with which I am concerned in this paper.

I shall consider only one other application of the theory, and I have selected the phenomena of the love-play as my example. There are two reasons for this choice : firstly it illustrates the way in which the theory may be combined with assumptions about the changes in the sexual tension so as to arrive at a unified mathematical account of the processes leading to orgasm, and secondly it affords me an opportunity to make good some of the deficiencies in the account of the love-play given in my paper on the restricted theory. In that account I was working with equation (A), and owing to the presence of the infinity-point, it was not possible precisely to define the amount of pleasure from stimulation of the erotogenic zones which would be required in order that the resultant pleasure should be a maximum, so that the theory had inevitably to remain somewhat vague and descriptive. By using equation (C) and introducing distraction, however, we can recast the whole account in precise mathematical terms, which enables the vagueness to be removed and further interesting conclusions to be drawn.

As before, I assume that the sexual tension is inherently unpleasurable and the stimulation of the erotogenic zones inherently pleasurable, but that the perceived feeling is the resultant of these two components and a small distraction component of a different kind according to equation (C). Let y be the tension and s the stimulation, and let a be the *pleasure* due to the tension (so that a will be negative), and b the pleasure due to the stimulation : clearly these two pleasures are of the same kind. I shall assume that a is proportional to y and b to s, and if we agree to measure the tension by the amount of unpleasure it produces and the stimulation by the amount of pleasure it produces, then the constant of proportionality will be unity in both cases and we shall have

$$a = -y \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (20)$$

$$b = s \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (21)$$

As regards the tension, I wrote before as follows :

'Evidently this tension consists of two parts. Firstly there is the part which increases spontaneously and gradually with the passage of time. . . . Secondly there is the part which is increased by external stimulation of erotogenic zones and is closely associated with the preparatory changes in the genital organs. . . . I imagine that the two parts of the tension are added together to form the total tension which enters experience, but it is very certain that the second part cannot be evoked in the absence of the first part, and that the intensity of the second part evoked by any given external stimulus is about directly proportional to the intensity of the first part existing at the time the stimulus is applied. What is more, experience seems to show that the second part dies away slowly after the stimulus producing it is removed, the total tension tending to return to the same value as it had before the application of the stimulus, i.e. the value of the first part acting alone.' We can translate all this into mathematical terms as follows: Let y_1 and y_2 be the first and second parts of the tension, then since y is the total tension we shall have

$$y = y_1 + y_2 \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (22)$$

Let $\Delta_1 y_2$ be the amount of the second part of the tension produced by stimulation in a short time Δt; then if it be assumed that this amount is proportional to the intensity of the stimulation and also to the intensity of the first part of the tension, we can write

$$\Delta_1 y_2 = g.s.y_1.\Delta t \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (23)$$

where g is a positive constant. As regards the dying-away process, the simplest assumption to make is that in the absence of stimulation the second part of the tension decreases at a rate which is at any instant proportional to the value of this second part at that instant. Thus if $\Delta_2 y_2$ is the (negative) *increase* of y_2 in the short time Δt and in the absence of stimulation, we shall have

$$\Delta_2 y_2 = -h.y_2.\Delta t \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (24)$$

approximately, where h is another positive constant. When the stimulation is present, the total increase of y_2 in the time Δt will be made up of the sum of $\Delta_1 y_2$ and $\Delta_2 y_2$. Calling this total increase Δy_2, we shall have

$$\Delta y_2 = \Delta_1 y_2 + \Delta_2 y_2 = g.s.y_1.\Delta t - h.y_2.\Delta t \quad (25)$$

I shall take it that the external situation is such that the ego is free to determine the intensity of the stimulation at all times; consequently it will at every instant select that intensity which makes the scalar resultant p a maximum in accordance with the pleasure-principle: from the result for the position of the maximum on p. 190 this condition will be fulfilled when

$$b = |k| - a. \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (26)$$

where k is the distraction. Using (21), (26) and (20) in turn, we find

$$s = b = |k| - a = |k| + y \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (27)$$

It is evident that for practical purposes we may consider that the first part of the tension remains constant during the whole of the love-play and sexual act, so that the changes in the total tension are the same as the changes in the second part. Consequently we shall have

$$\Delta y_2 = \Delta y \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (28)$$

also from (22) we have

$$y_2 = y - y_1 \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (29)$$

so that on substituting from (27), (28) and (29) in (25) we obtain

$$\Delta y = (\,(gy_1 - h).y + (g|k| + h).y_1).\Delta t \quad . \quad . \quad (30)$$

The solution of this equation involves the use of the integral calculus and is given in Appendix IV, the results being as follows: If we count time from the beginning of the love-play, so that we have $y = y_1$ when $t = 0$, the total tension y is given by the equation

$$y = y_1.(\,(1 + m)e^{nt} - m) \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (31)$$

except when $y_1 = h/g$, in which case the proper equation is

$$y = y_1.(1 + ut) \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (32)$$

In these equations $m = (g|k| + h)/(gy_1 - h)$; $n = gy_1 - h$; $u = g|k| + h$; $e = 2{\cdot}71828$. . . . Let us consider their meaning. Suppose first of all that y_1 is greater than h/g; in this case we use (31) and m and n will be positive, so that as t increases from $t = 0$, y will increase indefinitely. Furthermore, its rate of increase will become steadily greater with the passage of time, so that if it be supposed that orgasm occurs when the tension reaches the value y_0, then no matter how great y_0 may be, the orgasm is bound to occur in this case. If t_0 is the time at which the love-play terminates in the orgasm, it is easy to show by transposing (31) that

$$t_0 = \frac{1}{n}.\log_e \frac{(y_0/y_1) + m}{1 + m} \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (33)$$

Next suppose that $y_1 = h/g$; then we use (32), and since u is positive, y will again increase indefinitely as t increases, only this time its rate of increase will be constant. Again there is bound to be an orgasm, only in this case the love-play will last longer than before, its duration found from (32) transposed being

$$t_0 = \frac{1}{u}.(\,(y_0/y_1) - 1) \quad . \quad . \quad . \quad (34)$$

Finally, suppose that y_1 is less than h/g; in this case we shall use (31) again, but m and n will now be negative: putting $m' = -m$ and $n' = -n$, (31) becomes

$$y = y_1.(\,(1 - m')e^{-n't} + m') \quad . \quad . \quad (35)$$

where m' and n' are positive. It is evident that as t increases, $e^{-n't}$ becomes smaller, so that after a sufficiently long time we can neglect the term involving it altogether: thus y tends ultimately to the value $m'y_1$. It follows that if y_0 is less than $m'y_1$ orgasm will occur after a time given by (33),

whilst if y_0 is not less than $m'y_1$ there will be no orgasm at all, since in this case the tension will never reach the value y_c. To find the critical value of y_1 we put $y_0 = m'y_1$, and on substituting the expression for m' and solving the resulting equation for y_1 we find

$$y_1 = h.y_0/(u + g.y_0). \quad . \quad . \quad (37)$$

If y_1 is greater than this value the love-play will terminate in an orgasm, whilst if y_0 is not greater than this value, then theoretically the love-play will continue indefinitely and no orgasm will occur, although in real life the love-play will of course be terminated by some circumstance (such as fatigue, for example) which we have not taken into account in this theory.

Thus, according to the theory, if we start with a high initial tension there will be a short period of rapidly rising fore-pleasure and love-play followed by orgasm ; if the initial tension be not so great, then the love-play will be more prolonged and the fore-pleasure will increase more slowly ; whilst if the initial tension is not greater than the value given by (37), the love-play will tend to be prolonged indefinitely, the fore-pleasure will remain at a rather low and constant intensity, there will be no orgasm, and the process will finally come to an end as a result of fatigue or for some other reason. Bearing in mind that this theory does not attempt to take into account sexual inhibitions or other complications, it seems to me that this account, derived entirely from the mathematical theory, is a sufficiently accurate description of the sequence of events in actual normal love-making to justify the acceptance of the theory as a simplified working model of the hedonic processes involved. It is interesting to compare these purely theoretical deducations with the views of Batsayana, an Indian sexologist quoted by G. Bose.[10] Bose tells us that ' Batsayana, who flourished about 310 B.C. . . . notes that in intercourses following one another in rapid succession the male gets the orgasm in the first coitus comparatively quickly, whereas in successive intercourses the time to reach the orgastic stage gets longer and longer. His sexual urge diminishes with each successive intercourse.' The initial tension in the later intercourses is, of course, progressively diminished by the preceding orgasms.

Conclusion

I shall conclude with a few scattered ideas which occur to me in connection with what precedes, mostly with a view to anticipating some possible criticisms.

It would appear that the theory and the conclusions to be drawn from it are consonant with general evolutionary principles, for it is evident that an animal possessing a mechanism which causes difficulties in the attainment of a goal to heighten pleasure and so to act as incentives to further effort, would have an undoubted advantage over one for which such difficulties merely acted so as to reduce pleasure and thereby check its activities and endeavours.

Some of the phenomena covered by the theory, such as jealousy and revenge for example, have not as far as I know been explained either by direct analytical observation or by the theory of the instincts or in terms of the principles of functioning of the psychic apparatus as hitherto formulated : we seem to be on the frontier between motive and mechanism, and there appears to be no way at present of grasping the motives of these processes directly. Theory is in any case no substitute for psychological insight, and thus we are free to be as abstract as we please in our theorizing and need feel no qualms about introducing mathematical methods if such should hold out the promise of greater unification. The justification of the present theory is that it brings within the grasp of the pleasure-principle phenomena which had previously remained unexplained in terms of the principle and had necessitated *ad hoc* assumptions to account for them.

In the absence of any method of measuring the pleasures and tensions, the mathematical method suffers from the disadvantage of appearing more precise than it actually is, but perhaps there is not much harm in it so long as we bear the limitations of our knowledge clearly in mind. If a critic were to assert that it merely conceals ignorance behind a cloud of symbols, I should retort that such a thing will always occur with any part of analytical theory when the theory is used as a substitute for comprehension, that such a misuse is no more likely to occur in the present connection than in any other, and that we do not reject the mathematical theory of electricity as worthless because it is unable to explain what it feels like to receive an electric shock.

The applications—especially the study of the love-play—are intended merely as methodological illustrations. They reveal no new facts, and I present them in the hope that their limitations will stimulate further research into the use of mathematical methods in psycho-analytical theory.

Appendix I

Putting $a = -1$ in equation (B) we have

$$p = (-1 + b^3)(1 + b^2)^{-1}.$$

Expanding the second bracket by the binomial theorem and neglecting higher powers of b than the second (since b is supposed numerically much less than unity) leads to

$$p = (-1 + b^3)(1 - b^2) \text{ approx.}$$

On multiplying out and again neglecting higher powers of b we have

$$p = -1 + b^2 \text{ approx.},$$

[10] Bose, G. : ' The Duration of Coitus ', *Inter. J. Psycho-Anal.*, XVIII, 239.

which when differentiated gives $dp/db = 2b$. If Δp and Δb are small changes in p and b,

$$\Delta p = (dp/db).\Delta b = 2b.\Delta b \text{ approx.},$$

so that Δp is negligible when b is very small.

Putting $a = -1$ in equation (A) we have

$$p = (1 + b^2)(-1 + b)^{-1} = -(1 + b^2)(1 - b)^{-1}$$

Again expanding and neglecting higher powers of b :

$$p = -(1 + b^2)(1 + b) \text{ approx.},$$

and on multiplying out and again neglecting higher powers of b we obtain

$$p = -(1 + b) \text{ approx.},$$

which when differentiated gives $dp/db = -1$. Therefore $\Delta p = -\Delta b$, so that the change in p equals the change in b but is opposite in sign as stated in the text.

These results can also be inferred from a careful examination of Fig. 1 inverted : curve (B) has a turning-point at $b = 0$ and the tangent to curve (A) slopes downward at 45 degrees to the axes at the same point.

Appendix II

From (C) we find by straightforward algebra that

$$p = \frac{a^2 + b^2}{a + b}.(1 + u^2t)(1 + t^2)^{-1}$$

where $u^2 = k^2/(a^2 + b^2)$ and $t = k/(a + b)$. But since k is numerically much smaller than a or b or both, u^2 is much smaller than unity and t will be numerically much less than unity except when a and b are nearly equal and of opposite signs. It follows that, except within this region, (C) reduces to (A) approximately.

Consider the turning-points of (C) : let b be the independent variable and keep a and k constant ; then by a suitable change of scale we can make $a = 1$ and we obtain, on putting $x = 1 + b$,

$$p = (x^3 - 2x^2 + 2x + k^3)/(x^2 + k^2)$$

which when differentiated to x and equated to zero gives, after a little simplification,

$$x^4 - 2.x^2 - 2.k^3.x + k^2.(3.x^2 - 4.x + 2) = 0$$

The general solution of this biquadratic equation is hopelessly complicated, and we must resort to approximations : if x is numerically much greater than k we can neglect the terms involving k and we shall have simply $x^4 - 2.x^2 = 0$, giving $x = \pm\sqrt{2}$, the roots $x = 0$ being excluded since x is supposed numerically greater than k. If x is numerically much less than unity we can neglect x^4 by comparison with the other terms and the equation reduces to the quadratic

$$(2 - 3.k^2).x^2 + 2.(2.k^2 + k^3).x - 2.k^2 = 0$$

but k being small, we can neglect the right hand term in each bracket, the equation then reducing to

$$x^2 + 2.k^2.x - k^2 = 0.$$

The roots of this last equation are $x = -k^2 \pm \sqrt{k^4 + k^2}$, so that on again neglecting higher powers of k we find $x = \pm |k|$ approximately. The turning-points thus occur when $x = -\sqrt{2}$; $-|k|$; $+|k|$; $+\sqrt{2}$ approximately. The first and last are the turning-points of equation (A) in which a has been put equal to unity : doing this and substituting for x, (A) becomes $p = x - 2 + 2/x$, and on substituting the roots in this last we find $p = -2.(\sqrt{2} + 1)$ and $p = 2.(\sqrt{2} - 1)$ respectively. To find the values of p at the other turning-points we substitute the values $x = \pm |k|$ in the equation for p in terms of x above, and on neglecting higher powers of k we find

$$p = -1 \pm 1/|k| \text{ approx.}$$

Changing back from x to b, we have the following table for the turning-points and the point at which the graph crosses the line $b = -1$:

$b = -1\sqrt{2}$	$\mid -1-\lvert k\rvert$	$\mid -1 \mid -1+\lvert k\rvert$	$\mid -1+\sqrt{2}$
$p = -2(\sqrt{2}+1) \mid$	$-1-1/\lvert k\rvert \mid$	$k \mid -1+1/\lvert k\rvert \mid$	$2(\sqrt{2}-1)$

On changing the scale so as to obtain equation (C) containing a instead of unity, it is evident from dimensional considerations that we shall have the modified table :

$b = -a(\sqrt{2}+1)$	$\mid -a-\lvert k\rvert$	$\mid -a \mid -a+\lvert k\rvert$	$\mid a(\sqrt{2}-1$
$p = -2a(\sqrt{2}+1) \mid$	$-a-a^2/\lvert k\rvert \mid$	$k \mid -a+a^2/\lvert k\rvert \mid$	$2a(\sqrt{2}-1)$

Appendix III

Taking the initial unpleasure as -1 so as to simplify the calculation, the proposition will have been proved if it can be shown that for some negative value of b the value of the function $(b^2 + 1)/(b - 1)$ is greater than the value of the function $(b^3 - 1)/(b^2 + 1)$ for any negative value of b. Differentiating the second function to b and equating to zero we obtain, after a little simplification, the cubic equation $b^3 + 3.b + 2 = 0$, of which the real root is

$$b = (\sqrt{2} - 1)^{1/3} - (\sqrt{2} + 1)^{1/3} = -0{\cdot}595 \text{ approx.}$$

This is the value of b for which the function is a maximum : substituting it in the function we find this maximum value to be

$$((-0{\cdot}595)^3 - 1)/((-0{\cdot}595)^2 + 1) = -0{\cdot}895 \text{ approx.}$$

But from the second table of Appendix II we have the maximum value of

$$(b^2 + 1)/(b - 1)$$

as

$$-2.(\sqrt{2} - 1) = -0{\cdot}828 \text{ approx.},$$

which is greater than $-0{\cdot}895$; the proposition is thus established.

Appendix IV

Let Δt approach zero and we obtain the differential equation $dy/(y + m.y_1) = n.dt$, which when integrated gives $\log(y + m.y_1) - \log K = n.t$, and so $y = K.e^{nt} - m.y_1$. If $y = y_1$ when $t = 0$ this gives $K = (1 + m).y_1$ so that we have

$$y = y_1.((1 + m)e^{nt} - m).$$

To find the limiting form as y_1 approaches the value h/g, write $m = u/n$. Then the limit of e^{nt} for finite t is $1 + nt$ and we shall have

$$y = y_1.((1 + u/n)(1 + nt) - u/n) = y_1.(1 + ut)$$

in the limit.

A NOTE ON A CHILD'S GAME[1]

By W. BAGGALLY

I have had the opportunity of observing a game played by a girl aged seventeen months which seems to me to be worth reporting because it raises some interesting questions about the hedonics of play. The game consisted merely in standing upright on the couch and then slowly swaying and overbalancing so as to fall over and sit down with a bump, after which the child scrambled up and the game was repeated, many times. During the subsequent repetitions the time taken in swaying about before the final fall became lengthened more and more until ultimately interest in the game was lost and she turned her attention to other activities.

The manifestations of affect in this game were very striking and altogether delightful to watch. During the standing and overbalancing phase there was an expression of breathless pleasurable anticipation tinged with anxiety, rising in a kind of crescendo, until, when she finally toppled over, her pleasure was discharged in unrestrained laughter. Whilst she was getting up again for the next repetition there was no show of affect, from which I conclude that this getting up was no part of the game, but merely the necessary preliminary to its repetition.

In response to my inquiry, the mother informed me that the child had fallen over on several occasions in learning to walk, but without hurting herself to any extent. In spite of this I shall avoid shelving the problem of this game by referring to the repetition compulsion, because I am in agreement with Kubie when he writes[2]: 'Thus we are finally forced to conclude that there is neither any need nor any evidence for a "repetition compulsion"—and that the phrase itself has become a mere descriptive epithet . . . '

It might be argued that the purpose of the game was simply to obtain the erotic pleasure of falling and landing on the soft couch; that the game was in fact a form of auto-erotism and nothing more. But if that were all, it would not be easy to account for the prolongation of the game in the later repetitions or for the, to me, unmistakable trace of anxiety. In any case, although it is evident that there is bound to be *some* sexual pleasure, the following considerations are to my mind decisively against its being the sole or even the principal source of pleasure in the game.

I have known this child since birth[3] and have played with her a great deal and we have come to know one another very well indeed, and in particular I have on many occasions played 'peep-bo' with her, holding my handkerchief up so as to cover my face and then removing it after a short time or else allowing her to pull it away herself. Whenever I do this I always hold the handkerchief against my face so that I can observe her through it, and I have been left in no doubt whatever that the affective pattern is the same in both these games. Just as in the falling game so it is in the game of 'peep-bo': there is the same slightly anxious, and at the same time pleasurable, anticipation, and the same spontaneous pleasure and laughter when the handkerchief is removed. The similarity is so striking that I was quite deceived by it, for having explained the game of 'peep-bo' to my own satisfaction in terms of the generalized hedonic theory,[4] I took it for granted that the falling game was simply another example of the same phenomenon, and it was not until several days after making the observations that I realized on turning the matter over in my mind that things were not so simple as they had seemed at first glance.[5] Nevertheless the similarity remains, and since 'peep-bo' is clearly not an auto-erotic activity, presumably the falling game is also not predominantly auto-erotic, and so it is tempting to try to find a common explanation to account for both games.

The generalized hedonic theory gives the result that if the ego is subjected to a pleasure and an unpleasure simultaneously, and if the unpleasure is less intense than the pleasure, the resulting pleasure will be more intense than it would be if there were no unpleasure, provided that the applied pleasure and unpleasure are both associated with the same wish; if they are associated with different wishes then this apparently paradoxical law of combination does not apply. This immediately explains the pleasure which the child derives from playing 'peep-bo', because I am one of her love objects and so my presence is a source of pleasure to her; by the same token my partial disappearance caused by the handkerchief covering my face is a source of unpleasure, which is less in intensity than the pleasure of my presence because it is only my face which is covered, and in any case she knows quite well that I am still there behind

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[1] Published with the permission of Mr. Baggally's literary executors and a beneficiary under his will, viz. The British Institute of Radio Engineers.

[2] Lawrence S. Kubie: 'A Critical Analysis of the Concept of a Repetition Compulsion', *Inter. J. Psycho-Anal.*, XX, 402.

[3] This is the same child whose behaviour at three months of age I described in my paper on 'Hedonic Conflict and the Pleasure Principle', *Inter. J. Psycho-Anal.*, XXII, 280ff.

[4] W. Baggally: 'A Generalized Hedonic Theory of the Ego', *Inter. J. Psycho-Anal.*, Vol. XXVIII, Part 3.

[5] It was not until I had finished writing this paper that I became aware that my failure to consider the falling game in detail was determined not merely by my intuitive recognition of its similarity to 'peep-bo', but also by a fear lest it should not prove to be explicable in terms of the generalized hedonic theory; the fear only became conscious *after* I had proved it to be groundless. The danger of comprehensive theories is that one may unwittingly value them more highly than truth.

the handkerchief. Both the pleasure and the unpleasure are associated with the wish for my presence, and so all the conditions are fulfilled for a large increase in the resultant pleasure in accordance with the generalized hedonic theory. (For the details of the theory and the evidence in support of it the reader is referred to my paper on it.[6])

Directly we attempt to apply the same methods to the falling game we get into difficulties. The unpleasure is easily seen to be the anxiety about falling down and hurting oneself, but where is the pleasure, and what is the wish of which the pleasure must be the gratification and the unpleasure the frustration if they are to combine in such a way as to give enhanced pleasure ?

Let us follow out the analogy with the other game logically. The unpleasure must be the frustration of the wish, whatever that may be, but it is also the anxiety about getting hurt ; therefore the wish must be *a wish not to get hurt*. But the pleasure must be the gratification of this wish ; therefore the pleasure is that of falling without getting hurt. But if we admit the possibility of such a thing as a wish not to get hurt then everything is plain sailing. The pleasure is that of falling without being hurt, which is fully gratified ; the unpleasure is the anxiety lest one might get hurt in falling, and this is less intense than the pleasure because one's fears are unfounded and the couch is soft anyway, and both the pleasure and the unpleasure are associated with the wish not to get hurt, and so all the conditions are fulfilled for a large increase in the resultant pleasure in accordance with the generalized hedonic theory.

In this little investigation I have simply used the theory as a heuristic compass-needle to point the way to what would be required in order that the falling game should be explicable in terms of the theory, and have been led to the idea of a wish not to get hurt. At present this is not a real concept, but merely a logical artefact—an empty shell of words which would have to be filled by a psychological reality before the game could be said to be explained by the theory ; in fact at this stage of the discussion the definition of the wish not to get hurt would be that it is that which, *if* it existed in the child's mind, would explain the falling game in terms of the generalized hedonic theory. If we are to find out whether such a thing really exists, then we must look for it outside the confines of the foregoing argument.

Fear is a reaction to a known danger ; anxiety, a similar reaction to an unknown danger. Freud says of anxiety that it is ' a certain condition as of expectation of danger and preparation for it, even though it be an unknown one ; fear requires a definite object of which one is afraid ' [7] ; or again : ' Anxiety has an unmistakable affinity with expectation : it is anxiety *about* something. . . . In precise speech we use the word " fear " rather than " anxiety " if the feeling has found an object '.[8] But whenever there is a fear lest something *should* happen, there must at the same time be a wish that it *should not* happen ; in fact these are merely two ways of saying the same thing, so that looked at in this way, fear and anxiety are simply negative wishes—wishes to avoid something.

It does not require very much insight into the minds of children to see that if you are trying to maintain a precarious balance on your hind legs so as to be like the grown-ups, and if you have fallen over and bumped yourself many times in learning to do it, then the mere act of standing up is enough to make you afraid of falling and getting hurt, or in other words, to give you a strong wish *not* to fall over and get hurt.

Thus we see that there really exists in the child's mind just the negative wish required to explain the game in terms of the generalized hedonic theory, and that this wish, which is identical with the fear of falling over and getting hurt, comes into existence as a result of the child having experienced actual tumbles on the floor.

This state of things is reinforced by two other negative wishes : the wish to avoid the narcissistic blow engendered by the fall which demonstrates the child's feebleness in comparison with the grown-ups, and the wish to avoid the fright produced by the loss of equilibrium, which has been shown to occur from birth [9] and which appears to be an important contributory factor in certain anxiety neuroses.[10] Perhaps it does not matter very much as to the relative intensity of these different factors, because they all tend to produce the same result.

We can now summarize the proposed explanation of the hedonics of the falling game as follows. Firstly there is the miniature trauma constituted by falling down whilst trying to walk. This sets up three kinds of fear, corresponding to physical pain, narcissistic mortification, and loss of equilibrium : the first of these is probably the predominant one. These fears are capable of being regarded from the obverse standpoint as being wishes for the avoidance of their respective objects. When the child is standing on the couch, the external threat of pain no longer exists, because if you fall on the couch you do not get hurt, although the fear is not thereby abolished, but only reduced, since it persists as a memory of experiences on the floor. With the reduction of this fear the other two are secondarily reduced also, because if one

[6] See note on p. 198.
[7] Freud, S. : *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 9.
[8] Freud, S. : *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*, p. 158.
[9] See, for example, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, by John B. Watson, p. 229.
[10] Schilder, Paul : ' Types of Anxiety Neuroses ', *Inter. J. Psycho-Anal.*, XXII, 225.

were to fall down on purpose (a thing which can now be contemplated owing to the softness of the couch), then the narcissistic sting would have gone out of the experience because one is oneself in control of the situation and all that remains is the memory of past discomfitures, and furthermore one can fall so as to land sitting up, so that although there is a loss of equilibrium, it is regained immediately afterwards. Under these conditions it would evidently be great fun to try the daring experience—deliberately to frustrate these wishes to avoid unpleasure by actually falling down on purpose, so as to bring the unpleasure associated with the memory of previous falls on the floor into hedonic conflict with the more intense pleasure of finding oneself quite safe, quite unruffled, and the right way up in spite of one's fears, and thus to cause a large increase in the resultant pleasure in accordance with the combination law derived from the generalized hedonic theory, as well as to obtain the erotic pleasure of the physical movement. Of course, after the adventure has been repeated a number of times, the fears are reduced by the reassuring immediate experience, and so the swaying and overbalancing will be prolonged so as to spin out the remaining unpleasure as long as possible. Finally the fears have been banished entirely, and with them the interest in the game, because there is no longer any unpleasure to set against the pleasure, and the only thing to do is to find another game.

I am tempted to speculate a little further. We have found a trauma involving fear of physical hurt, narcissistic shock, and loss of equilibrium, which is followed by numerous repetitions of the traumatic situation in a modified form. That would serve very well as a description of the sequence of events in a traumatic neurosis, and is, of course, the analogy drawn by Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, only in this case the analogy is a particularly close one. If apprehension can mitigate fright, it also seems true to say that fright produces a state of subsequent apprehension. The pathological effect of unpreparedness would then lie in the fact that if the shock has come upon one without warning on one occasion, then it may do so again, whereas if we have warning of the impending shock the first time, we can expect to receive a similar warning on subsequent occasions. Thus, a shock for which we are unprepared will tend to leave behind it a state of permanent apprehension, whereas if we have warning of it, then we can relax our vigil until the warning comes again. The shock which precipitates the traumatic neurosis, then, comes unexpectedly and leaves behind it a permanent state of apprehension lest it should occur again unexpectedly [11]; or in the present terminology, it leaves behind it an intense wish that it should not occur again, just as the child's tumble on the floor leaves a wish not to fall again. But when the traumatic patient is asleep his interest is withdrawn from the outer world and so he is in a way protected from its dangers, just as the child is protected from the hard floor by being on the couch. Perhaps under these conditions the patient can envisage the possibility of experiencing the trauma on purpose, in the same way as, and for the same reason that, the child falls over on purpose, viz, so as to set the unpleasure of the (now weakened) apprehension against the pleasure of security so as to increase the resultant pleasure. But if this is the case then the patient's game fails completely, because the preliminary anxiety of the dream wakes him up and he finds himself back in the real world again and in the grip of his terrors. It is exactly as if the child were to find herself back on the floor instead of on the couch at the very moment when she was about to topple over. Are we to expect from this that if it were possible to prevent the patient from waking, his neurosis would exhaust itself in a succession of dreams of decreasing affective intensity, each of them terminating in a feeling of relief, just as the child exhausted the unpleasurable component in her game by constant repetition ?

If the patient sustains a wound at the time of the traumatic experience, then not only has he thereby obtained a means of loving himself which reduces the severity of the narcissistic blow, but he has also a permanent memento of the trauma, as it were, so that there would no longer be any point in conjuring up the trauma in a dream, for he has it always with him in a tangible form. Ferenczi's remark [12] that ' It is not impossible that the results achieved by many neurologists from treating war neuroses by painful electrical stimuli are due to the fact that these painful sensations satisfy the patients' unconscious traumatophilia ' would then take on a new significance : the electrical treatment would correspond to the child's game, since although the experience is alarming, the patient is in fact unharmed by it. It would thus form a fitting substitute for the dreams which, since they wake the patient before they have run their course, are abortive.

A BRIEF MEMOIR

The late W. O. A. W. Baggally, whose third article contributed to the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS is given below, was the son of W. W. Baggally. His father worked for the Society for Psychical Research in connection with the mediumship of Eusapsia Pallidino and other persons. Our contributor started his education at Brighton College, but failed to matriculate, yet much

[11] That there really exists such a state of permanent apprehension in these cases seems to be shown by one of Ferenczi's patients when he says : ' I can't get to sleep at all in the absolute quiet, because I always have to listen so carefully to hear whether there really is not some sound to be heard ' (S. Ferenczi : *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis*, p. 140).

[12] Ferenczi, S., *loc. cit.*

later he took a "post-graduate" course in quantum mechanics. Being an only child and having ample means he had no necessity to take up an occupation, but in one of his chosen subjects, radio, he left all amateurs behind. He did not build apparatus himself owing to manipulative awkwardness, but employed a mechanic to do so. About 1934 he designed a "memory unit" which he used for simple experiments on psycho-physical phenomena and to gain material for his hedonic theory. This apparatus used neon tubes for recording an "extinguishable memory," a glowing tube represented an item of memory which could be detected, from its lower resistance, by an automatic switching device in much the same way as the E.N.I.A.C. electronic calculator will "store" and subsequently make use of electrical signals.

He was an accomplished musician, playing the piano, organ, harpsichord and recorder, and could compose with insight and feeling, especially fugues. In addition he wrote delightful poetry in the 17th century lyrical manner. He also was interested in pictures and showed a considerable grasp of their qualities while retaining a power of criticism.

He was absorbed in psycho-analytical theory, as these papers show, and grappled with some of the most fundamental of the theories of "the Master," as he called Freud. Later in his reading he was much influenced by Melanie Klein's work, and he carried both in his synthesising mind.

The war and other domestic events disturbed him greatly; he was a conscientious objector and, isolating himself more and more from people, became a recluse.

His name is more likely to be remembered in electrical engineering than in psycho-analytical circles, but in the latter, in his own field, he was a pioneer. He died at the age of forty-four.

EDITOR.

BOOK REVIEWS

Sigmund Freud: An Introduction. By Walter Hollitscher, D.Ph. (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1947. Pp. viii + 119. Price 8*s.* 6d.)

The aim of this book is to introduce Freud to sociologists. It consists, in the main, of a summary of his work which is systematic rather than historical in form. Thus Dr. Hollitscher begins with defence of the concept of the unconscious, then outlines the Freudian theory of instincts in general and of the sexual instinct in particular which brings him to a discussion of the conflict between it and the demands of society. From there he turns back once more to first principles and devotes a chapter each to the concept of anxiety and the mechanism of identification before outlining the classical theory of the development of the super-ego and of super-ego morality.

This form of presentation makes Dr. Hollitscher's book easy for the layman to follow, and it is, in fact, unusually lucid and precise. But as it inevitably stresses some parts of Freud's theory more than others, its value will be differently assessed by different analysts. The present reviewer can only assess it from the point of view which he believes to be the most important.

To summarize Freud is, of course, a Herculean task. Not only was his scientific output prodigious, but it extended over a period of more than half a century during which his thought was continually progressing towards an ever deeper understanding of the human mind. Now one of the biggest steps in this progress occurred with the introduction of the concept of the Death Instinct. But Dr. Hollitscher, in stressing the conflict between the sexual impulse and the demands of society and the super-ego, seems to have allowed himself too little space to deal with the perhaps more fundamental conflicts between love and hate to which Freud attached so much importance in his later work.

Another criticism may seem more controversial. Dr. Hollitscher's avowed aim is to summarize Freud. But, since the summary is addressed to sociologists, he may be presumed to intend to give them the most up-to-date psycho-analytical equipment. To many analysts, an equipment which, for example, does not include any distinction between the depressive and persecutory elements in guilt, or any reference to reparation, will not seem up to date; for, without these concepts, sociologists cannot hope to understand such fundamental conflicts as that between the individual and the demands of society in which he lives. To show them that society is a representative of the super-ego, and that the external sanctions of the law are powerfully supported by this inner authority is, of course, a substantial help. But if they are left with the impression that the individual, in his conflict with the super-ego, is fighting solely for his freedom to obtain pleasure for himself, their understanding is still very incomplete. They will not be able to see that he may also be fighting for the freedom of his creative and reparative impulses, and that, in fact, a conflict between two moralities, one reparative and one authoritarian, may be involved. In short, they will not be able to understand what the basic moral conflicts in the world are all about.

These omissions have been stressed because they seem to be important. But although Dr. Hollitscher may not have provided sociologists with all the most up-to-date equipment, the tools he has provided are a good and serviceable selection which certainly no sociologists should be without. He has also, in his introduction and his postscript, added some valuable hints both on how they should, and on how they should not, be used to obtain the best result.

R. Money Kyrle.

Ego Hunger and Aggression. A Revision of Freud's Theory and Method. By F. S. Perls. (Allen & Unwin, London. Pp. 373.)

Perls' book, a contribution to the psychology of total personality dedicated to the memory of Max Wertheimer, is a most profound study and of

interest from many points of view. It combines the abstract philosophical approach of gestalt-psychology with the empiric system of terms of psycho-analysis, as far as the latter seems to be acceptable to the author. By his ' revision ' Perls intends :

' (*a*) to replace the psychological by an organismic concept ;

' (*b*) to replace association psychology by gestalt-psychology ; and

' (*c*) to apply differential thinking based upon S. Friedlaender's *Creative Indifference* (p. 14).

The first part of the book, ' Holism and Psycho-Analysis ', represents ' Collegium logicum '. The author shows how ' by the use of the new intellectual tools of holism (field conception) and semantics (the meaning of meaning) our theoretical outlook can now be tremendously improved '. As a short review cannot hope to present those ideas satisfactorily we would refer to the original.

In his concept of the ego the author shows his close relation to Adler's Individual Psychology. Consequently no more than a few unimportant rudiments of Freud's fundamental conception of the unconscious remain. Neurotic symptoms are not conceived as the product of a conflict between the ego and the unconscious. The conflict is located in different parts of the ego. The dualism of the psycho-analytic conception is replaced by the idea of figure background formation, which is so meaningful in gestalt-psychology. The repressed parts of the personality, complexes, are termed ' holoids ' or ' hidden gestalt '. ' Becoming figure ' may be compared to the term libido cathexis. The unconscious is background. The ego-sections which collide in symptom-formation are separated by ego-boundaries as a consequence of ' reflections '. One section of the ego A(ctive) opposes another section P(assive), a ' reflection ' occurs and an inhibition is constituted. The orthodox psycho-analyst asks in vain what are the advantages of these new terms gained by means of differential thinking. It would appear that the change from ' reflection ' back to so-called repression with reaction-formation (e.g. directing aggression against one's own person) does not represent an impressive progress in our knowledge. There is no differentiation between repressed unconscious and unconscious as an institution. All repressions in the psycho-analytic sense of the word are conceived as ' unfinished situations ' the ' finishing ' of which leads to recovery. Although the author acknowledges Freud's work now and then, he is all too ready to discard the theory of libido, the necessity of finding the infantile sources of the neurosis (the ' causes ' in the past), the eternal and barren question ' why '. It is the concept of transference in particular to which Perls cannot agree.

In the form of marginal comment and correcting improvements Perls takes up ideas of certain authors of psycho-analytic orientation. Federn's formulations on ego-boundaries appear to be somewhat akin to his own ideas. Furthermore, psycho-analysis is mainly represented by W. Reich (theory of character and muscle armour) and Karen Horney (stress upon sociological and environmental factors) who have gone quite some distance from the fundamental conceptions of psycho-analysis. A sometimes grotesque and simplifying polemic against these conceptions can be traced throughout the book. A great deal of what is well known to every student of the subject is misunderstood and distorted to such a degree that we do not think it fitting to polemize against such polemic and to repeat things that have been said so often. To mention only one instance the author contends that psycho-analysis conceives ego and libido cathexis not to be a ' function ' of the organism, but a kind of mystic ' substance '.

Such misinterpretations naturally rouse doubts as to whether the author has a legitimate claim to the revision announced by him. If, however, we do not allow this to prevent us from reading on we are rewarded in the second part of the book, called ' Mental Metabolism ' by an abundance of stimulating details and ideas on the problems of psychosomatics.

Perls bases himself on Bertrand Russell when he centres his conceptions of neurosis around the instinct of hunger. In his view various disturbances of organismic balance have their root in an inhibition (' reflection ') of oral or, to be more correct, ' dental ' aggression. Very justifiably Perls considers the masticators to be the best outlet for aggressions. The neurotic suffers from their insufficient activity (we should add ' amongst other things '). An important symptom which is known to every analyst from his daily practice, but which probably gets far too little consideration, is described under the felicitous term of ' oral frigidity '. Orally frigid patients have never learned, or forgotten, how ' to put their teeth into the things '. They swallow hastily, masticate badly. According to Perls this attitude, well-known to every doctor as an expression of ' nervousness ', is of serious consequence where a patient has ' to digest and assimilate mental food '. Perls rightly stresses the fact that eating habits are the model for a person's fundamental attitude to many other problems of life. (A German proverb says, ' The way one eats, one works '.) In Perls' view Freud and his disciples have over-emphasized the importance of a person's love-life and so the full weight of his experiences is placed into the scales in favour of the analysis of the hunger instinct. In this attempt, however, all the riches of psycho-analytic ideas are lost. Aggressions, which Freud found to be rooted mainly within the anal-sadistic stage, are exclusively located in the oral zone, where they were not altogether unknown before. The cause of this oral anæsthesia, called

' sense-motoric resistance ', is seen in a general way in certain mistakes in education, in particular the pressure used to make the child eat dishes he does not like. If stern measures of education succeed in forcing hated food upon a child in spite of his refusals and by means of intimidation, a way out of this situation is found by ' introjecting ', i.e. by swallowing the food without masticating and enjoying it. It is remarkable that other early infantile traumata, such as weaning, hunger, and many other sources of oral anxiety, which are considered by Freud and his disciples to be of importance, are not mentioned. Had the author not tried consciously to refrain from investigations into the ' history ' of the case below the surface, this would have offered an opportunity to evaluate the ideas of Melanie Klein. Nevertheless Perls mentions the experience of the suckling that biting the breast is ' bad ' and is followed by unpleasant consequences. At this point he cannot quite avoid the ' historic ' approach which is otherwise made fun of extensively. For the rest he thinks the constant attempts of Freudians at looking for ' causes ' to be leading astray, to be therapeutically ineffective and no more than an undesirable form of lending countenance to the ' dummy-complex '. This term covers a kind of self-deception of the neurotic, an attitude wherein the gain from illness and the need for suffering shake hands. In the author's view this ' dummy-attitude ' is particularly characteristic of oral frigidity and arises from an attitude of ' hanging-on bite ' (*Verbissenheit*) of those neurotic types. (The author does not accept Freud's assumption that the personality-structure of different people shows a varying degree of inclination towards fixation, i.e. their libido is more or less transferable or ' sticky '.) Whoever introjects in this way does not assimilate mental food satisfactorily. In the same way as large portions of food leave the intestines in a non-assimilated form, so the patient's ' mental stomach ' tends towards muddled thinking and projection. Thus defæcation is the physiological model of projection ; and possibly vomiting is an ' anal ' performance of the upper end of the digestive tract. Introjection and projection, the central mechanisms of the paranoic character, are not accepted as normal and transitory mechanisms of early ego-development, but have their origin solely in those ' sense-motoric resistances '. The insufficient assimilation of the oral-anæsthetic type develops in extreme cases into ' pseudo-metabolism of the paranoic character ', and is, moreover, the deepest root of our ' paranoic civilization ', a world full of hatred. In contrast thereto the attitude of the healthy personality is an organismic contact with food, a forceful activity of the jaws as weapons of attack against the ' outside ' world (environment). (The mucous membrane of the digestive tract was evolved from the ectoderm.) This in turn means a great intensity of ' taste ' (both in the literal and æsthetic use of the term), maximal liquefaction of food, and complete assimilation. The paranoic character remains at the predental stage of development, solid food is not attacked with the full force of the teeth, it is swallowed as if it were liquid, we might say it is ' drunk '. Loss or restriction of the organismic ' feeling of himself ' is the result of this attitude. Behind every neurosis of the digestive tract and every case of inebriety ' introjection ' and paranoic character-traits can be discovered. (The reviewer would like to add here alimentary adipositas, which is often based upon a compulsion to eat.) Further ' senso-motoric resistances ' are anal frigidity or anæsthesia, which is never absent in cases of spastic constipation. The consequence of anæsthesia of the openings of the body (which, as we well know, have a close relation to ego-formation) is ' confluence ', i.e. an insufficient differentiation between the individual and his environment. ' Confluence ' is the basis of projection. Disturbances of a neurotic or schizoid patient's contact with his environment cannot be treated until oral frigidity has been removed. The author is now examining his conceptions in their application to schizophrenic cases and expresses his hope of being able soon to publish decisive findings on this puzzling illness. It is a well-known experience that inhibitions of the ability to study, disturbances of perception, depressive inhibitions of thought, as well as melancholy in general, are rooted in the oral phase. This fact leads Perls to the interesting assumption of a ' mental stomach ' working in step with the digestive tract. In cases of insufficient ability to concentrate the free ' organismic ' interplay of ego and instincts is disturbed. Over-control of a spasmodic compulsion type is characteristic of neurasthenia for instance. Here the free ' becoming gestalt ' of the necessary performance is disturbed and must be achieved by an excessive display of strength. In the end this leads to a nervous breakdown.

In the author's view all these points have not been sufficiently recognized by psycho-analysis ; at least they were treated as ' step-children '. It remains uncertain whether the author has ever tried his teeth on the writings of K. Abraham (e.g. ' A Short Study of the Development of the Libido ') a writer who is mentioned cursorily. It would exceed the size of a review if we tried to compare Perls' formulations (interesting in spite or because of all their extremism) with the well-known fundamental conceptions of psycho-analysis, which since the publication of Freud's *Triebe und Triebschicksale* (Instincts and their Vicissitudes) have found a resounding echo in both investigation and literature (Ferenczi !) Perls has made extensive use of his principle of self-expression by re-discovering without any embarrassment things that have long been known. It cannot well be contended that the oral phase has not received due consideration by psycho-analysis. In conformity with his

point of view of common sense Perls discards both the conception of pregenital libido and the theory of libido as a whole. Thus no real basis for discussion is left. It is also true that he is not at all interested in the historical 'causes' of oral disturbances of the hunger instinct. Psycho-analysis and ontogenetic, i.e. historical, approach are inseparable. It cannot be gainsaid that this part of ego-psychology, the exploration of which began long after that of the unconscious, leaves a great deal yet to be investigated. It is also correct that these mental structures (ontogenetically the earliest) offer the greatest difficulties to *any* method of psychotherapy; this is often made to serve Perls' attempts at discrediting the 'old type method'. Should it be possible to find a certain therapeutic technique whereby this *crux medici* could in fact be removed, it would be worth a re-investigation in spite of any sceptical reserve. Instead of short glimpses illustrating the author's ideas a new edition of the book should therefore include extensive case histories giving a full account of the new technique.

In the third part of the book this technique is described as 'Concentration Therapy', 'a synchronization of analysis and reconditioning'. Thus the fundamental conception is partly of an educational nature. Freud's one-sided approach is said to concentrate mainly on the analysis of undesirable attitudes. Exercises aiming at an 'organismic reorganization' are given. They try to achieve full concentration on the food (the process of eating). They are not in accordance with Fletcher's compulsion ritual, but aim at a liquefaction, at tasting, at a 'feeling of himself' and full 'organismic' devotion. 'Visualization', a training of phantasy, an immersion in scenic-eidetic experiences, which, however, do not represent past events, but show desired attitudes as present. (Thus a technical performance such as driving a car is learned more quickly, if the necessary actions are repeated several times in the person's phantasy.) In contrast to the undesirable symptom the desired attitude must 'become gestalt'. In the course of these exercises intensive cathartic reactions are observed. Immersion exercises such as 'body concentration' and 'internal silence' are merely mentioned here. Various items remind us of well-known methods such as Frank's Modified Psychokatharsis and Autogene (tic) Training of I. H. Schultz and similar methods of relaxation technique.

The author contends that this technique differs from Yoga practices in that it does not aim at a deadening of the organism, but rather at an organismic balance. In any therapy of oral frigidity strong feelings of disgust that were suppressed by means of 'reflections', have to be actuated. In the course of this reconditioning strong resistances must be overcome, in particular a general tendency of human beings to fall back on old habits. It is contended that the correct linguistic expression is of great assistance in achieving self-expression. (The use of ego-language instead of it-language; e.g. I dropped the cup, instead of, the cup slipped out of my hand.)

We would restrict ourselves to these excerpts from a book that offers a strong stimulus to every psychotherapist for the study of the problems of psychosomatics and adult education and re-education. The author himself characterizes his work as the expression of a period of transition and personal re-orientation. 'My experiences in psycho-analysis were influenced by my own oral under-development' (p. 123). He is conscious of the fact that 'everybody's observations are dictated by specific interests, by pre-conceived ideas and by an—often unconscious—attitude which collects and selects facts accordingly' (p. 14). It is probably of importance that the author suffered a tragic disappointment in his own psycho-analytic treatment (p. 231), and, moreover, that on the occasion of a personal meeting he experienced 'impoliteness, even downright rudeness' on the part of Freud (p. 179).

The intended revision appears to the present writer to miss the aim in that the author presents an absolutely subjective and personal conception that has too little in common with depth-psychology. Freud's 'old type method' is drawn up in both theory and practice in far too unequivocal a form as to allow to present *partem pro toto*. Everyone is free to profit therefrom whatever he can. 'The assumption of the existence of unconscious processes', declares Freud, 'the acceptance of the theory of resistance and repression, the evaluation of sexuality and of the Œdipus-complex are the chief contents of psycho-analysis and the fundament of its theory. Whoever cannot approve of them should not consider himself a psycho-analyst.'

Even after perusal of this book the reviewer remains doubtful as to whether a really fruitful connection can be established between gestalt-psychology and psycho-analysis, a conclusion which need not exclude the development of useful amalgamations. The book is the clever child of a somewhat inharmonious marriage. A child may succeed in many ways to influence his mother, but will hardly ever change or reform her. The author, in accordance with his principles, will do well to 'put his teeth' into the umbilical cord of his new-born spiritual child; and after having made a 'clear cut' he will doubtlessly make further progress in dealing with this last 'unfinished situation'. A new and beautiful name will easily be found for the baby (we propose for instance 'organismic concentration'); freed from 'hanging-on bite attitudes' it will become a useful citizen of the world of psycho-therapy.

Daniel K. Dreyfus,
Jerusalem.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY

ANNA FREUD, GENERAL SECRETARY

I. *REPORTS RECEIVED FROM SOCIETIES*

(Reports on training activities and psychoanalytic clinics will appear in a future issue.)

AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION

Officers 1947–48

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Dr. Lewis B. Hill (President), Dr. A. Russell Anderson (Vice-President), Dr. H. Whitman Newell (Secretary), Dr. Sarah S. Tower (Treasurer).

Scientific Meetings

1947

January 18. Dr. Lewis B. Hill: 'Reflections on the Training of Psycho-Analysts.'

March 15. Dr. Jennie Waelder-Hall: 'Clinical Seminar in the Former Vienna Psycho-Analytic Institute.'

May 10. *Business Meeting.*

May 29. Brigadier J. R. Rees (England, by invitation), talked on the Third International Conference on Mental Health and the World Health Organization.

September 27. Dr. G. Henry Katz: 'Scientific Method of Freudian Psycho-Analysis.'

October 25. Dr. A. Russell Anderson: 'Problems of Countertransference.'

November 29. Dr. John C. Whitehorn: 'The Professional Psychiatric Approach to Personal Issues.'

BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

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(No reports received.)

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Scientific Meetings

1946

October 29. Dr. Helen McLean: 'Some Psychological Factors in Negro Race Hatred.'

November 26. Dr. Frances Hannett: 'Transference Reactions to an Event in the Life of the Analyst.'

1947

January 28. Dr. Edoardo Weiss: 'Unilateral and Bilateral Objectivation.'

February 25. Dr. George W. Wilson: 'Transvestitism and Olfactory Repression.'

March 25. Dr. Adelaide Johnson: 'Sanctions in Conscience Lacunæ of Adolescents.'

April 22. Dr. Henry Brosin: 'Evaluation of the Rorschach Experiment for its Usefulness to the Psycho-Analyst.'

September 28. Dr. Thomas French: 'Scientific Method in Psycho-Analysis.'

October 28. Dr. Catherine Bacon: 'Homosexuality and Bisexuality as Defensive Mechanisms.'

November 25. Drs. Bruno Bettleheim and Emmy Sylvester: 'Physical Symptoms in Emotionally Disturbed Children.'

DETROIT PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Officers: Dr. Richard F. Sterba (President), Dr. Leo H. Bartemeier (Vice-President), Dr. Harry E. August (Secretary), Dr. Max O. Wolfe (Treasurer).

Scientific Meetings

1947

January 6. Dr. J. Clark Moloney: 'Death—A Contribution to the Study of Masochism.'

January 20. Dr. Thomas Ratliff: 'Psychogenic Exophthalmos.' (Case report.)

March 17. Dr. Leo Bartemeier: 'Case Seminar. Dr. Sol Grossman: 'Case Presentation.'

March 31. Continuation of the programme of March 17.

April 14. Dr. Morton Barnett: 'Hair Pulling and Eating.' (Case report.)

April 28. Dr. Morits Katan: 'Schizophrenia.'

June 9. The group gave reports on papers presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association.

October 6. Dr. Fritz Redl, Mr. Henry Wineman (by invitation): 'Pioneer House.' (Case presentation.)

October 20. Continuation of the programme of October 6.

November 4. Dr. Leo Bartemeier: 'The Study of Medicine in a Neurotic Character.'

November 22. Dr. Leo Bartemeier: 'Dreams and Symptoms.' Dr. Anny Katan: 'The Rôle of Displacement in Agoraphobia.' Dr. Richard Sterba: 'A Critical Review of Alexander and French's book *Psychoanalytic Therapy*.'

December 8. Dr. Leo Bartemeier: 'International Congress for Mental Health.'

LOS ANGELES PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Officers 1947–48

Dr. May E. Romm (President), Dr. Charles W. Tidd (Vice-President), Dr. Ralph R. Greenson (Secretary-Treasurer).

Scientific Meetings

1947

February 4. Dr. Edward Weiss: 'Psychogenic Rheumatism.'

March 20. Dr. Charles Sarlin: 'The Analysis of a Transference Reaction.' (Candidate's thesis.)

April 5. Dr. David Rapaport: 'Psychological Testing—Its Practical and Heuristic Significance.'

April 26. Dr. Ralph R. Greenson: 'Food Addiction and Water Retention.'

August 25. Dr. David Levy: 'Phases of the Hostile Act.'

September 12. Dr. Franz Alexander: 'Analysis of Therapeutic Factors.'

October 18. Dr. Judd Marmor: 'Psychodynamic Mechanisms Underlying Fascist Trends in an American Youth.'

October 19. Dr. Martin Grotjahn: 'About the Symbolization of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.'

November 20. Dr. May E. Romm: 'Some Dynamics in Fetishism.'

Joint Meeting with the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society, *April* 26–27. Dr. Ralph R. Greenson: 'Food Addiction and Water Retention.' Dr. Bruce R. Merrill: 'Some Psychosomatic Aspects of Tuberculosis.' Dr. Joseph Biernoff: 'Psychogenic Spasm of the Fallopian Tubes.' Dr. Melvin R. Somers: 'Some Physiological Considerations Concerning Inhibition.' Dr. Walter Bromberg: 'The Dynamics of Psychopathic Personality.' Dr. Anna Maenchen: 'A Case of Infantile Ego Disturbance.'

Annual Joint Meeting with the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society, *October* 18–19. Dr. May E. Romm: 'General Introduction. Dr. Norman Reider: 'Clinical Observations Concerning the Concept of Normality.' Dr. Judd Marmor: 'Psychodynamic Mechanisms Underlying Fascist Trends in an American Youth.' Dr. Eric Berne: 'The Nature of Intuition.' Dr. Martin Grotjahn: 'About the Symbolization of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.' Dr. Gregory Zilboorg (by invitation): 'The Clinical and Social Difficulties of a Certain Type of Passivity.'

NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Officers 1947–48

Dr. Sandor Lorand (President), Dr. William H. Dunn (Vice-President), Dr. John Frosch (Secretary), Dr. Harry I. Weinstock (Treasurer).

Scientific Meetings

1947

September 29. *Business Meeting.*

October 14. Dr. Henry H. Hart: 'Exploration of Narcissism.'

October 28. Dr. Sandor Lorand: 'Comments on the Correlation of Theory and Technique.' (Presidential Address.)

November 11. Dr. Laci Fessler: 'The Psychopathology of the Climacteric Depression.'

November 25. Dr. Margaret E. Fries: 'The Formation of a Psychoneurosis with Compulsive Trends.'

December 9. Dr. Margaret Mahler: 'Enfants Terribles.'

December 16. American Psycho-Analytic Association Mid-Winter Meeting.

PHILADELPHIA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Officers 1947–48

Dr. LeRoy M. A. Maeder (President), Dr. George W. Smeltz (Vice-President), Dr. Robert S. Bookhammer (Secretary-Treasurer).

Scientific Meetings

1947

January 15. Dr. Robert Waelder: 'The Influence of the Development of Ego Psychology on Psycho-Analytic Technique.'

April 16. Dr. LeRoy M. A. Maeder: 'Social Psychiatry.'

September 16. Dr. G. Henry Katz: 'In Behalf of the Adoption of a More Formal Procedure for Psycho-Analytic Societies.'

THE ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOANALYTIC MEDICINE, NEW YORK

Officers 1947–48

Dr. George E. Daniels (President), Dr. John A. P. Millet (Vice-President), Dr. Nathan W. Ackerman (Secretary), Dr. Viola W. Bernard (Treasurer).

Scientific Meetings

1947

January. Dr. Phyllis Greenacre: 'Vision, Headache and the Halo.'

February. Dr. N. W. Ackerman: 'Toward a Dynamic Interpretation of the Anti-Semitic Reaction.'

March. Dr. Mittelmann: 'Complementary Reactions During Analysis of Married Couples.'

April. Dr. Paul Hoch: 'Pseudo-Psychoneurotic Forms of Schizophrenia.'

May. Dr. Sandor Rado: 'Principles of Psycho-Analytic Therapy. Part II. The Two Contrasting Types of Techniques.'

October 7. Dr. Carl Binger: 'What Is Mental Health?'

November 11. Dr. Richard Frank: 'The Phantasies of Pregnancy.'

December 2. Dr. Hoch: 'Anxiety in the Psychoses.'

SAN FRANCISCO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Officers 1947–48

Dr. William G. Barrett President), Dr. Bernhard Berliner (Vice-President), Dr. Paul Holmer (Secretary), Dr. Donald A. Macfarlane (Treasurer).

Scientific Meetings

1947

February. Dr. Bruce Merrill: 'Some Psychosomatic Aspects of Tuberculosis.'

March. Dr. Earle Marsh and Dr. Albert Vollmer: 'Childbirth Without Fear.'

April. Dr. David Rapaport: Guest Speaker.

May. Dr. Nevitt R. Sanford: 'Psycho-Analysis and Clinical Psychology.'

October. Dr. Leslie H. Farber: 'Remarks on Medical Milieu.'

December. Dr. Melvin R. Somers: 'Immobilizing Fear.'

Joint meetings with the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society, see above under Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society.

TOPEKA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

Officers 1947–48

Dr. Hugh M. Galbraith (President), Dr. Jan Frank (Vice-President), Dr. Michalina Fabian (Secretary-Treasurer).

Scientific Meetings

1947

February 6. Dr. Gregory Zilboorg: 'The Pressure to Do Something.'

February 7. Dr. Gregory Zilboorg: 'Culture and Religion in the Light of Psycho-Analytic Understanding.'

February 8. Dr. Gregory Zilboorg: 'Culture and Religion in the Light of Psycho-Analytic Understanding.'

March 29. Dr. G. Leonard Harrington: 'Concerning Insight.'

May 3. Dr. Margaret Brenman: 'A Note on the Indications for the Use of Hypnosis in Psychotherapy: An Illustrative Case Report.' Dr. Merton Gill: 'Spontaneous Regression on the Induction of Hypnosis.'

June 28. Dr. David Rapaport and Dr. Jan Frank: 'A Review and Preliminary Remarks on the Problems of the Psychology of Research.'

September 3–5. Dr. Berta Bornstein: 'Theory and Technique of Child Psycho-Analysis.'

September 24–26. Dr. Edward Bibring: 'Theory of Instincts.'

September 27. Dr. Edward Bibring: 'The Problem of Depression.'

September 30. Dr. Kate Friedlander: 'Super-Ego Disturbances in Delinquents.'

October 3. Dr. Kate Friedlander: 'Super-Ego Disturbances in Delinquents.'

October 25. Dr. Merton Gill: 'Psychodynamics of Paranoid Delusions.'

November 29. Dr. Robert L. Worthington: 'The Mechanics of Denial and its Significance in Treatment.'

WASHINGTON PSYCHO-ANALYTIC SOCIETY

Officers: Dr. Robert T. Morse (President), Dr. Grace Baker (Vice-President), Dr. Rex E. Buxton (Secretary-Treasurer).

(No reports received.)

ARGENTINE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Associacion Psicoanalitica Argentina

(Juncal 655, Buenos Aires)

Officers 1947–48

Dr. Enrique Pichon Riviere (President), Dr. Luis Rascovsky (Secretary), Dr. María Langer (Treasurer), Dr. Arnaldo Rascovsky (Editor), Dr. Angel Garma (Director of the Institute).

As our Society took an active part in the First Inter-American Congress of Medicine, which took place in the City of Rio de Janeiro on *September* 6–15, 1946, our principal scientific activity centred around the preparation of papers to be presented there. The Congress decided to organize for future similar congresses a section devoted exclusively to psycho-analysis. The members of the Sao Paulo (Brazil) Psycho-Analytic Society being also present we were able to hold the first joint meeting and discuss fully the psycho-analytic papers presented at the Congress.

The articles presented were:

Dr. Celes Ernesto Cárcamo: 'Anxiety and Organic Cardiopathies.' Dr. Horácio García Vega: 'Psychogenesis of a Chronic Sinusitis.' Dr. Angel Garma: 'Psycho-Analytic Observations of Colitic Patients' and 'The Symbolism of Clothing in Pregnancy Dreams.' Dr. Eduardo E. Krapf: 'Psycho-Analytic Contribution to the Problem of the Surgical Treatment of Hypertension.' Dr. María Langer: 'Psycho-Analytic Aspects of Some

Disturbances of Pregnancy' and 'Psychogenic Sterility.' Dr. Enrique Pichon Riviere: 'Psychosomatic Study of Migraine', 'Psycho-Analysis of Schizophrenia' and 'Manic-Depressive Psychosis and Peptic Ulcer.' Dr. Arnaldo Rascovsky: 'Psychodynamic Considerations on Thyroid Function', 'Psychosomatic Study of the Adiposogenital Syndrome', 'Psychosomatic Approach to Infantile Epilepsy' (in collaboration with Luis Rascovsky and Matilde W. de Rascovsky). Dr. Luis Rascovsky: 'Epilepsy with Organic Injury (Sequelæ of Meningo-encephalitis)' and 'Psychogenesis of a Case of Leo Bürger Illness'. Dr. Teodoro Schlossberg: 'Psychodynamic Factors in a Menorrhagia.' Dr. Alberto Tallaferro: 'Psychogenesis of a Recidivant Luxation.'

The following lectures were given in various scientific centres:

July 18, 1946, in the Argentine Homœopathic Society: Dr. Celes Ernesto Cárcamo: 'Present State of Psycho-Analysis.'

September–December, 1946, 15 lectures given in the French Institute of Superior Studies. Dr. Enrique Pichon Riviere: 'Psycho-Analysis of the Count of Lautreamont.'

October 23, 1946, paper read to the Neurologic, Psychiatric and Neurosurgical Society of Buenos Aires: Dr. Enrique Pichon Riviere: 'The Theory and Practice of Narcoanalysis.'

August 6, 1946, in Montevideo (Uruguay), paper read to the Societies of Pediatry and Psychiatry of Montevideo: Mrs. A. A. de Pichon Riviere: 'Psycho-Analysis of Children.'

October 19, paper read to the Society of Psychiatry of Montevideo: Mrs. A. A. de Pichon Riviere: 'Indications for the Psycho-Analytic Treatment of Children. A Clinical Case.'

August 6, 1946, paper read at the Ateneo, Montevideo: Dr. E. Pichon Riviere: 'Interpretation of Some Biographical Data on the Count of Lautreamont.'

September 11, 1946, paper read in the Maternity Ward, Professor Rodrigez Lima's Chair of Obstetrics: Dr. C. E. Cárcamo: 'Psychogenesis of Feminine Pathology.'

September, 1946. Dr. Stewart Wolf (New York, by invitation): 'Experiences Regarding the Influence of Emotional Factors on the Modifications Taking Place in the Gastro-Intestinal and Nasal Mucosa.'

November 18, 1946. Dr. Gregory Zilboorg (by invitation): 'Some Problems Concerning the Development of Psycho-Analysis.'

November 19. 'The Psychological Conflict in Vesalio's Illness.'

Dr. Gregory Zilboorg (New York, by invitation) gave the following lectures organized by the Society: *November* 18: 'Some Problems Concerning the Development of Psycho-Analysis.' *November* 19: 'The Psychological Conflict in Vesalio's Illness' (Argentine Society of History of Medicine). *November* 19: 'Lights and Shadows in the Problems of Psychosomatic Medicine' (Argentine Society of Neurology and Psychiatry). *November* 20: 'The Concept of Illness in Medicine and Psychiatry' (Clinic Hospital, Professor Padilla's Chair of Semiology). *November* 21: 'The City of Paris in the History of Medical Psychology' (French Institute of Superior Studies).

Scientific Meetings

1947

Mrs. Flora Scolni: 'Psycho-Analysis of a Twelve Year-Old Boy.'

Dr. E. Eduardo Krapf: 'Contribution to the Understanding of Conversion Hysteria, with Special Consideration of Hysterical Amenorrhœa.'

Dr. Teodoro Schlossberg: 'The Problem of Actual Neurosis. Semeiological Study of a Case of Impotence.'

Dr. E. Eduardo Krapf: 'Intentional Fostering and Active Use of the Transference in Analytic Therapy.'

Dr. Enrique Racker: 'A Case of Impotence, Asthma and Masochistic Behaviour.'

The following lectures were given in various scientific centres:

Dr. Celes E. Cárcamo: 'Psycho-Analysis and Mental Hygiene', at Dispensario Ose de Higiene Mental, Buenos Aires. 'Cardiopathy and Anxiety' in Instituto Cultural Avelino Gutierrez, Buenos Aires.

Dr. E. Eduardo Krapf: 'Problems of Psychosomatic Medicine', in the Faculty of Medicine, by special invitation of the University of La Plata. 'Mental Hygiene in Old Age', in Dispensario Ose de Higiene Mental, Buenos Aires. 'Psychiatric Indications of Prefrontal Lobotomy', in the Sociedad de Neurologia, Psiquiatria y Neurocirugia of Buenos Aires.

Dr. Marie Langer: 'Matrimonial Problems', in the Association 'Vorwärts'.

Dr. Arnaldo Rascovsky: 'Psychogenesis and Psychotherapy in Otorinolaryngology', in the Club of Otorinolaryngology, Buenos Aires.

Dr. Enrique Pichon Riviere opened a Symposium on 'Shock Therapy in Psychiatry' in the Sociedad de Neurologia, Psiquiatria y Neurocirugia of Burnos Aires on experiences made in the 'Servicio de Psiquiatria de la Edad Juvenil', which he directs in the Hospicio de las Mercedes. Dr. Pichon's opening paper was 'The Healing Mechanism in Shock Therapy' and contributions were made by his collaborators, Associate Members and candidates of the Argentine Psycho-Analytical Society.

The following papers were read by guests in the Society: Dr. Jacobo Schatzky: 'Actual State of the Psycho-Analytical Movement in the United States.' Dr. Robert Wallis: 'Classification of Instincts.' Professor Raul Bittencourt (Rio de Janeiro): 'The New Science for Reconstruction of the World.'

BRITISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

96, Gloucester Place, London W.1

Officers 1947–48

Dr. J. Rickman (President), Dr. W. H. Gillespie (Training Secretary), Dr. S. M. Payne (Scientific Secretary), Dr. R. D. Usher (Business Secretary), Dr. W. C. M. Scott (Director of the Clinic).

Scientific Meetings

1946

October 2. Dr. J. Rickman, short communication : ' Remarks on Creative Factors in Individuals and Groups.'

October 16. Miss Gwen Evans : ' Some Notes on a Case of Enuresis.'

November 6. Discussion, opened by Dr. D. W. Winnicott, on : ' Consultation Technique.'

November 20. The discussion was continued by Dr. Denis Carroll on : ' Consultation Technique.'

December 4. Mrs. M. Klein : ' Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms.'

1947

January 15. Professor L. S. Penrose : ' Psycho-Analysis and Experimental Science.'

February 5. Dr. D. W. Winnicott : ' Some Observations on Hate.'

February 19. Dr. Kate Friedlander : ' Some Aspects of Combined Research.'

March 5. Dr. Herbert Rosenfeld : ' On the Analysis of a Schizoid Case with Depersonalization.'

March 19. Dr. Clifford Scott : ' On Neurological Psychiatric and Psycho-Analytic Implications of the Body Schema.'

April 16. Dr. L. Frankl : ' Observations on Personality Changes in Patients treated by Prefrontal Leucotomy.'

April 30. Mr. C. D. Gomperts : ' Some Observations of Stage Fright in a Female Patient.'

May 7. Dr. J. Pratt : ' A " Poison Pen " Case.'

June 4. Dr. H. Segal : ' An Approach to Æsthetics.'

June 18. Miss H. Schwarz : ' A Case of Character Disorder.'

DUTCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Nederlandsche Vereniging Voor Psychoanalyse

(J. W. Brouwersplein 21, Amsterdam, Z.)

Officers 1947–48

P. J. van der Leeuw (Chairman), Dr. C. H. van der Leeuw (Vice-Chairman), M. Groen-van Beverwijk (Secretary), M. Mackenzie-van der Noordaa (Treasurer), H. A. van der Sterren.

1946–47

The most important fact of this past year is the foundation of the *Society's own Institute*, to which an *Outpatient Clinic* is attached. In spring 1946, on Mr. and Mrs. Lampl's initiative and with the enthusiastic support of the members an organizing committee started work and the Institute was founded on August 30. To begin with, the Institute had to be housed in rooms in a small private hospital. The housing shortage made the task of finding more suitable premises very difficult, but with the help of the Amsterdam Town Council a beautiful house was found and the Institute was opened with a special meeting on October 25, 1947. Miss Anna Freud was invited to the opening session and gave a very interesting lecture on the connection between the theory and technique of psycho-analysis.

In founding the Institute much sympathy and help was given from other branch societies. Our American colleagues supported us greatly, and also France and England assisted us, especially with the extension of our library.

Another important event was the *Conference of European Psycho-Analysts*, held in Amsterdam on May 24–26, 1947, which is reported under Section II of this Bulletin.

The Society regrets to announce the death of two of its members : Mrs. E. Wolter-Groen died on March 2, two days after having read a very interesting paper on the technique of Child analysis. Dr. M. Levy-Suhl died in September 1947 ; having escaped the terror of the Nazi occupation, his health succumbed to the heavy strain suffered during those years.

During the year the difference between the meetings of the Dutch Society and the ' Amsterdam Group ' practically disappeared ; the members of the Hague frequently attended our meetings, but still had their own gatherings.

Council of the Dutch Psycho-Analytical Society : H. G. van der Waals (President), Mrs. B. van der Stadt-Baas (Vice-President), H. A. van der Sterren (Secretary), Rh. Feith (Treasurer), Miss P. Tibout (Assistant Secretary), J. Tas succeeded Professor K. H. Bouman as Librarian.

Council of the Amsterdam Group : H. G. van der Waals (President), H. A. van der Sterren (Secretary), J. Tas (Treasurer).

Council of the Hague Group : Rh. Feith (President), Mrs. M. Kleyn-van Wylick (Secretary-Treasurer).

Board of the Institute : H. Lampl (President), Mrs. M. Mackenzie-van der Noordaa (Secretary), Mrs. M. van Beverwijk (Treasurer), Rh. Feith, C. H. van der Leeuw and H. G. van der Waals (Members). Director of the Institute : H. A. van der Sterren.

Scientific Meetings

1946–47

Dutch Psycho-Analytical Society and Amsterdam Group

1946

September 30. Mrs. M. van Steenbergen-van der Noordaa : ' Report of the Congress for Psychotherapy in Switzerland.'

October 14. Mrs. E. Wolter-Groen : ' Report on a Child Analysis.'

October 21. R. le Coultre : ' Reik's Scientific Development.'

October 28. Mme. Marie Bonaparte (by invitation) : ' Notes on Excision.'

November 11 and 18. H. G. van der Waals : ' Review of Alexander and French's *Psycho-Analytic Therapy*.'

December 2. Mrs. E. Frijling-Schreuder : ' Dickens and Copperfield.'

December 9. Mrs. E. Frijling-Schreuder : ' Dickens as an Author.'

December 16. Rh. Feith : Analysis of a Married Couple.'

1947

January 17. H. Lampl : ' Thomas Mann's *Die vertäuschten Köpfe*.' A van Meurs : ' A Case of Absences.'

January 24. Mrs. M. Groen-van Beverwijk : ' Three Cases of Psychotherapy.'

January 31. A. C. Oerlemans : ' Review of Flugel's *Man, Morals and Society*.'

February 14. Mrs. B. van der Stadt-Baas : ' Analysis of an Epileptic Boy.'

February 28. Mrs. E. Wolter-Groen : ' Technical Problems of Child Analysis.'

March 14, 21 *and* 28. R. le Coultre : ' Freud's Theory of the Death Instinct.'

April 18. C. van Emde Boas : ' Double Travesty in Shakespeare.'

April 25. Mrs. J. Lampl-de Groot : ' Freud's Theory of the Death Instinct. Discussion of le Coultre's paper.'

May 9. A. van Meurs : ' Review of Allen's *Psychotherapy with Children*.

June 13. Mrs. Maria Kircs : ' Review of Hermann's *The Archaic Instincts of Man*.'

HAGUE GROUP

1946

August 28. Rh. Feith and Mrs. B. van der Stadt-Baas : ' Problems of Technique.'

October 7. H. A. van der Sterren : ' Sophocles' *Antigone*.'

October 30. Mrs. A. Hijman-de Pool : ' A Case with Perversion Symptoms.'

November 13. Mrs. M. Kleyn-van Wylick : ' Analysis of a Twelve-Year-Old Boy.'

November 27. H. de Levie : ' A Case of Transvestitism.'

December 11. Mrs. A. Hijman-de Pool : ' Continuation of Case Report on October 30.'

1947

January 15. Mrs. E. Frijling-Schreuder : ' Dickens, His Life and Works.'

March 5. Mrs. B. van der Stadt-Baas : ' A Case of Compulsion Neurosis.'

March 26. Miss Rita Vuyk : ' Review of Roger's *Counselling and Psychotherapy*.'

April 30. Mrs. A. Hijman-de Pool and Miss W. Bruyel : ' Analysis of a Child.'

May 14. A. van Meurs and Miss P. Ongerboer : ' Allen's *Psychotherapy with Children*.'

June 4. Mrs. B. van der Stadt-Baas and Mrs. M. Kleyn-van Wylick : ' Analysis of a Married Couple.'

June 18. Miss K. Vertes (by invitation) : ' A Case of Child Guidance Work.'

FRENCH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Société Psychanalytique de Paris

(Secretary : Dr. M. Schlumberger, 17, Avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris 16e.)

The Society is recovering from the losses sustained since 1939 of over ten of its most active members by emigration or death and the deprivation of its Institute.

Two Belgian psycho-analysts, M. Maurice Dugautiez and M. Fernand Lechat, of Brussels, were elected to full membership. These two analysts form the nucleus of a newly-founded Belgian Psycho-Analytical Society and have started training candidates.

After a nine years' break our quarterly is going to be published again. The first issue of *La Revue Française de Psychanalyse* should be available in early Spring 1948.

Scientific Meetings

Official meetings of the Society were resumed in 1945 on a small scale at private homes of members. Papers were read by Dr. Parcheminey, Dr. Cenac, Dr. Leuba, Dr. Dolto, Dr. Schlumberger, Dr. Boutonier, Dr. Berge, Dr. Bouvet. Full scale meetings were resumed at the end of 1946 and the following papers were read and discussed :

1946–47

Dr. Hesnard : ' Psycho-Analysis and Contemporary Psychological Theories.'

Dr. Lebovici : ' Narco-Analysis with Children.'

M. Lechat : ' Death Anxiety.'

M. Shentoub : ' A Clinical Case.'

Dr. Nacht : ' Introduction to Psychosomatic Medicine.'

Mme. M. Bonaparte : ' Saint Christopher, Protector of Motorists.'

Dr. Schiff : ' On Technique.'

Dr. Leuba : ' Narcissism and Resistance.'

Dr. Lebovici : ' Group Psychotherapy with Children.'

M. Dugautiez and M. Lechat : ' Ego, Super-Ego and Id.'

Dr. Held : ' A Phobia of Knives.'

Dr. Benassy : ' Reactions to Holidays During Cure.'

Dr. Berge : ' On the Formation of the Super-Ego.'

Dr. Courchet : ' On a Serious Case of Anorexia in an Adult.'

Dr. Boutonier : ' Remarks on the Psycho-Analytical Treatment of Obsessions.'

GERMAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Deutsche Psychoanalytische Gesellschaft

(Sulzaer Str. 3, Berlin-Schurargeudorf)

Scientific Meetings

1945

August 14. Dr. Cellarius : ' Review of Schultz-Hencke's *Schicksal und Neurose* (' Fate and Neurosis ').

September 18. Dr. Cellarius : Continuation of Review.

October 16. Dr. Müller-Braunschweig : ' The Present-Day Position of the Psycho-Analyst.'

December 11. Discussion on *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.*

1946

January 15. Dr. Müller-Braunschweig : 'Review of *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.*'

January 29 *and February* 12. Dr. Kath : Continuation of Review.

February 26. Dr. Boehm : ' Recent Advances in Psycho-Analytic Theory and Therapy.'

March 12. Frau Boehlendorf : ' Analysis and Synthesis : Acting-Out and Life.'

March 26. Dr. Wiegmann (by invitation) : ' Psychotherapy with In-patients.'

April 9. Dr. Kalau vom Hofe : ' From Work in Prisons.'

May 21. Dr. Müller-Braunschweig : ' The Ideal of Therapy.'

June 4 *and* 18. Dr. Müller-Braunschweig : ' Variations in the Concept of Narcissism.'

July 2. Herr Schirren (by invitation) : ' The Bringing About of a First Solution in a Deadlock Situation with a Patient.'

July 16. Dr. Kemper : ' The Patient is Silent.'

July 30. Discussion on Dr. Kemper's paper ' The Patient is Silent '.

August 20. Herr Schirren (by invitation) : Continuation and Discussion of paper given on *July* 2.

October 1 *and* 29. Paper read in absence of the author, Mrs. H. Ries (London) : ' An Unwelcome Child and Her Death Instinct.'

November 12. Frau Werner : ' Psychiatry in U.S.A. Works for Peace.'

November 26. Frau Dräger : ' Freud's *A Child is Being Beaten.*'

December 10. Continuation of Discussion on *A Child is Being Beaten.*

1947

January 7. Paper read in absence of the author, Dr. Fromm-Reichmann (U.S.A.) : ' The Transference Problem in Schizophrenics.'

January 21. Frau Dräger : ' *A Child is Being Beaten.* Discussion in the Light of Recent Advances.'

February 4 *and* 18. Dr. Kemper : ' Review of Marjasch' *Chronische Schweiger.*'

April 1. Frau Werner : ' Two Child Cases.'

April 15 *and* 29. Dr. v. Staehr (by invitation) : ' On the Symbolism of the Numbers 1—4.'

May 13. Frau Werner : ' Two Child Cases ' (continued).

June 10. Frau Dräger, Dr. Kalau vom Hofe, Dr. Müller-Braunschweig : ' Reports on the Meeting of European Psycho-Analysts at Amsterdam, Whitsun 1947.'

June 24. Frau Steinbach : ' Review of Marie Bonaparte's *Mythes de Guerre.*'

July 22. Dr. Wiegmann : ' Review of A. Mitscherlich's *Vom Ursprung der Sucht* (The Origin of Addictions).'

September 30. Dr. Boehm : ' Presentation of a Case.'

October 7. Continuation of Discussion on Mitscherlich's *Vom Ursprung der Sucht.*

October 21, *November* 4 *and* 11. Frau Werner : ' On a Case of Parent Guidance Presented by Mrs. Ruben (London).'

HUNGARIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Magyarországy Pszichoanalitikai Egyesület

(Secretary : Dr. E. Petö, Katona Jozsef-u. 14, Budapest V.)

Officers 1947–48

Dr. L. Hajdu (President), Dr. E. Petö (Secretary), Dr. Z. Färber (Treasurer).

Scientific Meetings

1947

January 7. Dr. Kata Lévy : ' Report on the Scientific Work of Anna Freud During the War Years.'

January 21. Dr. I. Schönberger : ' Report on Melanie Klein's Work During the War Years.'

February 18. Dr. L. Hajdu : ' Report on Publications on Questions of Technique.'

March 18. Dr. I. Schönberger : ' Pavlov and Freud.'

April 1. Dr. V. Kapos : ' Clinical Contribution to the Problem of Tic.'

April 15. Dr. (Mrs.) Hermann-Roboz : ' Problems of Technique.'

June 14. *Ferenczi Memorial.* Dr. E. Almásy : ' Dreams in the Novels of the Writer F. Karinthy.'

October 18. Dr. E. Petö : ' Two-Years Report on the Activity of the Psychotherapeutic (Psycho-Analytic) Out-patient Clinic of the Landeskrankenkasse der Arbeiter ' (State Health Insurance Scheme for Manual Workers).

November 11. Dr. L. Hajdu : ' Contribution to the Therapy and Theory of Traumatic Neurosis.'

November 25. Mrs. H. Major : ' Case Histories of Child Analyses.'

Most of the activities of the Members (scientific, organizatory, social) take place outside the Society, since the country's new democracy offers variegated opportunities.

So far the Institute's Out-patient Clinic has not been re-opened, for two reasons, one connected with traffic difficulties which still prevent the use of the clinic's premises, the other reason being that so far the two largest panel organizations have established four psychotherapeutic out-patient clinics two of which are staffed exclusively by medical members and candidates of our Society (Drs. Petö, Amár, Pfeiffer, Brunner, Ormos). One of these also works in the third clinic. These panel organizations cater for all classes of manual workers and private employees.

Apart from these purely therapeutic activities many opportunities to apply psycho-analysis offered themselves. Dr. L. Hajdu was appointed Adviser to the State Health Insurance Scheme by the Ministry of Justice. Dr. Alice Hermann is Psychological and Pedagogical Adviser to the Co-operatives in all matters concerning hostels and nurseries and the training of kindergarten workers. Dr. V. Kapos is one of the capital's Medical Officers of Health, Dr. T. Rajka Medical Superintendent of the Civil Servants' Health Insurance, Dr. L. Rotter Psychological and Mental-Hygiene Adviser of the capital's Board of Health and the socio-political department.

A new and important field of activity was opened up by the establishment of the Association for Mental Hygiene, where psycho-analysts were elected officers. This association, with the support of the authorities, aims at control in all problems connected with Mental Hygiene, thus officially influencing and supervising training, social institutions and therapeutic organizations. The Association is about to publish a periodical, whose editors are mainly psycho-analysts.

Public Lectures. Dr. I. Hollos took a leading part in a two-days' Congress of Hungarian Psychiatrists in May, 1947. Dr. I. Hermann, Lecturer in Psycho-Analysis at the Faculty of Medicine, gave a series of public lectures and published scientific papers in Hungarian periodicals. Dr. A. Hermann gave a series of lectures and official training courses for pedagogues, social workers and kindergarten workers ; she also published a book on modern education. Dr. (Mrs.) Felszeghy participated in the post-graduate training of teachers of elementary and secondary schools. Dr. Fisch is Superintendent of about 100 hostels of the Joint American Distribution Committee. Dr. (Mrs.) Stein holds a newly-created position as School Psychologist to three of the capital's secondary schools. Dr. Kata Lévy gave a series of lectures for Social Workers. Dr. L. Rotter, in her capacity as Director of Training for kindergarten workers, pedagogues and police-women, has a wide field of activity. Dr. I. Schönberger gave a series of lectures on Social Psychology in the Society for External Affairs. Dr. Kata Lévy read a paper in London on ' Perpetual Dilettants '. Mrs. M. Hirsch read several papers on topics of Social Psychology in various organizations. Dr. L. Hajdu took part in a series of lectures on ' The Motherless Child ' at the Free University of Budapest. The medical members of the Society give a series of scientific lectures at the Medical Association, Section for Psychiatry and Neurology.

Dr. E. Petö,
Secretary.

INDIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

(No reports received.)

ITALIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

(No reports received.)

PALESTINE PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

(No reports received.)

SWEDISH PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Svenska Psykoanalytiska Förennigen

(Secretary : Dr. N. Haak, Almlöfsgatau 3, Stockholm.)

1946

During the year meetings were held on January 16, February 6, May 6, May 31, September 24 and November 20. At the Annual General Meeting on February 6 Dr. Nils Haak was elected Full Member and Dr. Gösta Harding Associate Member. On May 6 Dr. A. Tamm gave a short address on Professor Sigm. Freud and his work on the occasion of his 90th birthday.

The following papers were read during the year :

Dr. Lajos Szekely : ' Preconscious Mechanisms of Thinking and Learning.'

Dr. Gunnar Nycander : (1) ' On Some Aspects of Freud's Theory of Sex.' (2) ' On Inhibitions of Aggression.'

Lektor Tore Ekman : ' On Five Chapters of F. Alexander and Th. M. French ' *Psychoanalytical Therapy.*'

Dr. Tora Sandström : Short Communication : ' The Gripenholm Case ' (A criminal quack who, *inter alia*, carried on a most harmful kind of wild analysis).

A committee was founded to safeguard the interests of the society, prepare a scheme for the training of suitable candidates and deal with public authorities by clarifying the differences between

Freudian psycho-analysis and wild analysis in a given case.

Dr. Istvan Hollos sent a letter of thanks for the assistance given by the Swedish Society to the Hungarian Psycho-Analytical Society.

1947

Four meetings were held during the period January–May, 1947, on January 29, March 13, April 28 and May 19, and the following papers were read :

Dr. Alfhild Tamm : ' On Sublimation.'

Dr. René de Monchy : ' Psychosomatic Diseases.'

On January 29 it was decided that persons who previously had been members of another branch society of the International Psycho-Analytical Association could only become members of the Swedish Psycho-Analytical Society if proposed by its Council. In order to be elected to full membership a paper must be read on a completed analysis.

The following were elected to Associate Membership : Dr. Lotte Bernstein, Cand. Phil. Greta Tjellström, Dr. Lajos Szekely and Dr. Aina Versteegh.

Officers : At the Annual Meeting held on May 19 Dr. Gunnar Nycander was elected President, Dr. Alfhild Tamm having asked not to be re-elected ; Dr. René de Monchy (Vice-President), Dr. Nils Haak (Secretary), Dr. Erik Reinius (Treasurer).

The Society has suffered a great loss through the death of its Secretary, Dr. Vera de Monchy, on March 16 following a short acute illness.

At the meeting held on March 13 Professor Harald Schjelderup (Norway) gave a survey of the situation of the Norwegian Psycho-Analytical Society.

During the period October-December four meetings were held on October 20, November 3, December 4 and 18. Papers read :

Dr. Lotte Bernstein : ' A Case of Impotence.'

Dr. Ludwig Schnabl : ' Psycho-Analytic Aspects of Leisure and Pleasure of Young People.'

A Discussion was held on the last chapter of Wilhelm Reich's book *Character Analysis.*

The Society was invited by the Association for Child Psychiatry, where Dr. de Monchy gave a paper on the prophylaxis of neuroses.

During the autumn the Society organized a series of lectures on various psycho-analytical problems at the University. Attendance : 200. Great interest was manifested. There are signs that the authorities begin to be interested in psycho-analysis. Thus the official association of psychiatrists has suggested that panel patients should be granted subsidies to enable them to have psycho-analytic treatment. Professor Whitehorn (U.S.A.) was invited by the Swedish health authorities in autumn and read a number of papers on psycho-analytical lines to an audience of psychiatrists.

SWISS PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Psychoanalyse

(Secretary : H. Zulliger, Ittigen bei Bern.)

1946

Officers : Dr. P. Sarasin (President), Dr. M. Boss (Treasurer), Mr. H. Zulliger (Secretary), Dr. theol. and phil. O. Pfister and Dr. H. Flournoi (Members of Council).

Number of Members : At the end of 1945 : 30.

Elected to Membership during 1946 : Miss Anna Maerk, Professor Dr. Rudolf Brun, Dr. N. Béno.

Number of Members : at the end of 1946 : 33, of whom 21 are full Members.

Scientific Meetings

January 19. Dr. E. Blum : ' On Human Needs ' (Die Not des Menschen).

February 16. Dr. A. Kielholz : ' On Pathography and its Uses.'

March 23. Dr. Paul Reiwald : ' Masse und Vermassung.'

June 16. Jacques Berna : ' Case Histories of Two Juvenile Stammerers.'

September 21. Dr. Emil Walter : ' Systematic Comparison of the Concepts Involved in the Depth-Psychologies of Adler, Jung and Freud.'

October 19. Dr. A. Kielholz : ' Fables on Animals and Fabulous Animals.'

1947

Officers : Same as 1946.

Number of Members : Miss Anna Freud resigned membership. Dr. Elsa Blum-Sapas died in Russia. Dr. Charles Odier was elected Member.

Number of Members : at the end of 1947 : 32, of whom 20 are full Members.

Scientific Meetings

January 25. Dr. Paul Reiwald : ' Analysis of a Seven-Year-Old Murderer.'

March 1. Dr. Paul Parin : ' The War Neurosis of the Yugoslav People.'

March 29. Professor Dr. phil. E. Schneider : ' Fritz von Holstein, the Grey Eminence. A Psycho-Pathographic Investigation.'

April 26. Professor Dr. R. Brun : ' The Processes of Innervation in Neuroses.'

September 27. Dr. N. Béno : ' Névrose de Perfection.'

September 27. Mlles. J. Sauthier and R. Bertrand (of the Service médico-pédagogique de Malévoz) : ' Presentation of a Child Guidance Case.'

November 29. Dr. Emil Walter : ' Socio-psychological Investigations of the Culture of Alor (Report on the American doctrine of Kardiner and Linton).'

VIENNA PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Wiener Psychoanalytische Vereinigung

(Rathansstrasse 20, Vienna I.)

Officers : Mr. August Aichhorn (President), Dr. Otto Fleischmann (Secretary), Dr. Jokl (Training Secretary).

It is not possible to give reports on scientific meetings of the Society for the year 1947. Owing to the prevailing conditions it was necessary to re-establish the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society, which had been dissolved in 1938, at a time when the young members had not yet achieved their full scientific training. Their training is now being completed by fortnightly seminars of 2–3 hours each. These seminars are held by Drs. Jokl and Fleischmann and are concerned with the study of Freud's writings and with questions of technique.

External Activities of the Institute : A Child Guidance Centre ; Seminars for Child Guidance Workers of the Vienna County Council's Juvenile Department and for Kindergarten Workers ; introductory courses of lectures for educational workers of ' Jugend am Werk ' (an institution of the Vienna County Council for boys and girls between 14 and 18 years not in employment) and for educational workers in the State Grammar Schools ; lectures at Vienna University Extension Courses ; lectures within the training scheme for educationists in the holiday camps of the Austrian Trade Union for Apprentices.

Courses in Preparation : Courses for physicians and medical students, a course for journalists.

New Formations

THE SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS IN PRAGUE

(*Společnost pro studium psichoanalysy*)

(Jungmannova 3, Prague II.)

Report for the year 1946–47

Officers : Dr. Theodor Dosužkov (Chairman), Dr. Otakar Kučera (Secretary), Mr. Eugen Wiškovský (Treasurer).

Number of Members : 16.

The representatives of psycho-analytic treatment are Dr. Theodor Dosužkov and Dr. Otakar Kučera (both direct members of the International Psycho-Analytical Association). Pedagogic consultations are given by Mr. Eugen Wiškovský.

Public Lectures. A *Freud Seminar*, directed by Dr. Dosužkov, was held fortnightly (14 seminars in all) on Freud's *Studies on Hysteria* and his early papers on neuroses (1892–9). Attendance : 5 physicians, 22 medical students, 13 educationists, 18 students of the faculty of Education, 18 students of the Faculty of Social Science and laymen. The total number of hearers was 80.

Publications. Psychoanalytická rocenka 1947 (Psycho-Analytical Almanach 1947). Contents : Dr. Dosužkov ' Sigmund Freud 1856–1939 ' ; Dr. Osipov ' Man's Sex Life ' ; Dr. Kučera ' On Sublimation ' ; Dr. Vereščaka ' Czech Mythology ' ; Dr. Dosužkov ' Pavlov's Experimental Neuroses from the Psycho-Analytical Point of View ' ; Dr. Dosužkov ' The Fundaments and the Development of Psycho-Analysis '. Articles published in Czech medical journals by Dr. Dosužkov : ' Sigmund Freud ' and ' On the Delusion in Dismorphophobia ' (in *Časopis lékařů ceských*) and ' On Anxiety Neurosis ', followed by a detailed discussion and two replies from the author (in *Practicky lékar*) and a serial dictionary of psycho-analytic terms in the *Encyclopœdia of Medical Practitioners.*

Translations of psycho-analytic works are continued by Mr. Wiškovský and a group of collaborators. Volumes published during the year : Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Papers on the Theory of Sex and the Theory of Neuroses, Studies on Hysteria ;* Anna Freud, *Introduction to the Technique of Child Analysis.*

September–December 1947

The *Freud Seminar* for laymen and students took place twice monthly (5 seminars in all). Freud's *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* were discussed. A new series of seminars (once a month, 3 in all) was organized for physicians and scientists, which were held in Professor Dr. Mysliveček's Psychiatric University Clinic.

II. *REPORT OF THE MEETING OF EUROPEAN PSYCHO-ANALYSTS, AMSTERDAM*

May 24–27, 1947

The meeting was organized by the Dutch Psycho-Analytical Society. Immediately after the liberation the Society realized the necessity of contact with the colleagues in other European countries in order to get information of the conditions obtaining there. This plan was soon found to meet with ready acceptance and it was decided to organize an unofficial meeting of European psycho-analysts.

Eighty-nine psycho-analysts from various countries of Europe, viz. England, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland, met in Amsterdam during the Whitsun-week. It was regretted that the colleagues from Austria, Belgium and Italy were not able to attend the meeting, while the German colleagues, owing to travelling difficulties, arrived only after the Conference, though in time to meet many foreign psycho-analysts. No replies had been received from Norwegian and Danish colleagues.

Official receptions and other festivities were limited to a minimum in view of the difficult general conditions.

The Municipal authorities of Amsterdam received and addressed the members attending the meeting on the first day. A public dinner was organized at

Ouderkerk-on-Amstel following a boat trip there at the end of the meeting. This gathering offered opportunity for the final expression of the impressive unanimity prevailing from beginning to end of the meeting. Freud's words in a letter to a friend, 'Once I am no longer with you, you must stand fast together', gain increased significance for the future, and it may be hoped that this meeting which manifested the spirit of co-operation so clearly will prove a stimulant for the future.

First Scientific Meeting

Dr. J. Leuba (*Paris*). 'Psycho-Analysis and Psychotherapies.

The author discusses narco-analysis:

(1) The psychological investigation that may be anticipated from narco-analysis does not surpass in any respect that obtained by an expert psycho-analyst when using his technique in the right way.

(2) Therapeutic results, though being obtained in traumatic neuroses, where all methods, even those which have nothing to do with psychology, yield positive results, amount to absolutely nothing in neuroses of a solid structure.

(3) A sudden penetration into the repressed presents a grave danger in children, as experience has taught in Professor Heuyer's clinic. In Paris narco-analysis has had unexpected and favourable consequences of another kind. Psychiatrists have turned to analysis and consequently the most distinct and useful result has been that numerous doctors have been won over to psycho-analysis who would have hesitated to submit themselves to a didactic analysis.

Dr. S. H. Foulkes (*London*). 'Group Therapy and Psycho-Analysis.'

It has been shown that group-treatment, like psycho-analysis, is:

(1) A special method of approach.

(2) A mode of therapy.

(3) An instrument of scientific investigation.

It is the instrument of choice for the study of the dynamics of the group, a new science in which psychology and sociology meet.

In view of the importance of good relations between groups of all kinds, the relevance of such studies need hardly be stressed at the present time. Once again it may be the privilege of psycho-pathology to throw decisive lights on the social life of man in all its manifestations.

Dr. I. Herman (*Budapest*). 'Problems of Instincts.'

Such criteria of the instincts must be found which are based on biological facts.

Aggression is consistent with these criteria, death-instinct is not.

Several biological causes can be traced which intensify aggression in man. The psychic symptoms accompanying starvation are investigated.

The contrasting pair of instincts—clinging and searching—are demonstrated to be the propelling-force of anti-semitism.

As the nucleus of the death-instinct, a lethal-semilethal biological factor can be traced which is closely linked up with genitality.

The facts on which this assumption is founded include the latency period. The retardation of puberty, however, is a property common to all apes, so that only the latency period may be considered as specific to the human species whereas retarded puberty must not be regarded as such.

Dr. J. Bowlby (*London*). 'On Delinquency.'

An unprepared communication based on the author's paper 'Forty-four Juvenile Thieves: their Characters and House Life,' published in this Journal. 1944. Vol. XXV.

Second Scientific Meeting

Dr. W. Clifford M. Scott (*London*). 'Problems of Ego-Structure.'

The author discusses the problems with regard to the relationship of the Body-ego and Psychic-ego.

He concludes that more progress would be made if psycho-analysis were to attempt to view this division between the psychic-ego and the body-ego as symptomatic, as a symptom of splitting, which may not be ego-syntonic.

The author tries to get rid of the dynamics of this distinction. Case material is added and several aspects are discussed.

Dr. H. Christoffel (*Basle*). 'Super-Ego and Individuation' (A critical and developmental-psychological attempt).

For twenty-six years the super-ego has been considered—at least in psycho-analytic theory—as a heterogeneous and heteronomous product. The author stresses the other root of the super-ego, the autogenous and autonomous factor (seen by Freud forty-two years ago). He pays attention to Kant's 'Categorical Imperative' as an autogenous super-ego. The difficulties in individuation are often due to the heteronomous super-ego.

Dr. A. Stephen (*London*). 'Super-Ego and other Internal Objects.'

Paper published in this Journal. Vol. XXVIII, Part 2.

Dr. W. Hoffer (*London*). 'Mouth, Hand and Ego-Integration.'

In his investigation, the author develops the idea that the differentiation of the ego from the id shows itself on the infant's body surface, when in the service of the oral instinct, and for the sake of auto-erotic pleasure two sensations are aroused simultaneously—an oral and a tactle one—by finger-sucking. Such a situation does not arise

until the twelfth week when, quite intentionally and not reflexly, the hand is put into the mouth in order to relieve oral tension.

When entering the second year the infant has built up an oral-tactile concept of its own body and the world around it, and by this means it regulates, to a certain extent, its erotic and aggressive (active) instincts.

The findings of Gesell and Ilg and the author's own observations are mentioned.

Third Scientific Meeting

Dr. H. G. van der Waals (*Amsterdam*). 'Existentialism and Psycho-Analysis.'

With regard to the appearance of existential tendencies in modern psychiatry one has to observe that, praiseworthy though it may be to aim at an adequate anthropology as a basis of psycho-pathology, it is not to be expected that a result will be obtained thereby that holds good for every conception of the world. With the aid of Locke's untenable distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which has been the basis of physics for over a century, the author illustrates that a debatable point of departure is not necessarily an obstacle to the flourishing of an empirical science. Psycho-Analysis being an empirical science, shows this to a great extent.

The way in which Hume's doubt as to the validity of empirical science was answered in Kant's theory of knowledge, is also of interest to the psycho-analytically minded investigator, for to him it becomes obvious that, besides the problems of consciousness (which he learns to know as 'accidentally subjective'), there is also a problem relating to the question of how is it that man in consciousness may share in the 'generally valid objective'.

How Husserl tried to find an answer to this question, by means of his phenomenological researches, is discussed, as well as how his phenomenology, introduced by him as descriptive psychology, resulted in a philosophical method as *reine Wesensschau*, and as a foundation of a philosophy as 'strict science'. Nevertheless it is Heidegger rather than Husserl who a number of modern psychiatrists regard as being of special significance to psycho-pathology, because it is he who discusses the problems of human life in the more penetrating way.

The paper discusses principles of Heidegger's doctrine, how he endeavours, for example, by means of an analysis of the fundamental structure of the *being* (of *Dasein*) eventually to arrive at the conception of a connected structural entity of '*Dasein*'—existentiality—which would have an *a priori* significance because it would make possible such phenomena as 'guilt', 'conscience' and 'mood' in the last instance, and would thus make them comprehensible from the condition of '*Dasein*'. The revealing significance which 'mood' would have is, according to Heidegger, elucidated, and the conception of anxiety, which would reveal the *nothing* to man, is discussed.

It is pointed out, however, that Heidegger's findings do not touch upon any of the problems confronting the psycho-analyst every day arising from the anxiety of his patients. The ætiology of anxiety in an individual living of life does not enter into Heidegger's discussions. The central significance of anxiety in his system is borrowed from Kierkegaard who, in view of the fact that he was in all probability a severe case of manic-depressive psychosis, had a special predisposition to feelings of anxiety.

The paper goes on to deal with Heidegger's conceptions of 'conscience' and 'guilt', and it is pointed out that no matter what value one may attach to his findings, these in no way modify any of the facts revealed by psycho-analytic experience concerning feelings of guilt.

Sartre, as a second exponent of Existentialism, is then discussed, and there follows a summary of his doctrine of Being, and special mention is made of his conception of human freedom and of anxiety, revealing this freedom. Sartre has unwittingly but clearly demonstrated that the more neurotic an individual is, with the consequent increasing divergence of motive and action, the stronger is his tendency to develop anxiety.

The criticism of Sartre's conception of freedom may be left to philosophers; it should, however, be pointed out emphatically that his so-called freedom may be accompanied by all possible degrees of bondage in the psycho-analytic sense of the word. The fact that Sartre declines the 'postulate of the unconscious' should not lead us astray as 'conscious' certainly does not mean 'conscience'.

As regards Sartre's interesting design of an 'existential psycho-analysis'—modelled on Freud's empirical psycho-analysis, but directed towards the determination of the original 'choice', as yet, however, 'not having found his Freud'—it is safe to admit that it is within the bounds of possibility to imagine something far more excellent than empirical psycho-analysis provided that it is forever remembered that 'better is often the enemy of good'.

Finally, in reply to yet another critic of psycho-analysis, Binswanger, a representative of the *Daseinsanalytische Forschungsrichtung*, who demands an estimate of the fundamental significance of Heidegger's doctrine at its true value, let it be observed that it does not seem advisable to introduce a philosophical system as an *a priori* principle—a system scarcely understood even by professional philosophers and severely criticized by many of them—into psycho-pathology, which should be an empirical science.

Here it is possible to draw a parallel between the development of physics and that of psycho-

analysis, for as far as the development of the latter is concerned it, too, is indebted to a continuous clinging to a methodological principle, which proved to be useful at the outset, and has repeatedly shown its usefulness in the psychic reality it revealed. When phenomenological data are worded in concepts, it is inevitable that simplification takes place. When psycho-analysis is accused of its conceptions being inadequate, at most this may be true of its theory, but not of its practical aspect and results. There are many psycho-analysts who are not wholly satisfied with some parts of the analytic theory. But the *Daseinsanalytische Forschungsrichtung*, however, runs the risk of throwing to the winds the most important empirical findings of psycho-analysis in its search for adequate conceptions.

Miss Anna Freud (*London*). ' Transformation of Instinct in Early Childhood.'

Introduction : Psycho-analytic child psychology and its application to the upbringing of normal and abnormal children and adolescents.

Part I : The development of psycho-analytic education. The means of education. The quantitative point of view. The qualitative point of view.

Part II : Transformation of instinct and the influence of the environment. Transformation of instinct as a result of conflict.

Part III : Experiments in education.

Fourth Scientific Meeting

Dr. A. Lampl de Groot (*Amsterdam*) and Dr. E. Glover (*London*) : theme of discussion ' Basic Mental Concepts.'

A parallel can be drawn between the developmental processes in id, ego and super-ego.

The drives, though highly influenced by environmental circumstances, develop in a biologically prescribed way (oral, anal, phallic and genital phase).

In the ego a sort of autonomous development (maturation) is observed as well.

Piaget's researches show a developmental process of the intelligence from birth on (*La naissance de l'intelligence chez l'enfant*).

Intelligence is the ' instrument ' with which the ego works in its function of exploring the outer world.

The ego-functions (perception, the building-up of memory traces, control of motility, reality testing and synthetic function) run through a developmental process out of an inborn ego-core (nucleus) as well. Individual differences, normal as well as pathological, arise through interference of that autonomous development with influences of the outer world and id.

The super-ego, though appearing only after some years, shows also a development from its forerunners (e.g. sense of guilt developing from anxiety). Inherited mechanisms, as f.i. introjection (identification) and turning of aggression towards the self, play an important rôle.

The author thinks it impossible yet to decide whether there are specific super-ego mechanisms, inherited or not.

The fact that some of the ego functions develop from birth on (e.g. perception) does not permit us to identify that primitive shape of the ego with the ego of the older child or the adult, in which all functions are already established.

Likewise one has to distinguish sharply between the super-ego and its forerunners. (One also makes a difference between the new-born infant and the fertilized ovum out of which the infant has developed.) In this way the author fully agrees with Dr. Glover : distinction between early mental mechanisms and later complex mental processes is absolutely necessary.

Dr. Edward Glover (*London*). ' Basic Mental Concepts.'

Originally Freud's postulation of basic mental concepts was a prerequisite of the development of psycho-analytical theory. Their formulation provided also an excellent discipline by which later ' theoretical reconstructions ' could be controlled. Recent attempts to re-construct early stages of mental development have not been subjected to this form of mental discipline.

Two reasons for this :

(*a*) Neglect of Freud's earlier metapsychological formulations, which in fact were not superseded by his later differentiations of the mental apparatus in terms of ego-development.

(*b*) Over-sanguine expectations, that the end-products observed in the study of psychotics and infants would solve the problems of early mental function. Fallacies and errors arising from these assumptions.

Illustrative discussion : primary and secondary processes ; the formation of the pcs. ' thing ' and ' word-presentations ' ; phantasy, preverbal or otherwise, early mental mechanisms, the necessity for distinction between earlier dynamic and later structural aspects of introjection, contrast of the ' embryonic ' (formative) phases of mental development and the functional phases, that operate from the end of the second year, the climax in infantile mental development : the Œdipus phase, contrast of early and later affective development, anxiety and guilt.

Conclusions

(*a*) Hypothetical reconstruction should be subject to almost as stringent control as the formulation of basic mental concepts.

(*b*) The most promising (yet most neglected) field for clinical investigation and for corroboration of hypotheses is represented by the so-called ' psychopathic ' states.

Fifth Scientific Meeting

Dr. D. W. Winnicott (*London*). 'Clinical Observations Illustrating the Use of Environment in Analytic Work.'

Dr. Winnicott, giving an unprepared communication, spoke of the way in which a child's environment plays a part in the cure of emotional illness. He illustrated his remarks by two cases, one of a child not in analysis, and the other of a child having psycho-analytic treatment.

The first was that of a girl of six who had developed a severe regression following the coincidence of two kinds of emotional strain. While she was only just managing her reactions to the coming wedding of her aunt, she was told a lurid story about the death of a man. Her repressed rivalry with the aunt's fiancé made her unable to tolerate the story and its details of blood-spilling, and she became seriously disturbed, with the development of psychotic regression.

The management of this case needed simply giving support to the natural family reaction to the illness of the one member. The parents and the other children, both older and younger, had joined in creating an artificial environment that suited the ill child, an enclosed social circle, with the acting out of the idea that all within was friendly or 'good', while all outside was persecutory or 'bad'. No one was allowed to come to the door; and when it was pointed out to the authorities what was happening, even the social workers agreed to keep away. The child found within this circle a small area around the mother's person in which she could be herself, and gradually this area enlarged, to include the whole house. In time (a matter of months) the family was able gradually to relax its paranoid organization. Eventually the child lost her psychotic state, recovered from her regression, and gradually became able to take her usual place at school again.

This not unusual case introduced, Dr. Winnicott held, the whole problem of the use made in psycho-analytic treatment of the child's family. In many cases the home was good enough to play its part, and then there existed two possible techniques, the one making use of the home and the other working the way that is forced on the analyst in the case where no good home exists.

The second case was of a little girl of three whose analysis was greatly helped in the early stages by the fact that the mother was in the next room; as the child became less suspicious through the interpretations given in the analytic room, she regularly went in to cash in on the newly-acquired capacity for affectionate contact with her mother. The mother was greatly strengthened by this and warmed to her child who had hitherto been lacking in affection. Eventually the child played out getting into her mother's body, getting inside her coat, getting herself covered by a rug, sucking her thumb and plucking at her mother's soft clothes. This wakened in the mother the maternal feelings so strongly that she left her professional life and had a new baby, which she managed much more warmly in the initial stages than she had been able to do with her first, the patient.

The analysis could have been carried out with the mother unavailable, though it would have taken longer, but in that case the mother would have missed something valuable.

Dr. Winnicott suggested that the theory of analysis was not altered by this procedure. There was no essential difference between the analysis of adults and that of children, and children develop a true transference neurosis (this view seeming to contrast with that of Anna Freud expressed in her book *The Psycho-Analytical Treatment of Children*). Nevertheless, when a suitable environment existed, the transference could be (as it were) shared for a time. The analysis of children was in this way a useful reminder to the analyst of adults that the relations, friends, lovers, pets (etc.) of patients played a vital part in analyses, allowing the acting out that the analyst did not seek or permit in the transference situation. One of the difficulties in the analysis of the more psychotic patients was that these claimed the right to act out in the transference situation itself, and in staking their claim might refuse to let other present-day figures act instead of the analyst.

Dr. A. C. Oerlemans (*Amsterdam*). 'On Determinants of Human Behaviour.'

The author discusses Róheim's 'Die psychoanalytische Deutung des Kulturbegriffs' and the historical-materialist concept of history.

Stress is laid upon the concept of 'entity' in modern biology.

Human behaviour is the result of a creative interaction of the entity man and the social environment.

Team work of sociologists and psycho-analysts is a necessity.

Dr. Michael Balint (*London*). 'Genital Love.'

Genital satisfaction is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition of love.

'Genital love' is much more than gratitude for, or contentment about, the partner being available for genital satisfaction.

It is, in fact, a fusion of two disagreeing elements, genital satisfaction and pre-genital tenderness.

One of the most important tasks of every education is to bring about this fusion, i.e to teach man to preserve certain infantile traits in his love-life.

Thus man is not only anatomically a neotenic embryo, but all his life he remains infantile in relation both to his parents and to his sexual partner.

Dr. Th. Dosuzkov (*Prague*). 'Pavlov's Experimental Neuroses from the Psycho-Analytic Point of View.'

Regarding the analysis of experimental neuroses (Pavlov's school), the author draws the following conclusions: (1) Pavlov's experimental neuroses entail a wider concept than that of human neuroses (they cover parapraxes and mistakes of various kinds as well). (2) Out of Pavlov's experiments only two correspond to the human neuroses, viz. the traumatic and the actual neuroses. These are the observations of neurotic behaviour after flood and Mrs. Petrov's second experiment. The other experimental neuroses of Pavlov's school do not correspond to human neuroses (psycho-neuroses). (3) Human psycho-neuroses are more complex than the animal experimental neuroses of Pavlov's school. Some physiological mechanisms shown in Pavlov's experiments are valid for some psycho-neurotic phenomena.

Dr. I. Schönberger (*Budapest*). 'Disorders of the Ego in Wartime.' Read by Dr. Margaret Little.

We can state that the effect of immense quantities of hatred and destruction accompanying war, will cause depersonalization, consequently the peace ego is lost.

In adaptation to the circumstances, a new war-ego will come into existence. Effects favourable for the feeling of reconstructional (restitution) omnipotence will render it possible for the war-ego to form a new peace-ego.

It is this that will restore the healthy equilibrium and is the psychological significance of reconstruction.

Nevertheless, this equilibrium is no longer the same, for a trauma that has once occurred cannot be undone by any reconstruction, even though the feeling of reconstructional omnipotence connected with the actual reconstruction might fill the individual and the community with increased self-confidence.

A common trauma and a common collective recovery that is reconstructional will produce new egos which will, of necessity, differ from those which suffered neither the trauma nor felt the effects of recovery. These points of view are illustrated by case material, and to some extent, literature on depersonalization and war-neuroses is discussed.

P. J. v. d. Leeuw.

MELBOURNE INSTITUTE FOR PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

(111, Collins St., Melbourne, C.1, Victoria, Australia.)

1947

Officers: Dr. A. R. Phillips (Chairman), Dr. R. G. Ellery (Secretary), Dr. F. W. Graham (Acting Secretary and Director of the Clinic), Dr. C. Lazar-Geroe (Training Secretary).

Members of the Board: Dr. N. R. Albiston, Dr. P. G. Dane, Dr. Ernest Jones, Dr. G. A. Reynolds, Dr. R. C. Winn.

Scientific Meetings

August 30–*September* 5. Second Australian Interstate Psycho-Analytical Meeting in Melbourne. The meeting was attended by psycho-analysts and candidates in training from Sydney, Adelaide and Melbourne.

August 30. Opening address by Dr. R. C. Winn. Dr. A. R. Phillips: 'Welcome to Interstate Visitors.' A. L. Meadows: 'Freud's Empiricism.' Dr. C. Lazar-Geroe: 'The Differences in Anna Freud's and Melanie Klein's Technique of Child Analysis.' Dr. H. Southwood: 'Some Considerations of the Part of Suggestion in the Analytic Cure.' Dr. R. A. Phillips: 'Two Cases of Sex Offenders (reports to the Court, and their analytic aspects).' Discussion on Penalty.

September 1. Dr. C. Lazar-Geroe: 'New Analytic Concepts of Melanie Klein' (Revue of the Kleinian theory, first part). Dr. H. Southwood: 'The Problem of Identification in Hysterical and Psychotic Depression.' A. L. Meadows: 'Some Aspects of the Clinical Treatment and Psychological Research of Juvenile Delinquency.'

September 2. Dr. F. W. Graham: 'Transference Problems in the Analysis of a Compulsion Neurosis (continued report from the 1946 Interstate Meeting).' Dr. R. C. Winn: 'Exposition for Discussion of the Problems of (*a*) Negative Transference, (*b*) Passivity of the Analyst, (*c*) "Counselling Therapy", (*d*) Prevention of Neurosis through Early Analysis or Education?' Dr. H. Southwood: 'Technical Problems in the Analysis of a Hysterical Depression (continued report from 1946 Interstate Meeting).'

September 3. Dr. R. C. Winn: 'Parts of an Analysis of an Epileptic.' Further discussion on Dr. Southwood's case.

September 4. Dr. C. Lazar-Geroe: 'Revue of the Theory of Melanie Klein (second part).' Discussion on technical problems, opened by Drs. Southwood, Graham, S. Fink.

September 5. Dr. C. Lazar-Geroe: 'Critical Revue of Melanie Klein's Theory of the "Depressive Position".' General Discussion on various problems of theory and practice.

Public Lectures held at the Institute. Dr. P. G. Dane: 'Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis for Medical Students.' (*May-July*, 10 lectures. Attendance: 8–10 students.) Dr. C. Lazar-Geroe: 'Changes in the Psycho-Analytical Theory of Instincts.' This lecture was held before an audience of 50, composed of members of our study circle and invited guests, to farewell Dr. Dane on the occasion of his leaving for overseas for a year. Dr. C. Lazar-Geroe: 'The Destructive

Instinct in the Child.' Lecture for parents and pedagogues. Attendance : 25.

Lectures held outside the Institute. Dr. C. Lazar-Geroe : ' Prediction in Psychic Development (a Psycho-Analytic Study) ' given before a combined meeting of the British Psychological Society and the Rorschach Society. (Attendance : 40.) Dr. C. Lazar-Geroe : ' Psycho-Analysis as Therapy ', held at the Psychology School of the Melbourne University for the 2nd-year students of Psychopathology (by invitation of the University). Following this lecture the Institute invited the class to a ' Discussion Night ', which took place at the Institute. The class comprised 40 members. A. L. Meadows gave addresses at the Presbyterian Ladies College (by invitation of the Parents' Association) : ' Individual Differences ', ' The Gifted Child ', ' The Retarded Child '. Attendance : 60. Dr. F. W. Graham : ' The Freudian Concept of Sex ', lecture given to an Adult Education Class of the University Extension Board (attendance : 35) and ' Psychology of the Mystical Experience (a Psycho-Analytic Study) ', lecture given to the Rorschach Society (attendance : 18). Dr. A. R. Phillips : ' Psychopathic Personality ', lecture given to the Rorschach Society (attendance : 20).

Reports on Society activities from the Boston Psycho-Analytic Society, the Washington Psycho-Analytic Society, the Hungarian Psycho-Analytical Society, the Indian Psycho-Analytical Society, the Italian Psycho-Analytical Society, the Palestine Psycho-Analytical Society and the Sao Paulo (Brazil) Psycho-Analytical Society have not been received up to date and will appear in a future issue.

III. *CLINICAL ESSAY PRIZE*

Members and Associate Members of the International Psycho-Analytical Association are reminded that competitors for the Clinical Essay Prize must send in their work to the Hon. Secretary of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 96 Gloucester Place, London, W.1, by March 31, 1949.

The conditions governing the competition are the following.

A prize not exceeding £20 is offered.

Requirements for the Essay

The essay shall consist of a clinical record of a case investigated by psycho-analytical methods. It should clearly illustrate the events and changes in the mental life of the patient and their relation to external environment. In awarding the prize, the Judges will pay attention to acuity of observation and the clearness with which the facts are stated. If the writer wishes to draw theoretical conclusions, he must bear in mind the necessity of making the evidence for such conclusions carry conviction. It is recommended that the length of the essay should not exceed twenty thousand words.

Date of Sending in Essays : Language : Format, etc.

Essays must be submitted on or before the thirty-first day of March in any year, in the English language. They must be typescript on quarto paper with ample left-hand margin. They must be in triplicate and be sent to the Hon. Secretary of the Institute. All copies of essays submitted become *ipso facto* the property of the Institute (or its successor) while it has the appointment of the Trustees.

No Award

If no essay is submitted of merit worthy of a prize in any year, no award shall be made for the year.

Joint Award

In the event of the Judges regarding the essays of two or more competitors of equal merit, they may divide the prize-money available for distribution as aforesaid into equal parts and award it to such competitors jointly.

Eligibility

Any person of either sex, who is not a member or a past-member of the Board of the Institute, shall be eligible for the competition.

Tenure

The prize shall be given to the writer of the best essay in the opinion of the Judges submitted in any year, but the prize may be awarded to the same person twice, provided that he submits a second essay of sufficient merit in a later competition, and that the prize shall not be awarded more than twice to the same person.

Title

The competitor to whom the prize is awarded in any year may be called the Clinical Prizeman for that year.

Copyright

The copyright of any essay to which a prize is awarded shall become the property of the Institute. Should the author wish to quote it in whole or in part, the Institute shall not unreasonably withhold its consent. The Institute shall not publish such essay in whole or in part in English or in translation in England or abroad without the author's written consent during his life-time. Other persons who may wish to quote extracts from any prize essay shall obtain the written consent of the Institute or its successor, and of the author given during his life-time.

R. D. Usher,
Hon. Secretary,
Institute of Psycho-Analysis.